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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines rhetorical conditions and internet-mediated
communication strategies that open and close dialogue between individuals with diverse
and conflicting worldviews. I illustrate this tension through sacred-secular interactions in
college composition classrooms and online environments, positing that navigating
conflict between these discourses—namely those espoused by religiously committed
students and public university instructors—often requires stepping outside of adversarial
communication frameworks. This project makes a case for models of civic engagement
that use more deliberative rhetorical approaches prioritizing empathy over defensiveness
and understanding before persuasion. To develop these non-adversarial communication
approaches for the composition classroom, I look to participatory media for insights and
study the negotiation strategies of Christian and atheist YouTube users who leverage the
affordances of the video medium, internet logics, and invitational rhetorical strategies to
engage ideological differences in their respective online communities. Through mixed
methods research involving in-depth interviews with five YouTube vloggers,
netnographic study of over 3,000 videos, and statistical analysis of 76,000+ user
comments, Coding Christianity finds that perspective-taking in conflict-ridden
environments can happen between netizens when content creators opt out of “flame
wars” and, instead, explicitly model critical openness and charitable listening to
perceived “others.” I ultimately suggest that sacred-secular tension in both academic and
digital environments be used, not diffused, to negotiate conflicting values and engage in
rigorous, civil dialogues.
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PRELUDE
In his book Teaching as Believing, Chris Anderson posits that “ideas always grow
out of experience, that what we think is grounded in who we are” (4). This assertion
prompts me to note my own lived experience—to position myself in relation to the issues
I will later identify at the crossroads of composition pedagogy, religion, and digital
rhetoric. Thus, let’s start at the very beginning.

Fig. 0.1: My brother and I in our Saturday best

I was born into a Protestant Christian home, inheriting the faith practices and
beliefs that my religious community observed rather conservatively. Jesus was my
“personal friend,” whose Father I prayed to before meals and in church pews (White 64).
My “church family,” who also comprised my school environments as I attended Christian
institutions through college, nurtured principles that emphasized the importance of the
Bible, described as a “sword” that I could use to defend myself from my own and others’
“carnal mind [which] is enmity against God” (New King James Version, Eph. 6:17; Rom.
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8:7). My teachers and peers lovingly tendered social and spiritual belonging in exchange
for my participation in “doing unto others” (Matt. 7:12), acts of goodness that we all
agreed should be motivated not through worldly accolades but through conviction from
the Holy Spirit to save the lost. The first twenty-six years of my life were actively
dedicated to these efforts to bring wayward souls back to the fold of Christianity, to “go
ye therefore” and spread the Gospel message to the world (Matt. 28:19), to evangelize on
behalf of my denomination that salvation through Christ alone was both imminent and a
worthy pursuit. I held this salvific motive as my highest aim in life.
Within this framework, the sacred and the secular were almost always mutually
exclusive, especially in the classroom. I attended Christian schools through college,
which operated within the nonnegotiable narrative of a loving Creator God, fallen
humanity, and redemptive Son. My formative educational experiences centered spiritual
growth wherein Bible-based beliefs and values became foundational—not ancillary—
principles to course curriculum. I frequently positioned the development of cognitive,
academic skills as a defense against “external” ideologies that would inevitably produce
tension in my belief system once tested beyond the comforts of my Christian bubble. My
apologetics-based perspective seemed to create a self-sufficient, deliberative tapestry of
belief.
My entrance into secular academe by way of graduate school offered a radically
different scene. From my reading of Michel Foucault, I learned the anatomy of
Discourse, which called my religion “no longer much more than the shimmering of a
truth about to be born in its own eyes” (228). The gist I got from Friedrich Nietzsche
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similarly claimed that “truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what
they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power” (47). Moreover,
my elementary understanding of Jacques Derrida taught me that “God”—a term—was
not off limits from differánce, that ever-elusive play of signification that continuously
disrupted a center. The language of the secular university identified and lifted what
appeared to be a blindfold, leaving me staring not at the shadows in Plato’s cave but the
glaring light where philosophers—the “real” scholars—dwelt. In an effort to follow their
lead, I ran from the closed interpretive system, shedding the unnecessary ontological fat
that called “God” the Way, the Truth, the Life. I leaned out my epistemologies until they
included only tools of deconstruction. I thought that I had a lifetime of dismantling to do.
Disillusionment and pain welcomed me on my journey in the philosophers’ sun
and became close companions. You see, the process of deconstruction was not just the
undoing of ideologies that no longer served my academics; it was the loss of a personal
Friend who loved me unconditionally, the letting go of a life mission that guided my
thoughts and actions, the realization that I was becoming a stranger to the communities
that raised me. I cast off from the shores of certainty into a frightening unknown.
This project consists of field notes I have collected on this trek, presented here as
a dissertation and dedicated to the student with their eye on the sea.
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CHAPTER ONE
CHRISTIANITIES: BEYOND THE CONFLICT NARRATIVE
“Christianity is under tremendous siege, whether we want to talk about it or we don’t want to talk
about it […] I’ll tell you one thing: I get elected president, we’re gonna be saying ‘Merry Christmas’
again; just remember. And by the way, Christianity will have power without having to form because if
I’m there, you don’t need anybody else. You’re gonna have somebody representing you very, very
well. Remember that.” —Donald Trump, 2016, campaign rally in Sioux Center, Iowa
“Jesus was not brought down by atheism and anarchy. He was brought down by law and order allied
with religion, which is always a deadly mix. Beware of those who claim to know the mind of God and
who are prepared to use force, if necessary, to make others conform. Beware of those who cannot tell
God’s will from their own.” —Barbara Brown Taylor, 1998, “The Perfect Mirror”

Introduction
The Problem: Stuck in the Conflict Narrative
I believe in a glimmer of hope, one that is difficult to see amidst an increasingly
bleak and hostile backdrop in the United States involving religion, namely Christianity.
Catching a glimpse of this hope first requires surveying the foxholes of conflict, which is
where we begin. The tension reverberating in the above epigraphs reeks of war
metaphors. Each portrays Christianity at odds with a perceived Other, whether secularists
arguing against “Merry Christmas” or an authoritarian iteration of itself battling a more
progressive theology. We see manifestations of this clash happen in the secular university
classroom where religiously committed students, especially Christian-identifying, bring
their ideations of big-T Truth into coursework and resist any pedagogical attempts to
critique or, in the very least, critically engage their assumptions (Downs; Goodburn;
Yagelski). The same occurs in online space as netizens seek to express their respective
positions of faith but cultivate intense vitriol when diverse and divergent perspectives
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intersect (Theobald; Pihlaja, “Christians”). Additionally, the mobilization and general
conflation of conservative politics with fundamentalist strains of Christianity work to
further entrench assumptions that religion is synonymous with bigotry and is hungry for
power (Whitehead and Scheitle). Operating in these sites and within these perceptions,
civil discourse and speaking across difference seems near-impossible when it comes to
religion, which proves problematic for students and instructors grappling with and
negotiating meaning in the classroom, for online participants creating new meaning and
forming digital enclaves, and for rhetoricians seeking more deliberative and productive
modes of civic engagement.
This dilemma speaks to what composition scholar Phillip Marzluf calls the
“conflict narrative,” which he identifies as a “teaching genre” in the secular university
that produces reductive and binding tropes of teachers and students when faith-based
writing appears on the scene. He notes that within this narrative, there’s typically a
“secular, liberal” instructor-antagonist who will “ridicule or reject religious expression”
in order to uphold a leftist ideology (“Religion” 267). This, in turn, produces one of two
responses from the protagonist, who is usually a fundamentalist Christian and/or
conservative student: bullheadedness or surrender. The former plays out in a drama akin
to the God’s Not Dead Christian film franchise, whose thesis, explains film critic Alissa
Wilkinson, “is that Christians and Christianity are under attack in America, and that the
way to fight back is through exercising First Amendment rights, mostly in educational
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settings.” 1 The difference between the film and its offscreen counterpart is in the
denouement: the latter hosts no scripted conversion story on the part of the educator—no
“aha!” moment that God is real. The student typically capitulates, choosing to relegate
religion to the private sphere and simply go through the motions to keep the “liberal”
teacher placated and their own worldview intact (Perkins, “A Radical”). Again, the
outcome is neither raised consciousness nor mutual understanding; rather, we have
further ideological separation between the secular and the sacred.
When the religious writer’s intended audience is no longer a secular teacher but is
a collection of avatars online, the conflict narrative only intensifies, particularly on
platforms like YouTube. John Paolillo’s 2008 analysis of YouTube’s core themes shows
religion accounting for the second largest thematic cluster of information, and Mike
Thelwall et al.’s 2012 study of user commenting behaviors reveals that religion was “the
biggest trigger of discussion” on the platform at the time of their data collection (616).
Examining these interactions ethnographically, Simon Theobald observes that when
YouTube users, primarily video bloggers or “vloggers,” approach their audiences with
religious motivations, their assertions are typically “diatribes” that reveal that “their
authors are poorly versed in the tenants of other religions” (336). Additionally, continues
Theobald, religiously affiliated vloggers often “claim that they have a monopoly on truth,

1

Politically conservative organizations like Turning Point USA rely on a similar conflict narrative that
accuses higher education of compromising “freedom” and “first-amendment rights” for a liberal agenda.
The Professor Watchlist, for example, exists to “expose and document college professors who discriminate
against conservative students and advance leftist propaganda in the classroom,” cautioning “students,
parents, and alumni” against these alleged enemies of free speech (“About Us”). Steve Kolowich’s “State
of Conflict” piece in The Chronicle of Higher Education, along with This American Life’s “My Effing First
Amendment,” speak to identical themes of “conservative students” and “liberal professors” who hurl
descriptors like “fascist” and “radical” at each other and fight for their respective in-groups.
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and that their particular interpretation of their faith is the only acceptable one” (337).
Thus, conversations centered around religion on YouTube are seldom peaceful or
charitable to other perspectives, and community typically forms over a drive to protect
the in-group and further marginalize the out-group. Stephen Pihlaja finds this especially
within Christian-based YouTube exchanges. He notes Christians taking their offline
readings of scripture to wield as a weapon in online YouTube conversations or placing
value judgments on other Christians’ online assertions of faith in order to determine
whether they are “good,” credible Christians or not (“Christians”; “What About”). Users
often establish clear binaries—true versus false, worthy versus unworthy, good versus
bad.
The ubiquity and persistence of extremist politics both on and offline work to
further embolden binary thinking and us-versus-them mentalities, especially as they
relate to Christianity. In their 2019 analysis of 76 million YouTube videos, Paolillo et al.
found a significant presence of conspiracy theory videos, some of which were linked to
Christian themes such as the apocalypse. These ideologies often rely on and foment a
distrust of science, cast blame and claim victimhood, and idolize charismatic personas
who proffer “the truth,” not through facts but by way of demonizing the other side
(Finlayson). Shaheed N. Mohammed notes this especially of flat-Earth YouTube
channels that not only exceed the quantity of round-Earth content on the platform but also
use Christian scriptures and doctrines as evidence that our world is not a globe and that
organizations like NASA are actively working to obscure the truth. Other studies show
Christianity invoked in modern conspiracy-motivated antisemitism on YouTube
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(Allington and Joshi; Brittingham), in support of Donald Trump’s presidency as a
fulfillment of prophecy (Berry), and in justifying and propagating misinformation online
during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (Bruns et al.). As Daniel Darling
describes in his chapter on online conspiracy theories and Christianity in A Way with
Words, “in the cut-and dried world of conspiracy, you are either with the conspirators as
part of a cover-up or you are on the side of the angels who believe it” (111). Christianity
seems to be the ideal partner in crime to radical agendas that feed off of exclusion.
In the offline realm, analogous lines of exclusionary thinking persist particularly
when Christianity precipitates national identity. In her 2020 New York Times article
“‘Christianity Will Have Power,’” Elizabeth Dias notes that a common refrain by Trumpsupporting citizens is that the United States began as a Christian nation, and key to
maintaining the values of a “Christian society” is by voting individuals into power who
will “stand up for Christianity.” In their book Taking America Back for God, Andrew
Whitehead and Samuel Perry call this conflation “Christian nationalism,” which they
define as
a cultural framework that blurs distinctions between Christian identity and
American identity, viewing the two as closely related and seeking to
enhance and preserve their union. It is undergirded by identification with a
conservative political orientation (though not necessarily a political party),
Bible belief, premillennial visions of moral decay, and divine sanction for
conquest. Finally, its conception of morality centers exclusively on fidelity
to religion and fidelity to the nation. (15, my emphases)
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As seen in this description, Christianity operates as an agent shaping a political identity
that both anticipates and defines itself according to the conflict narrative; in fact, the
basic premise that Christian nationalists forward, explain Whitehead and Perry, is that
there are two forces “at war in the United States: biblical and secular humanist” (110).
Thus, preservation of a State prone to moral decay via secularism occurs by rallying the
troops, so to speak—through religiously motivated conquest and fidelity to God and
nation. Whitehead and Perry argue that this frame positions “Christian language and
symbols” as a means to “demarcate and defend group boundaries and privileges,” which
are lines typically drawn around beliefs that promote “nativism, white supremacy,
patriarchy, and heteronormativity, along with divine sanction for authoritarian control
and militarism” (87; 10). Once again, Christianity becomes both fuel and vehicle for
exclusion and conflict, using discursive means to build its defense and wage its offense.
Needless to say, the terms “Christian” and “Christianity” are loaded, allied to
ideologies, practices, and people groups that seem to default to more combative and
marginalizing approaches. By way of James Morone, Sharon Crowley notes in Toward a
Civil Discourse that “one line of distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ commonly used in
America has always had a religious coloring” (20). Considering this characterization, it is
no wonder that, according to a 2016 study conducted by the Barna Group, the public’s
perception of Christians in the United States is increasingly negative. “The most
contentious issues,” explains research director David Kinnaman, “are the ways in which
religious conviction gets expressed publicly, but the findings illustrate that a wide range
of actions, even beliefs, are now viewed as extremist by large chunks of the population”
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(“Five Ways”). These perceptions are reminiscent of the just wars and acts of “sanctified”
Christian violence that have metastasized under the guise of righteous proselytizers
throughout history (Kehoe; Wren; Romero). Thus, contemporary forms of Christianity in
general and Christian evangelism in particular appear to be going backward in time and
retreating inward in ideology. Membership numbers are also receding. A 2013 study by
the Barna Group traces a pronounced decline in Christian evangelism, with those
persisting on the front lines being perceived as intolerant. Moreover, a 2019 Pew
Research Center report finds a 12% decrease in the number of Christian-identifying
adults in the United States, a number down from 77% in 2009. In the same time span, the
religiously unaffiliated have grown from 17% to 26%, represented by individuals across
generations, races and ethnicities, and political parties.2 According to a 2020 Pew report,
the general assumption among these groups, particularly “white evangelicals, Jews, and
atheists,” aligns once again with the well-worn narrative: they are “more likely than other
groups to see conflict between their own religious beliefs and mainstream American
culture” (Pew, “Views”). We are exactly where we began—stuck in the conflict
narrative.
Conjecture and Methods
Dear reader, I need a glimmer of hope, and I assume you do, too. In this
dissertation, I propose that the hope emerges not through a deus ex machina but within
the very foxholes of conflict surveyed above. It requires us to feel the ground beneath our

Pew notes that the most pronounced growth in religious “nones,” while identifiable across diverse
demographics, is seen among young adults and Democrats (Pew, “In U.S.”).
2
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feet—that, as thinkers like Frederick Douglass, Bishop Stephen Cottrell, and Krista
Ratcliffe assert, to understand, one must first “stand under”—and to continue digging, not
to become further entrenched but to excavate earth that nurtures more than just strife.
Such excavation involves what Elizabeth Vander Lei calls renovation, or “valuing what is
present and seeking to improve it, over deciding to demolish it and build anew” (90).
Within this framework, tension radiating from the conflict narrative neither disappears
nor goes unacknowledged. Instead, it becomes a tool for renovation. As Vander Lei and
bonnie lenore kyburz explain in Negotiating Religious Faith in the Composition
Classroom, the hope, especially for religious students in secular learning environments, is
“not that they alter what they believe but that they learn to use tension between faith
(their own or that of others) and academic inquiry as a way of learning more and learning
better” (8). Positioning tension in this way, as I will demonstrate in this project, helps
establish a more productive configuration between people of faith and the communication
strategies they, their communities, and secular-minded individuals use. Put simply, it
moves us beyond the conflict narrative.
To pursue a more constructive use of tension, I look to a site that may be
considered the antithesis of productive dialogue: YouTube. Though many often reduce
the platform to a host of internet drivel or a medium unable to facilitate deliberative
discourse due to corporate structures and emphasis on entertainment value (Hess), I argue
that YouTube not only has the capacity to foster deliberative dialogue but also offers
rhetorical affordances that create opportunities for empathy and recognition of difference
through affective user performances and innovative uses of rhetorical strategies. Digital
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media enable the use of not only text-based communication modes but also images and
sounds, which, as I will later show, can amplify less inflammatory and more collaborative
compositional practices. Additionally, YouTube represents a public that is not dissimilar
to the university writing classroom, offering analogous roles for both students and
teachers. Particularly in exchanges between Christian and atheist video bloggers, or
“vloggers,” we see a similar conflict narrative play out between the sacred and secular
but on a much larger scale and with additional variables and subjectivities. For example,
in addition to the teacher-student dynamic that exists between vloggers and their
subscribers, we also have internet trolls and bots, experts and amateurs, activists and
naysayers, fiery video responses, and endless user comments, all of which contribute
meaning and provoke unpredictably diverse understandings.
Through an IRB-approved study examining the channels of two Christian and
three atheist YouTube vloggers, I investigate these additional factors through text
analysis, in-depth interviews, and longitudinal observations. These processes characterize
netnography, a methodology coined and developed by Robert Kozinets in 1995 that uses
social media data to qualitatively investigate “the telling of stories, sharing of beliefs,
passing along of powerful images and media” in an effort to “(re)connect meaning” to
what might be otherwise seen as “regular” and “ordinary” (Kozinets 134). I argue that the
meaning embedded in YouTube interactions between participants in this study resonates
with Gregory Ulmer’s theory of electracy, postmodern theology, and scholarship in
rhetorical empathy and invitational rhetoric, which all seek a critical openness to and
collaboration between traditionally opposed perspectives by positioning both the
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individual and pathos as essential planes to carry and cultivate meaning. These theories
also demonstrate an awareness of difference that goes beyond passive acknowledgement
and, instead, propels the individual or group to act, create, and participate in more civicminded (and potentially less vitriolic) ways. I look to Jeff Ringer’s Vernacular Christian
Rhetoric and Civic Discourse: The Religious Creativity of Evangelical Student Writers to
help name how such awareness and deliberative action occurs through rhetorical
strategies he calls “vernacular religious creativity,” which he loosely defines as “a
process whereby religious believers adapt or adjust their beliefs to fit their social context”
(37). It is through these lenses and adjustment strategies, as performed online, that I
challenge the conflict narrative and suggest ways to navigate the tension between
religiously committed students and a secular college composition curriculum.
Because I will ultimately apply all insights from this study to the composition
classroom, I will first examine how the field of Rhetoric and Composition and its subfield
in Rhetoric and Religion have sought interventions from within the writing classroom.
This chapter will lay out a brief history of the field, examine religion’s role in
composition pedagogy, and pinpoint the rhetorical conditions that trigger both conflict
and cooperation between Christian and secular academic discourse. I argue that while
rhetoric and religion scholars have offered brilliant and effective strategies from within
the classroom, most of their recommendations privilege deliberation over participation.
Chapter 2 argues that we can have our cake and eat it, too—that both deliberation and
participation are possible (potentially), especially in digitized spaces. I unpack this claim
by building a theoretical premise that more precisely examines how Christian discourse,
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particularly as framed by postmodern theology, can be used to open the universe of
discourse and work toward radical hospitality. By observing iterations of what I call “the
holy”—the uniquely religious element of discourse and sentient experience—through
apparatus theory, I suggest that the apparatus of electracy opens a possibility to realize
this capacity in online environments. Chapter 3 applies this framework to what Heidi A.
Campbell calls Digital Religion, or the study of “how digital media and spaces are
shaping and being shaped by religious practice” (Digital 1). More specifically, this
chapter unpacks how changes in communities brought about by electronic technologies
and new media shift our understanding of argumentation and negotiating worldview,
especially a Christian framework. Via Sonja Foss, Cindy Griffin, Lisa Blankenship, and
Jeff Ringer, I offer an “invitational approach” as a tension-negotiating rhetorical strategy
that works to complicate adversarial communication frameworks. Then, in Chapter 4, I
focus these explanations on YouTube and explicate data I collected of five YouTube
channels, which consists of over 500 hours of watched videos, five in-depth interviews,
and analysis of over 76,000 user comments through a software called Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count 2015 (LIWC2015). The chapter fleshes out the “invitational approach”
as adapted by YouTube vloggers who have created channels around worldview. Chapter
5 analyzes a more focused sample of user comments and presents a discussion of
LIWC2015 findings to assess how viewers respond to both invitational and adversarial
communication approaches. Based on these results, I offer composition instructors
insights on how to better engage religiously committed students in increasingly divisive
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learning and living environments by leveraging the unique affordances of digital
technologies and online logics.
The Ghost of Rhetoric and Composition Past
Dueling Writing Philosophies: Product and Process
Providing a comprehensive history of the field of Rhetoric and Composition is
well beyond the scope of this project and better served in extant accounts (see North;
Brereton; Crowley; Hawk; Malenczyk et al.). The brief and admittedly reductive history I
offer here serves as context for the field’s examination of religion in relation to the
writing classroom. I identify some of the major pedagogical and philosophical
movements in rhetoric and composition studies not to unite the work and philosophy of
current scholars but to demonstrate how the legacy of these past approaches—what I will
later call the “ghost” of Rhetoric and Religion—led to critical engagement and
conceptualizations of religion, namely Christianity, that persist as traces in contemporary
scholarship and classroom practice. Though I will link these initial approaches to the
conflict narrative, I will ultimately show how scholars have since moved beyond this
framing but not entirely beyond its reach. This will help us locate the sites for further
digging.
Heather Thomson-Bunn pinpoints written exchanges between Ann Berthoff, Beth
Daniell, JoAnn Campbell, Jan Swearingen, and James Moffett in a 1994 May issue of
College Composition and Communication as the first discussion singularly devoted to
religion and spirituality in composition scholarship. These scholars argued that
“contemporary intersections of literacy and spirituality have gone largely unrecognized in
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our discipline” (qtd. in Thomson-Bunn 376), a sentiment shared by Maxine Hairston
earlier in 1992. In “Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing,” Hairston similarly noted
that “religion plays an important role in the lives of many of our students—many of us,
I’m sure—but it’s a dimension almost never mentioned by those who talk about cultural
diversity and difference” (191). Offering an annotated bibliography of over 200 pieces
regarding faith in writing between 1992-2017, Paul Lynch and Matthew Miller observe a
particular anxiety in accounts akin to Hairston’s: that secular academe defaults to a
wholesale dismissal of religion, casting it as a barrier to more nuanced understandings of
civic life and action, along with composition’s celebration of a pluralistic philosophical
reality.
This philosophical stance and perceived bias against religion in the university
speak to larger assumptions historically made by composition theorists regarding the
writing classroom’s purpose and language’s rhetorical function, which grew increasingly
anti-foundationalist as epistemologies of language turned toward social construction.
Before this focus, composition instruction in late 1880s United States calcified around a
product-centered approach, motivated by a rapidly growing “skilled work force” and an
attempt to stem the tide of illiteracy in young American men (Moberg 72; CoxwellTeague and Lunsford). The legacy of this approach was what scholars eventually coined
“current-traditional rhetoric,” which emphasized the formalistic features of writing (e.g.,
grammar, syntax) and sought uniformity in the rules of language usage and style. James
Berlin and Robert Inkster explain that the philosophical basis of this focus relied on a
view of reality that could be accessed objectively—“that the external world existed
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independent of the mind and that direct knowledge of this world was attainable” (1).
Thus, writing was a passive, positivistic endeavor and a means to achieve “congruence
with that objective, knowable external reality,” which scholars like George Campbell,
Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately assumed to be “rational, regular and certain” (13; 2).
Rhetoric under this frame was similarly a means to push language toward a standardized
outcome and reduced as an “art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end,”
which is “to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions,
or to influence the will” (qtd. in Berlin and Inkster 1). Such a characterization harkens
back to Plato’s view of rhetoric in the Phaedrus as the “handmaid” of Philosophy, a
means of persuasion that was useful and “good” only when aiding higher philosophical
Ideals and Truths.
Deborah Coxwell-Teague and Ronald Lunsford note that composition scholars
came to recognize tenets of current-traditional rhetoric as “monolithic and uniformly
bad” due to their myopic and rigid approach to writing pedagogy and the field’s radical
reconceptualization of rhetoric (xiii). In the 1970s, product-centered writing gave way to
a process-centered approach, which Irene L. Clark describes as “devoting increased
attention to writers and the activities in which writers engage when they create and
produce a text, as opposed to analyzing and attempting to reproduce ‘model’ texts” (6,
emphasis in original). This deliberate focus on writers is significant. Rather than
uniformity in the rules and mechanics of writing, composition scholars emphasized the
individual and the multiple, idiosyncratic steps one could take in moves toward literacy,
encouraging critical reflection on these practices. Clark, along with Coxwell-Teague and
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Lunsford, identify the oft-mythologized Dartmouth Conference and earlier movements in
linguistics as the beginning of these decisive changes in composition pedagogy. In his
historicizing of the Dartmouth Conference, John Trimbur explains that post-World War II
anxieties and Cold War concerns in the 1960s catalyzed “development and
modernization” in university curricula in an effort to keep pace with a world adopting
more progressive modes of knowing and being. English curricula underwent analogous
analysis, deemed “outmoded and in need of modernization” by the American and British
scholars present at Dartmouth (150). Trimbur links this diagnosis to a subsequent
preference for a growth model of learning, where a focus on nurturing “the student’s
innate linguistic capacities” replaced “traditions of rote learning and national literary
heritage” (151). This focus would, in turn, partner with movements in linguistics that
recognized and celebrated the plurality of native fluencies and would challenge notions of
a “Standard English.” The goal of composition instruction was no longer to produce a
polished written artifact but was, instead, to make writers and their own knowledge and
experiences more legible to and involved in the writing process.
The “Empowering” Social (Epistemic) Turn
Bound up in the process movement and what became more broadly known as the
“social turn” in composition studies was a student empowerment focus, one that coupled
student growth with tenets of democracy and civic engagement. Underlying these aims
was a postmodern understanding of reality that rejected the idea of “universal certainties”
and cast language not as descriptive of an objective reality but as that which “constructs
society […] that there is no reality except as soaked in discourse” (Berlin, Rhetoric;
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Moberg 68). Put another way, discourse was always tied to social, economic, political,
and cultural concerns as well as the institutions and ideological structures they
proliferated. Thus, discursive activity was more than just the adoption of tools or rote
skills. It was, as George Moberg puts it, an act of “learning how to define reality and how
to have one’s own effect on it at the same time” (68). Within this framework, rhetoric
was no longer a means to dress up Truth but was, instead, the mechanism to both create
and critique a plurality of truths that were always situated in an historical context;
motivated by ever-changing exigencies; invented, arranged, styled, remembered, and
delivered by rhetors who were, themselves, susceptible to constraints waged ideologically
and materially. Highlighting the invention canon in particular, Sharon Crowley contends
that rhetoric, what she conceives of as “an art of invention,” involves “the systematic
discovery and investigation of the available arguments in a given situation,” which, she
explains, are both “produced and circulated within a network of social and civic
discourse, images, and events” (“Composition”). Crowley’s emphasis on rhetoric’s
function and reach—one in use and situated well beyond the classroom—further
underscores the stakes involved in both the rhetorical act of writing and its pedagogy.
Especially for scholars in the late 80s and early 90s, to teach writing was, in some ways,
to teach the individual how to move about the world and recognize their place in it. To
desire a more empowered, just, and equitable positionality on the part of the studentcitizen and their communities was a noble aim and seemingly within the purview of
rhetoric and composition.
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In Reimagining Process, Kyle Jensen notes that “the appeal to student
empowerment has become so commonplace in rhetoric and composition research that it
enjoys a largely unquestioned existence” (3). Pushing back on this notion, he observes
the field generally conflating “literate development” with liberatory aims, for better or for
worse. Despite often rallying beneath the banner of a priori empowerment, engaging the
ideas in Paulo Freire’s 1970 Pedagogy of the Oppressed and other liberatory pedagogists,
scholars have theorized and responded to these efforts in vastly dissimilar ways. James
Berlin’s 1988 “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class,” written at the height of the
social turn, presents three approaches that illustrate these differences and, as I will later
argue, had immense influence on the field’s perception of religion.
Berlin begins his piece by situating rhetoric in ideology, or a consideration of “the
ways its [rhetoric’s] discursive structure can be read so as to favor one version of
economic, social, and political arrangements over other versions” (477). Ideology,
according to Berlin, guides the way one makes and negotiates this reading of structural
hierarchies and, as a result, determines how they become a person functioning in society.
Drawing from Göran Therborn’s reading of Louis Althusser, Berlin asserts that ideology
is an “historically specific,” intepellating force that hails individuals into adopting values
and making social, political, and even aesthetic choices for a particular moment in time.
He emphasizes the temporality of these factors to drive home the freedom of ideology
from a metanarrative, characterizing it as necessarily plural and “competing,” that is to
say, not locked into an essentialist hierarchy. Though he argues that the competition tends
to favor “the hegemony of the dominant class” and, thus, establish unequal and
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oppressive power relations, he maintains that ideological resistance to ideological
authoritarianism remains possible (479).
Composition scholars like Bruce McComiskey suggest that the field in the late
80s generally accepted that ideology was “the central guiding concept behind all of
rhetoric and composition” (168); however, the writer’s role and charge within this
framework became a point of contention. Berlin offers three prevailing responses to this
issue: cognitive, expressionistic, and social-epistemic. Cognitive rhetoricians, asserts
Berlin, take the epistemological tidiness of current-traditional rhetoric and marry it with
the process movement’s conception of writing as a series of socially situated, recursive,
but definable steps. The writer, then, could sidestep the ideological dimensions of
discourse, devoting attention to the “mental processes of writing” instead: planning,
composing, revising (481). This distills writing to a problem-solving exercise that yields
deliverables of goals rather than reflections on the ideological “value” of these goals and
their formation (482). Empowerment through a cognitivist approach, according to Berlin,
is mastery of the writing process through metacognition and, thus, an ability to take these
insights and adapt them for various and diverse tasks and situations.
Expressionistic rhetoricians, on the other hand, place the individual and their
unique experiences, not their mental processes, front and center. Berlin explains that
expressionists take the process movement’s growth mindset and put it in service to the
writer’s self-discovery, which is the locus of empowerment. “Empowerment” from this
perspective is not a negation of ideology, especially its alliance to systems of power and
oppression, but always puts these factors in “individual terms” (487). Thus, the point of
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writing is liberation from hegemonic ideologies through the cultivation of a writer’s own
voice, which would enable resistance to “the authoritarian corporation, state, and
society,” or the impediments to self-actualization (487). Lester Faigley in “Competing
Theories of Process” explains that the expressivist view takes its cues from
psychoanalytic theory to reinforce personal development, namely drawing out the “innate
potential of the unconscious mind,” as a means to cultivate “good” writing, or vice versa
(531). Referencing the work of Peter Elbow and Ken Macrorie, he asserts that
expressivists characterize “good” writing as an honest, extemporaneous, inimitable act of
personal creativity—a far cry from the logical and systematic cognitive approach.
Social-epistemic rhetoricians, however, forward an entirely different premise of
the writer’s subjectivity and use of language. Being neither a puppet master of discourse
nor a carrier of innate liberating knowledge, the writer is instead a construct of language,
formed by “the various signifying practices, the uses of language and cultural codes, of a
given historical moment. In other words, the subject is not the source and origin of these
practices but is finally their product” (Berlin, Rhetorics 62). Berlin explains that the
social-epistemic approach decenters the individual and puts emphasis on constructions of
the self as they function dialectically with a material reality and a discourse community,
knowable only through language. Empowerment, characterized as “resistance,” comes
through critical awareness of these dialectical, discursive formations and the ideological
weight they carry, and the writing classroom could (and perhaps, according to Berlin,
should) be a site to cultivate such awareness. In Rhetoric, Poetics, and Culture, Berlin
offers the following charge to writing teachers:
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Our business must be to instruct students in signifying practices broadly
conceived—to see not only the rhetoric of the college essay, but also the
rhetoric of the institution of schooling, of politics, and of the media, the
hermeneutic not only of certain literary texts, but also the hermeneutic of
film, TV, and popular music. (93)
Through such acts of critical examination, students could better resist interpellation by
oppressive social, political, and cultural systems in a variety of media, making them more
informed citizens with the capacity to participate in and effect change through civic
action. Favoring this approach, Berlin positions the social-epistemic stance as one that is
never “innocent”—never transcendent of reality in any form or encapsulated in one grand
narrative but cognizant of even “its own rhetoricity, its own discursive constitution and
limitations” (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 492; Rhetorics 81). This approach speaks to what
Nedra Reynolds, Jay Dolmage, Patricia Bizzell, and Bruce Herzberg call the “prevailing
tendency in the field” in the late 1980s and early 90s: that writing should be seen “in
social and cultural contexts” that, as Faigley argues, are “historically dynamic” (The
Bedford 12; “Competing” 537). This stance requires a view of the world that values a
plurality of perspectives and recognizes each as predisposed to change.
The field’s increased focus on issues of race, culture, class, gender, sexuality, and
disability in the 90s further reinforced the importance of difference-affirming, socially
situated pedagogical and theoretical lenses, which offered sharp critique of cognitive and
expressivist perspectives and, by extension, religion. The cognitive approach was often
seen as tending too close to the rigid rationality of current-traditional rhetoric and, as a

23

result, sanitizing language of its ties to ideology. Faigley via Henry Giroux notes that
“pedagogies assuming a cognitive view tend to overlook difference in language use
among students of different social classes, genders, and ethnic backgrounds,” opting for
more scientific, logic-based structures for the writing process (534). Extending this
critique to the reductive treatment of emotion, Lynn Worsham calls cognitivism a
pedagogy supportive of “the general way dominant pedagogy understands emotion and
organizes emotion-work by channeling it into appropriate and legitimate objects, aims,
modes of expression, and stages—all of which are socially and historically produced and
organized” (225). Again, we see the cognitive approach denying language of its
complexity in favor of playing to more standardized and sterilized conceptions of
meaning and their social impact. In fact, Worsham links cognitivism to positivism by
describing them both as pedagogies that reify power structures that use “emotion to
secure the ideological subordination of women and minorities” (224). For this to be the
case, a tacitly accepted view of reality—which, in the context of Worsham’s argument, is
the a priori assumption that emotion is inferior to reason and innately tied to “the
irrational, the physical, the particular, the private, the feminine, and nonwhite others”
(224)—must be in play. Thus, as Worsham argues, unquestioning adherence to this
primordial truth-of-sorts is the basis of and continued justification for exploitation.
Expressionistic (or expressivist) rhetoric met similar criticism, though on the
opposite end of the spectrum. Rather than too objective, critics saw expressionism—e.g.,
writing personal narratives, freewriting, cultivating an authentic voice (Macrorie)—as far
too subjective, perhaps even a prolonged exercise in anti-intellectual navel gazing.
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Despite the field’s conflicting and confusing definitions of expressive discourse, as noted
by Jeanette Harris in “The Role of Expressive Discourse in the Teaching of Writing,”
critiques generally established a binary between private and public, accusing
expressionists of privileging the former to the detriment of the latter. The limitation of the
private, personal approach, explains Faigley again by way of Giroux, is that it “ignores
how writing works in the world, hides the social nature of language, and offers a false
notion of a ‘private’ self” (531). It does this by using personal experience and voice as a
means to their own individualistic end, not as a path to broader critical awareness and
civic engagement. Berlin contends that expressionists evade this ideological problem by
assuming that personal insights would “correspond to the privately determined truths of
all others: my best and deepest vision supports the same universal and external laws as
everyone else’s best and deepest vision” (486). Thus, the writer need look no further than
to their own selves for keys to empowerment for both self and others. Framed in this way,
we have yet another method to escape ideology as imagined by social-epistemic rhetoric,
another means to opt out of language’s social and cultural context in order to focus on the
individual writer and their own development.
Origins of the Christian Conflict Narrative in Composition
In light of the push back to cognitive and expressivist rhetorics, it is no wonder
that scholars found religion, namely Christianity, relevant in this ideological critique.
Robert P. Yagelski’s 1988 “Religion and Conformity in the Writing Classroom” offers a
fruitful case study for how compositionists, especially those adhering to a social view of
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language, contended with Christian discourse3 as articulated by a religiously committed
writing student. He begins his piece by introducing us to David, his “born again” student
who holds “a fundamentalist view of life: he had the world figured out now and he was
utterly convinced that he was right” (26). In the context of our current discussion, such
dogmatic assurance resembles current-traditional rhetoric’s objective, dualistic
philosophical reality. The Christian iteration credits a God for creating a salvation
narrative and code of ethics by which individuals distinguish right from wrong, sacred
from secular, good from evil—ideas fully accessible through belief in an external plane
of spiritual existence: “If you were of the world, the world would love its own. Yet
because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world
hates you,” explains Jesus via the apostle John (New King James Version, John 15:19).
Christians are in the world but not of it. Though Yagelski describes himself as a “tolerant
person” committed to student agency in the writing process, he admits to feeling
challenged by this worldview, wincing at David’s writing that conveys explicitly
Christian ideals of salvation and frames secular society as godless and sinful. He explains
that David perceives any critique of these ideas as “the product of an unenlightened
mind” and makes full use of conversion narratives and personal, mystical experiences as
the backbone of his arguments (27).
References to the “unenlightened mind” and personal experience seem to point in
the direction of cognitive and expressivist sensibilities respectively, appealing to the

My discussion here conflates “Christian discourse” with fundamentalism. We will tease out the plurality
and nuance of “Christian discourse” later in this chapter and the next, which will show how this conflation
is extremely misguided.
3
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notion that there is a structural logic to Christian thinking. Accessible through belief in an
a priori truth and the individual’s unique spiritual experiences, this epistemology appears
to obscure ideological complexity in favor of an all-encompassing worldview. Yagelski,
seeing his classroom as a microcosm of a broader public, notes the pushback David
receives from his peers, who describe the written presentation of his values as
“offensive,” “bombastic,” and “unacceptable,” leaning toward “fanaticism” (27).
Yagelski considers this portrayal as characteristic of a majority opinion in American
society. Thus, he recognizes the ideological gap in his, David’s, and secular society’s
approaches and makes earnest attempts to create opportunities for his student to rethink
his stance and understand that “a certain tolerance for other viewpoints was expected,
even desirable” (27). Checking this pedagogical impulse, Yagelski also discloses his own
motives: “In truth, I was tacitly trying to convince him that he was wrong, that the color
of the world was my gray, not his black and white” (27). Put in social-epistemic
rhetorical terms, perhaps Yagelski sought to instruct David on the “signifying practices”
propagated by his Christian ideology, which were not absolute or off limits to critique but
were constructed and negotiated through language—that the world was not as
philosophically tidy and straightforward as he was led to believe by fundamentalist logics
or his own convictions. Considering that this piece was published in The Radical
Teacher, a journal serving “the community of educators who are working for democratic
process, peace, and justice” and seek to pinpoint “the root causes of inequity” to promote
“progressive social change,” Yagelski’s sympathies clearly lie with the empowerment
camp of the critical pedagogy variety (“About the Journal”). Hence, when he realizes
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that, despite his best efforts, David continues to use “wild epithets and unsubstantiated
charges of the sinfulness of our society” in his final paper, Yagelski feels disappointed,
seeing his attempts for David to critically reconsider his worldview as “failed” (28).
Before examining the important insights and nuance Yagelski draws from this
encounter and of his own pedagogy, let us turn to two more pieces that present similar
but more precise concerns and further reinforce the “problem” of Christian discourse in
the writing classroom: I. Hashimoto’s 1987 “Voice as Juice: Some Reservations about
Evangelic Composition” and Doug Down’s 2005 “True Believers, Real Scholars, and
Real True Believing Scholars: Discourses of Inquiry and Affirmation in the Composition
Classroom.” These perspectives illustrate the field’s growing conception of Christian
discourse as incongruent with university ideals, which, I argue, cement the conflict
narrative and favor the social-epistemic approach as broadly conceived by Berlin.
Hashimoto’s article participates in the critique of expressivist writing similar to
Faigley and Berlin’s, but he does so by invoking the Christian evangelical tradition
specifically. He argues that both discourses bear a striking resemblance and “zeal” that
can be detrimental to composition instruction and the field at large. This “zeal,” he
explains, is a proclivity for voice, which he describes via Peter Elbow as “juice,” or that
which gives writing a certain mystical oomph through the genuine expression of the
writer’s persona (70). Hashimoto finds parallels between this pedestalization of voice and
Biblical references that position voice as serving a revelatory function (e.g., the “still
small voice” Elijah hears in the desert, John the Baptist’s “voice that cried out in the
wilderness,” the voice of He who stands at the door and knocks, etc.). Trusting this voice
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and its revelations, he explains, would help the individual escape the clutches of hell,
offering instead “immediate salvation if sinners renounce complexity and the evils of
over-intellectualizing, return to simple black-and-white ideals, and embrace their
primitive, emotive, human selves” (73, emphasis in original). Explicit in this
characterization is a conflation of expressivist writing and Christian discourse with antiintellectualism and an insular focus on the personal, characteristics that Hashimoto deems
as incompatible with university ideals. He calls writing an “intellectual endeavor” and
fears that the evangelical-expressivist frame will create “self-centered, passive students
[who] can wait for revelation without the pain and frustration associated with intellectual
pursuits and confusion or disorientation from unaccustomed methods of thought” (77).
Once again, the Christian-expressionist perspective offers a seemingly convenient escape
from ideology and enables a worldview that neatly simplifies the complexity and rigor of
academic thought.
Doug Downs continues this line of thinking but focuses his critique on what he
calls the Discourse of Affirmation, which he conflates with Christian logics and pits
against academia’s Discourse of Inquiry. He borrows James Paul Gee’s theorization of
Discourse, describing it as an “identity kit”—a group’s social and cultural rules that
authorize fluency and acceptance in the way one thinks, behaves, speaks, composes, etc.
The Discourse of Inquiry, argues Downs, is the identity kit of higher education and views
discourse as “contextual rather than essential” (41), questioning “as a valued source of
knowledge” (44), “change and instability” as necessary to tolerate (46), and “complexity
and multiplicity” of perspectives as important to a student’s excavation of self and others
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(48). Put concisely, Inquiry opens, and we see echoes of Berlin’s social-epistemic
rhetoric, particularly the push for developing critical awareness, in this portrayal. The
Discourse of Affirmation, however, closes. Like Yagelski, Downs uses a classroom
anecdote to illustrate his point. He introduces Keith, a student who expresses dogmatic
assurance in his Christian beliefs and refuses to engage arguments that do not align with
his stance against gay adoption. In his scathing feedback, Downs calls Keith’s final
assignment “the most indoctrinated, close-minded, uncritical, simplistically reasoned
paper I’ve ever read!” (39). Affirmation, as demonstrated by Keith, views the identity kit
as “essential” (41), “received knowledge” as superior to “inquired knowledge” (44),
consistency and permanence as characteristic of received knowledge (46), and
“absolutism” as a transcendent frame for belief. Though Downs concludes by suggesting
ways to bring the two discourses together, calling them not mutually exclusive but tricky
and contentious in their alignment, he ultimately privileges Inquiry, which he says “earns
a certain priority in lying at the heart of the academic mission” (41).
Judging from these three depictions of Christian discourse at odds with secular
academe, we get a clearer picture of the values that both camps hold dear. The rhetoric of
Christianity adheres to airtight hermeneutics and preestablished Truths that, as Thomas
Amorose observes, imbue the faith-based rhetor with a simultaneous sense of superiority
to secular logics and accepted inferiority to the Judeo-Christian God, who bestows
insights through personal, emotive, revelatory experiences. These convictions lead to
hermetically sealed beliefs that resist Inquiry and place “a drag on rhetoric’s potential to
serve as method for exploration of new ways to faith, new ways of faith, new ways to
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express faith” (144, emphasis in original). The secular academy, however, champions the
gray—the disturbance of Truths that claim transcendence in form and epistemology. This
is not an arbitrary rebellion against absolutism but one rooted in the belief that reality is
language’s social construct and that the development of a critical consciousness, one that
not only acknowledges difference but celebrates it, will lead to a more equitable, just, and
tolerant society (Bizzell, “Foundationalism” 202). Thus, Yagelski, Hashimoto, and
Downs are not alone in their frustration with Christian discourse as a barrier to such ends,
along with the cadre of “student fundamentalists” who propagate these closed ideologies.
In 1989, Chris Anderson references Cathy, an undergraduate student in his graduate
student’s first-year writing course who writes in Christianese and appeals only to
religious authority in assignments (“The Description”). In 1998, Amy Goodburn
introduces Luke, her student who refuses to read and engage with course materials that he
deems are too secular (“It’s a Question”). In 2008, Peter Kerry Powers’ colleague
overhears her chair in the English Department bemoan the fundamentalist students in
their classrooms, emphasizing that it is the English teacher’s duty to disabuse and
distance these students from their faith in favor of more critical approaches to knowledge
and learning (“A Clash”). In 2020, I encounter a student in my Advanced Composition
course who mourns the loss of the United States’ moral core and yearns for the “good old
days” when Christian values were the bedrock of American society.
This is the basis of the conflict narrative: two warring and seemingly incongruent
ideologies whose core missions are diametrically opposed and, interestingly, held sacred
by their respective in-groups. Speaking to this latter point in her 1986 piece, Patricia
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Bizzell offers the categories “foundationalism” and “anti-foundationalism” as perfect
analogues, the former resembling Christian thought and the latter social-epistemic
rhetoric. A foundationalist perspective, she explains, positions language as theoretically
transcendent of its social context and assumes objectivity through mastery of convention.
Anti-foundationalism allies itself with social construction and claims agency through
recognition of discourse’s malleability and the individual’s ability to make critical and
just use of it. Despite their philosophical differences, both approaches, asserts Bizzell via
Stanley Fish, default to foundationalism. Speaking to social-epistemic rhetoric’s
foundationalist dilemma, Bizzell states, “The tendency, in other words, is to hope that by
becoming aware of the personal, social, and historical circumstances that constitute our
beliefs, we can achieve a critical distance on them and change our beliefs if we choose”
(205). She explains that this logic simply substitutes one foundationalism for another.
Yagelski becomes especially cognizant of this paradox when he reflects on his experience
with David and begins to see through his “sense of failure” and disappointment: “Without
question, David exposed in me the tendency to teach conformity, a tendency I once
would have denied and one which I still believe can be dangerous. By resisting me and
remaining true to his own beliefs, David showed me the flaws inherent in my teaching”
(28). In place of the God of Christianity was the God of nonconforming conformity.
Jeff Ringer echoes this paradoxical resemblance of both discourses in “The
Dogma of Inquiry: Composition and the Primacy of Faith,” a piece published in 2013,
which further emphasizes the observed dominance of anti-foundationalist thought in the
field over time—perhaps the “ghost” haunting Rhetoric and Composition. Though Ringer
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acknowledges that not all compositionists subscribe to this philosophy, he references
David Smit in 1995 and Richard Fulkerson in 2005 to demonstrate that the prevailing
notion in composition theory is that “all ‘truth’ is rhetorical, dialectically constructed, and
provisional,” common refrains of the social-epistemic perspective (qtd. in 357). By way
of Chris Anderson, Ringer notes that “antifoundationalists and social-constructionists can
be ‘absolute in their absolutism’ and ‘blind . . . to their own bias’” (qtd. in 357). In fact,
even the tenets of Downs’ discourse of Inquiry—questioning, in particular—“must stem
from an existing belief” since a prerequisite of doubt is an unquestioned belief (356). In
place of militant anti-foundationalism, he encourages the field to recognize that “we all
have basic beliefs to which we’re committed that motivate the questions we ask. Such
commitments are tied up in identity, such that we cannot—and should not—replace them
at will” (359). Thus, he suggests humility on the part of both religiously committed
students and instructors who share concerns akin to Yagelski’s. To reiterate Berlin’s
exact urging, we must recognize our epistemology’s “own rhetoricity, its own discursive
constitution and limitations” (Rhetorics 81). Doing so helps us challenge the bind and
binary of the conflict narrative.
But, to what end?
Moving Beyond the Conflict Narrative
The Loss in Inquiry’s Gain
Let us pause for a moment to make an important clarification. Challenging the
binary of Inquiry and Affirmation and calling dogma on both discourses is not a move to
create a reductive, one-to-one comparison, bust binaries for the sake of busting binaries,
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or to defenestrate critical inquiry. Bizzell, in the 1990 follow-up to her article on antifoundationalism, commends the critique of foundationalism, saying “anti-foundationalist
philosophers are correct to attack any authority that claims to place itself beyond
question” (667). This echoes the epigraph at the top of this chapter by Episcopal priest
Barbara Brown Taylor, who warns against those who “claim to know the mind of God”
and “cannot tell God’s will from their own.” Bizzell’s point, however, is that simply
making this critique is not enough since its rationale often falls on its own sword. She
remarks that anti-foundationalists continue to hold tightly
to the conviction that the question about foundational knowledge and
unimpeachable authority is the single most important question, even if it
has to be answered in the negative […] It seems to me that Berlin, and
many of the rest of us who try to make a pluralistic study of difference
into a curriculum, are calling students to the service of some higher good
which we do not have the courage to name. We exercise authority over
them in asking them to give up their foundational beliefs, but we give
them nothing to put in the place of these foundational beliefs because we
deny the validity of all authority, including, presumably, our own. (667;
670)
Here, Bizzell speaks to the limitations not only of anti-foundationalism but also the
agenda of critical pedagogy. Holding agency and, by extension, empowerment as the
higher value, the anti-foundationalist faces a significant problem, especially when dealing
with more conservative Christian students. Once disabused of their fundamentalist ways,
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what is next for religiously committed students? Does meta-awareness of ideology really
lead to empowerment? Are we, as Susan Miller notes in “Technologies of Self?Formation,” creating students who have “smart awareness of generic power,” “savvy
about stylishness” and an ability to “interpret” oppressive ideologies but not “practice in
manipulating genres” and “guerrilla stylistics” or “strength to withstand forces that
prevent their [students’] critiques from wide acknowledgement” (499)? Put another way,
in the name of empowerment, are we unintentionally producing passive writers whose
academic efforts begin and end with critique, all at the expense of their foundational
beliefs? What is lost in Inquiry’s gain?
As Ringer notes above, the loss is identity, not only of the religiously committed
student but also of Christian discourse, which secular academe might deem a worthy
sacrifice. In Toward a Civil Discourse, Crowley takes up a definition of identity, tying it
to the concept of commonplaces, which, she explains, are socially negotiated beliefs that
become shared assumptive values held and reified by a group. Commonplaces tend to
obscure difference in an effort to maintain implicit values and arguments and do so by
becoming bound up in personal and group identity. By way of Manuel Castells, Crowley
asserts that “identities are constructed by the habitus”—by the community to which a
belief or commonplace belongs and circulates (72). Affect and emotion, which
necessarily involve the body, work to reinforce and motivate belief (and vice versa) and,
in turn, shape identity both discursively and viscerally. Thus, in the habitus, what is
socially accepted and felt often is, regardless of how compelling an alternative may be.
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When it comes to religiously committed students as characterized in Yagelski et
al.’s accounts, the loss of fundamentalist commonplaces, repeatedly regarded as the
product of anti-intellectual convictions, is frequently viewed positively. In fact, Priscilla
Perkins, among others (DePalma, “Re-imagining”; Dively; Marzluf, “Writing”; Rand,
“Enacting”; Thomson-Bunn, “Mediating”; Williams), notes a popular commonplace in
the secular academy is to write off religion in general and Christianity in particular as
proxies for dangerous, difference-obscuring, fundamentalist ways of knowing, doing, and
being. Even the conclusion of Crowley’s text specifically warns against apocalyptic
belief, which she generally conflates with Christian discourse. Beth Daniell, however, is
quick to remind us that religiously committed students’ resistance to the discourse of
Inquiry does not always have a fundamentalist root but often stems from “fear of losing
identities that seem essential or of having to give up a community that has nurtured them
since childhood” (“A Question” 108). This is not a matter of letting go of “bad beliefs”
but of renouncing the habitus altogether. Moreover, like Ringer, Daniell urges educators
to be empathetic to these concerns as “we have identities (and embodied beliefs) that we
ourselves might not want challenged and communities we would not want to lose” (108).
Bizzell also admits, “everything I do in the classroom is informed by one or another
element in my world view, thus potentially conflicting at every turn with other elements
in the students’ diverse world views and, because of my institutional position at the head
of the class, potentially undercutting their values” (“Afterword” 284). Chris Anderson
forwards a similar argument: “as teachers of writing and literature we are all in the
business of recommending values, insisting on faiths” (15). Put simplistically, this
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patchwork of quotes illustrates that we all have a lot on the line, things that not only help
determine disciplinary identity but also who we are—who I am.
In response to Crowley’s Toward a Civil Discourse, Daniell reveals that she is “a
Bishop-Spong-reading Episcopalian” who identifies with what she calls the “middle,” or
Christians whose religious identities and beliefs do not tend toward dogma and an elision
of critical thinking (“Whetstones” 81). By promoting the commonplace that Christians
wield their beliefs as a defense against the dark arts of the academy, the secular educator
misses the capacity of Christian theology specifically and religious rhetorics more
broadly to be an ally to just, difference-respecting, critically aware composing—a
concept we will explore more in-depth in Chapter 2. Michael-John DePalma also adds
that “the problem with treating religious discourse as antithetical to academic discourse is
that it promotes the assumption that the only legitimate way for students to write about
their faith in the academy is critically” (223, “Re-envisioning”). Put another way, in the
context of the conflict narrative, the religiously committed student is limited to an all or
nothing choice when it comes to matters of faith: either be a “bad scholar” by fighting the
discourse of Inquiry and exorcising its demons with a religious frame or cast Affirmation
as a problem to be corrected by academic processes, becoming a “real scholar” as a
result. Jeff Ringer explains that the consequences of pushing students into the latter role,
or “the very act of putting evangelical faith in dialogue with other perspectives may lead
students to consider their own perspectives as contingent, a realization that could lead to
demoralization, dislocation, or even deconversion for students whose identities rest in
such a belief” (278). Again, the outcome is a student left in the negative of Inquiry’s gain.
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Flipping the Script of the Conflict Narrative
So, what happens when we erase lines drawn by the conflict narrative and
position Affirmation as Inquiry’s gain? More specifically, what happens when we, as T J
Geiger II urges, take “religion seriously as a topic and identity” and recognize it as
“rhetorical, discursive, and political as well as personal” (250; 254)? Put another way,
what happens when we invite Christianity to the parlor,4 start with a more nuanced
commonplace that does not begin with an anti-intellectual and unjust characterization,5
and offer it a speaking role? To answer these questions, we must first recognize that these
efforts have already been made in the secular academy. In fact, Lynch and Miller in their
extensive bibliography observe that while the conflict narrative became a well-worn trope
in composition and rhetoric scholarship, the field has largely argued that “we need not be
satisfied with the idea of faith and reason as non-overlapping magisteria” (4). Moreover,
we need not be satisfied with the descriptions given to the roles of students and teachers
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I do not imply that this invitation be required on the part of secular academe or the student. As Vander Lei
and kyburz note, “When we ask students to open their private lives in the public classroom, we must also
respect some students’ desire to keep their religious faith a private issue, one about which they prefer to
remain silent” (8). This dissertation agrees heavily with this statement and also recognizes that this may be
the same for educators. Though they may not hold animosity for religious belief, some teachers in secular
higher education may view the classroom as an inappropriate venue to host religiously themed
conversations. In response to this perspective, I offer both support and this exigency from Lynch and
Miller: “Despite claims of an inevitable secularization, religion endures. For the foreseeable future,
religious literacy will appear to be a basic requirement for civic life” (9). Considering their framing of
religion, this dissertation seeks to promote such literacy for all educators in secular academe, especially for
those who do not envision addressing religious rhetorics head-on.
5
I also do not imply that by letting go of this commonplace that we absolve Christian discourse of its
problematic context. Going back to Worsham’s “Going Postal,” I agree with her observation that the
cognitive approach positions a metanarrative as a means to oppress, which is, undoubtedly, how
Christianity has functioned historically and continues to operate, especially in the United States’ political
arena (see Whitehead and Perry). My point, however, is that while we must continue to be wary of a
colonizing metanarrative that perpetuates systems of inequity and injustice, we must also be mindful that
the Christian metanarrative does not always default to oppression. Again, we will develop this idea in
Chapter 2.
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as bullheaded and open-minded or faithful and corrupting. In a 2011 qualitative study of
24 first-year composition (FYC) classes, Marzluf finds that teachers in secular systems of
higher education do not operate on facile understandings of religion or hold students’
religious beliefs and texts in contempt or against them (“Religion” 286). Heather
Thomson-Bunn corroborates this finding in her 2017 empirical study of Christian
students on a state university campus. She notes that composition scholars have taken
huge steps to respond to calls like DePalma’s, Geiger’s, and Daniell’s by thinking
through ways to work with and welcome students into academic writing.
The problem, however, is that students, namely the 45 that Thomson-Bunn
surveyed and 7 who agreed to an in-depth interview, still believe in the inverse. Though
responses were relatively diverse, “over half of the Christian students surveyed (25, or 56
percent) at least expected some form of negative reaction/response to their religious
beliefs” (389, emphasis in original). Such an assumption automatically puts Christian
discourse on the defensive. Anticipating discord initiates an us-versus-them stance from
the very beginning—an assumption that dialogue is not an option, that a belief system is
not shared but defended. Thomson-Bunn also found that students determined their level
of transparency in the classroom regarding their beliefs by gauging their instructor’s
disposition toward religion, which they presumed to be uncharitable. “I think instructors
think Christians are ignorant or gullible. Writing instructors that I have had tend to
believe they know all and know better than to be coaxed into believing a ‘myth,’” writes
a respondent (381). Thus, to flip the script of this equally mythical mêlée between secular
teacher and religious student, work still needs to be done. Even if the conflict narrative
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does not haunt our pedagogies, it continues to impact the student and, as Thomson-Bunn
notes, limits their openness to “constructive feedback” due to “suspicion, fear, or anger”
(376). This does not bode well for instructors committed to promoting critical thought
through rhetorical lenses and/or who visualize their classrooms as publics-in-training
(Eberly). In “Reimagining Rhetorical Education,” DePalma argues that this is all the
more reason to provide opportunities to engage religious rhetorics, not as a means for
students to just critique their worldview but also to “critically interrogate and, in some
cases, thoughtfully use religious rhetorics” as a way in to promote a rhetorical education,
which DePalma describes as the occasion “to write, read, and speak in ways that
encourage them [students] to examine their beliefs and the beliefs of others in relation to
questions of justice, ethics, and truth—work that has significant implications for political
decision-making and civic action” (257; 256, my emphasis). DePalma’s reimagining
places religious belief not in the negative of anti-foundationalist critique but as an entry
point to rhetorical and compositional practices that work toward goals valued by both
secular academe and religiously committed students and the creation of citizens who are
cognizant of difference.
Rhetoric and religion scholars have offered numerous methods and pedagogical
accounts conveying strategies that work toward or in the vicinity of such reimagination.
Marzluf’s 2011 article offers three helpful frames for these approaches: the formalistic
frame, the tolerance frame, and the process frame. The first, as its name implies, grapples
with faith-based classroom tension by redirecting focus to “mechanical-syntactic and
formal-rhetorical features,” which “limits FYC teachers’ comments and professional
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responsibilities to correctness, organization, and style” (286). While this approach
resembles more current-traditional rhetoric than it does DePalma’s vision, it remains
useful for the educator who feels uncomfortable with, caught off guard by, or illequipped to take on religion in the writing classroom. In fact, in many ways, we could
characterize Yagelski’s approach as formalistic since he ultimately helps David make the
“correct” moves of rhetorical argumentation, namely being more cognizant of audience,
without forcing his student to renounce tightly held beliefs. Yagelski even admits, “As
we neared the end of the course, I believed that I had helped David—helped him improve
his writing, and perhaps even helped him to think just a bit more critically about his own
ideas,” even though David ultimately refused to budge (28); however, as Yagelski notes
at the end of his article, the limitation of this approach is that while it leaves room for
both Affirmation and Inquiry, it typically ends in a stalemate. Learning how to move each
chess piece, the student ultimately gains awareness of rhetorical procedures rather than
their effect on beliefs, practices, and identity.
The tolerance frame, however, widens this lens a bit and encourages “the writer to
use faith-based experiences as a cultural text that can be analyzed and developed”
(Marzluf 286). This approach—perhaps bearing a greater resemblance to the objective
logics of cognitive rhetoric and the focus on student experience in expressivist rhetoric
rather than DePalma’s reimagination—enables the teacher to “evaluate faith-based texts
without having to make judgments about the students’ belief system or without these
beliefs contradicting their own” (286). In “Religious Discourse in the Academy,” Ronda
Leathers Dively offers insight on how this could play out in the classroom. Drawing from
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poststructuralist theory that positions the subject not as coherent or unified but “as a
changing blend of intersecting and re-intersecting values and belief systems” (95), Dively
casts personal experience as a complicated text consisting of different ideological
“strands” that can both be accessed and analyzed through “self-reflection” (96). She
recommends the use of not only students’ personal experiences as content to examine but
also the work of prominent Christian authors like C.S. Lewis or writers who explicitly
address accounts involving religious ideas, especially as they interact with viewpoints
deemed “outside” of the belief system. Though she hopes for an outcome that moves
beyond the bounds of tolerance and into the realm of suggesting change if not in core
beliefs than in one’s relation to those beliefs, Dively is ultimately satisfied with teacherly
tolerance:
The primary goal of a pedagogy that seeks to move students beyond
dualistic modes of thought and expression, particularly in the realm of
religious faiths, should be to help them discover the opposing influential
discourses that hold some relevance for their lives […] Naturally, religious
students in the wake of such a pedagogy may refuse to abandon their
notions of the unified self and their dualistic world views, but at least they
will have encountered discourses that suggest that they re-examine the
assumptions and question the ideologies that have contributed to their
sense of self and their readings of the world. (100)
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Once again, we have a viable strategy for bringing religion into the classroom without
defaulting to the Affirmation-Inquiry binary, but the outcome is much the same as the
formalistic frame: critical awareness at best, standstill at worst.
Marzluf’s third frame, process, inches closest to DePalma’s reimagination and an
actionable outcome that’s mutually beneficial to religious student and secular teacher. He
describes the process frame as one where “fundamentalist Christian students and their
faith-based texts need to be examined as a process within a learning context” in hopes
that this approach will encourage the writer “to express their religious faith
appropriately,” which some teachers in his study found to be the case with students at the
end of their semesters (286). While addressing content similar to the tolerance frame (i.e.,
personal experience and religious texts), this approach differs due to its more explicit
focus on the rhetorical situation, within or without the classroom. We see this in Mark
Montesano and Duane Roen’s “Religious Faith, Learning, and Writing: Challenges in the
Classroom.” They envision “religious belief as a model of ‘rhetorical culture’” and,
throughout the semester in their writing courses, offer opportunities for students to enter
the “contact zone” (85). Montesano describes this zone as the encounter between one’s
beliefs and a broader context where difference abounds. To establish a more productive
encounter, they preface in-class discussions by first soliciting informal writing responses
that invite not traditionally academic critiques but personal, emotive reactions to
philosophically challenging course content (e.g., Nietzsche’s Zarathustra). Next, they
host small groups in class where students can discuss and, in some cases, have structured
debates on their respective responses, generate counterarguments, and brainstorm ways

43

for the author(s) to rebut their counterarguments (94). Montesano and Roen explain that
these exercises—this process—exist to encourage dissoi logoi, or the Sophist tradition of
arguing “from multiple perspectives” with the hope that this method would “strengthen
students’ understanding of their own subject positions within the larger culture” (96).
Though critical awareness is, once again, an intended outcome, the authors pair
awareness with more civic-minded aims by always situating the individual in a contact
zone where they must learn how to operate.
Lizabeth Rand and Priscilla Perkins separately offer slightly similar perspectives
but focus more intently on the knowledge students bring to the classroom. Rather than
provide content to respond to as Montesano and Roen do, they offer frameworks that
enable students to work from and with their religious identities and principles. In
“Enacting Faith: Evangelical Discourse and the Discipline of Composition Studies,”
Rand argues that composition teachers would be well served to see Christian identity,
namely from an evangelical tradition, not as naïve or something to be overcome but as an
act of critical resistance. “Religion, rightfully understood, is a subversive force,” she
argues, using the process of conversion as her justification (359). She explains that in
order for evangelical students to claim Christianity, they must first consciously give up
their own will in favor of God’s. Put another way, they must forego the world—a choice
considered much more difficult than playing to their own worldly desires—and align
themselves with a set of principles that requires daily, renewed commitment—what Rand
calls “a complex interrogation of the self” and the apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:31
calls a daily death to self (363; New King James Version). By way of Stephen Carter,
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Rand acknowledges that such thinking could favor a more fundamentalist agenda, but it
could also resonate with a liberal politic that refuses “to surrender one’s moral beliefs to
the authority of others” (361). Carter credits this mentality with generating “the diversity
that America needs” due to its break with conventional ideas and generation of
alternatives (qtd. in 361). Thus, asserts Rand, “writing instructors who start from the
premise that evangelical discourse may reflect an oppositional and critically resistant
stance can call upon a richer understanding of the language of Christian faith to engage
students in further conversation about the complex negotiations of selfhood that they
undergo” (363). When put in the context of Marzluf’s process frame, Rand’s
recommendations place Christian evangelical rhetoric as the mechanism to develop
deeper understanding of religious expression and its relationship to a broader context.
Priscilla Perkins argues similarly but offers a more specific method for
investigating the intersection of religious identity and its wider social milieu. Drawing
from the work of Jesuit philosopher Bernard Lonergan, she sees ethos as the way into this
discussion. Lonergan, explains Perkins, uses a “self-appropriation” technique that is a
process by which individuals evaluate and reevaluate their spoken and written ideas and
actions through frequent, scaffolded self-reflection (“Attentive” 74). Though this
approach may sound like Dively’s suggestion above, Lonergan’s differs from hers and
aligns more with Rand’s due to his emphasis on the legitimacy of experience and belief
as seen through a subjective lens, even if that lens skews toward dualism. Perkins notes
that self-appropriation, then, frames ethos not in the typical way that rhetorical pedagogy
does—i.e., a one-way street of writer to audience where the latter becomes a barometer
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for how the writer must approach and deliver an argument—but as a self-analysis that
encourages the individual to first “be attentive; be intelligent; be reasonable; be
responsible” to their own beliefs before considering an audience, which is the core
philosophy of Lonergan’s method (74). Put another way, the writer becomes her own first
audience, and a broader audience is not one to persuade but to learn alongside of.
Applying this to the classroom, Perkins suggests that the desired outcome of this
approach is that students “take their own experiences and positions seriously enough that
they cannot help but consider how their words might affect—not just persuade—the
communities they address” (76). She uses classroom anecdotes to illustrate this idea,
pointing to students like “Sara,” an evangelical Lutheran, who takes greater ownership of
her beliefs as they meet challenging course readings and peer reviewers who do not share
her worldview. Unlike Yagelski’s David, Sara engages the critiques not by doubling
down on her worldview but by using the tension she encounters as an opportunity to
explore why and what she believes—a Lonerganian exercise practiced throughout the
semester. As a result, Perkins finds Sara expressing greater sensitivity to others’ beliefs
due to her new understanding of how difficult it is to navigate her own.
Summary and a Look Ahead
Perkins’ account does not offer just a “success” story. She also points to Tina, a
self-identifying Christian, who rejects the Lonerganian method and persistently
proselytizes about belief in the Christian Gospel to both her peers in class and imagined
audience in her writing. Tina also finds ways to reconcile her more conservative beliefs
with her in-class persona as “a fashion-forward cultural critic,” who “represented herself
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throughout the course as tolerant and more than assimilated into our secular university”
(79-80). The impasse, posits Perkins, stems from an unwillingness to recognize the
tension that exists between these identities and to, then, extend that same grace and
acceptance to an audience. The outcome is much the same as the accounts presented in
this chapter: a student so married to belief that openness to anything outside of this
system becomes impossible.
Throughout this chapter, I have demonstrated how scholars in the field of rhetoric
and composition have dealt with this central dilemma of dogma, expressed not only by
Christian students unwilling to consider beliefs beyond their own but also by the field
itself. Like Bizzell, I do not see the critique of absolute belief as off limits, especially in a
pedagogical stance that views Christianity in a more nuanced way. Like Berlin, I also do
not think classrooms in higher education are a-ideological, simply due to the fact that I—
the lecturer, lesson planner, and evaluator—subscribe to a system of values that guides
my practice, as Ringer, Daniell, and Anderson, among others have noted. Why else
would job committees ask for a teaching philosophy? With this being said, positioning
the development of a critical consciousness—namely one that compromises the identity
of the student and leaves them in the negative—as the “cure” to composition’s perceived
problem with religion is sorely misguided. As rhetoric and religion scholars have
beautifully demonstrated, there are numerous alternatives to academic critique that offer
viable and rhetorically sophisticated strategies to negotiate Christianity in the classroom,
and many of them point to the necessity of reevaluating our assumptions of Christian
discourse and our frames for a rhetorical education. They also encourage the composition
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teacher to not reduce rhetoric to a simple means of persuasion but to recognize it as an
opportunity to learn with instead of against, especially when it comes to Christian
rhetorics. Though these alternatives do not present an all-encompassing solution or rid
the secular classroom of tension, as Perkin’s account aptly illustrates in her differing
student anecdotes, they ultimately leave the religiously committed student with more
choice in subject positions and negotiation strategies and do not require a wholesale
erasure of their Christian commitments or identities.
I fully support these efforts and, in this project, seek to contribute to this
conversation by proposing a fourth frame to Marzluf’s three. In addition to the
formalistic, tolerance, and process frames, I follow Sarah Arroyo’s suggestion of a
participatory frame, which she describes in Participatory Composition as addressing “the
convergence of the visual, verbal, aural, and corporal by removing the hermeneutic
requirement of analysis and instead advocating production and participation in every
writing gesture, largely defined” (10). I explicate this further in Chapters 2-3. Though
Arroyo’s work does not address religiously committed students directly, I see immense
potential for her approach, along with other scholars in Digital Rhetoric, to inform and
extend strategies forwarded by rhetoric and religion scholars. As seen in the numerous
student accounts presented in this chapter, the best-case scenario is often a student’s
willingness to not only tolerate but also accept difference as part of their writing ethic.
This wonderful and extremely ambitious outcome yields incredible amounts of
intellectual growth but does not necessarily promote or help exercise “political decision
making and civic action” as imagined by DePalma. Perhaps this is because, as Vander
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Lei observes in “Ain’t We Got Fun? Teaching Writing in a Violent World,” writing
students who learn to open their minds to and validate other points of view frequently
“increase [their] willingness to deliberate and decrease [their] willingness to participate”
(102). Put another way, deliberation often profits not further dialogue but inaction. On the
other hand, explains Vander Lei, “Hospitality to those who are like us increases our
commitment to our political views and increases our willingness to act on those views”
(102). The echo chambers produce a fierce form of participation and also manufacture
bullheaded resistance and the end of dialogue. Thus, there seems to be an inverse
relationship between deliberation and participation in the writing classroom. Postmodern
theology and online environments, however, tell a different story and show that a
participatory frame does not necessarily burden deliberative rhetoric but could help better
facilitate it. We explore the potentialities offered by these frames in the next two
chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
ELECTRATE RELIGION: HOLY, HOLEY, WHOLLY
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the
beginning with God. All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made that was
made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of man. And the light shines in the darkness, and the
darkness did not comprehend it.” —John 1:1-5, NKJV
“Words, scripture, and writing are not solid, stable, and steady. Words are incurable, scripture holey.”
—Mark Taylor, Erring
“The ‘wholeness’ of theory and practice should simultaneously be thought of as a perpetual ‘hole’:
never to be filled, completed, or ‘whole’ enough to be turned into a stable practice. Once a theory is
appropriated by theorizing it or applying it, the theory itself resists, unravels and forges new
connections. During this unraveling, elements that had to be excluded in the name of clear
communication and teaching eventually return to disrupt the analytical appropriation or application.”
—Sarah J. Arroyo, “Playing to the Tune of Electracy”

Framework Assemble!
In this chapter, I assemble a theoretical premise for the participatory attitude
adumbrated in the previous chapter, one that creates room for both deliberation and
participation on the part of religiously committed and secular individuals engaging in the
writing classroom. To do this, we will dwell in the ontologies and epistemologies made
possible by the aleatory connection of three homophones: holy, holey, wholly. Despite
their sonic congruence, these terms, when analyzed through the lens of apparatus theory
and postmodern theology, illustrate oscillations between the poles of holy closure
perpetuating conflict and holey openness promoting hospitality. Ultimately, I argue that
the possibility of radical hospitality, facilitated by or beginning in what Richard Kearney
calls anatheism and Gregory Ulmer calls choragraphy, creates opportunities for
deliberative participation and participatory deliberation. Moving between and within
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(w)holies toward this outcome is neither a linear journey nor one guaranteeing productive
exchanges between interlocutors. Instead, it is a hopeful, necessarily recursive, dynamic
condition that extends another option to engage the sacred-secular space of writing
pedagogy.
Before beginning this exploration, I first emphasize my opening verb, “assemble,”
and explain its connection to my title, “Electrate Religion.” I rely on Gille Deleuze and
Felix Guattari’s conception of an “assemblage” to fashion this framework. In the
introduction to A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and
Guattari explain that their book does not orbit a unified subject but, instead, is comprised
of “lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight,
movements of deterritorialization and destratification” (3). What they describe here is the
condition of meaning in their book, which we might analogize to modes of transportation.
Meaning travels by way of paved roads and makeshift pathways, operating at speeds with
“relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture” (4).
Sojourners on these roads, fluidly coasting or stuck in traffic, remain distinct in their
vehicles but are momentarily united by the medium—the lines of articulation and flight—
that facilitates or dismantles their journey. Taken together, these lines and “rates of flow”
make up what Deleuze and Guattari call an assemblage, or a “multiplicity—but we don’t
know yet what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed” (4). The assemblage,
in other words, is contingent and breakable, temporarily congruent but distinctly
heterogenous. Brent Adkins and Paul R. Hinlicky note that any semblance of cohesion in
an assemblage is “not unity or identity” but is, instead, a configuration of “disparate
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components [that] are themselves further composed of disparate components” (2). They
are cars, buses, motorbikes traveling the same or a different highway and both engineered
and driven uniquely and for disparate purposes. Sarah J. Arroyo in Participatory
Composition adds that assemblage happens not with pure intention but through “aleatory
connections” prompted by desire, which she characterizes by way of Deleuze and D.
Diane Davis as “a constant state of production” that views the thing of desire not as lack
but as incentive for assemblage. She notes that the “goal is not to fill the apparent ‘gaps’”
of desire but is to move “desire out of the realm of the negative and [allow] knowledge
formerly excluded to emerge” (33). (We will return to desire later in this chapter.) It is
with this excluded knowledge that the assemblage maintains a dynamic construction.
This chapter is an assemblage, which stems from a desire to bring the sacred and
secular into a less vitriolic communion, an aspiration Chapter 1 shows is a tall,
complicated order with no definitive solution or strategy. As evidenced by the conflict
narrative, the sacred tends to shut down desire by forming along Absolutist lines of
articulation (e.g., Doug Down’s Affirmation and Thomas Amorose’s description of
Christian resistance) while the secular celebrates the lines of flight and uses critique as a
means to expose and dismantle calcified ideology (i.e., Down’s Inquiry, James Berlin’s
social-epistemic rhetoric). Rhetoric and Religion scholars, however, demonstrate that
religiously committed rhetors need not operate in this either-or schema but can, instead,
use religious discourse, or secularism’s supposedly excluded knowledge, to negotiate
strategies that work toward understanding and openness to difference. Similarly, we need
not banish the secular from the sacred or see it as a tacit antagonist or repellent to
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religiously committed writers. Scholars like Michael-John DePalma, Priscilla Perkins,
and Lizbeth Rand show that bringing these discourses together requires continuous
shapeshifting—an attention to relationality—on the part of interlocutors and the messages
they carry.
Elizabeth Vander Lei’s essay “‘Ain’t We Got Fun?’: Teaching Writing in a
Violent World” illustrates this approach by presenting the tension arising in many writing
classrooms when students bring or encounter “words and ideas that we may find
disagreeable” (90). Like several scholars examining the intersection of composition
pedagogy and religion, Vander Lei shares an account from her classroom where the
disagreeable idea comes from her student Marty who likens writing to “being flogged in a
dungeon” (89). She notes that this response comes a week after he visits her office to
discuss the aim of his research paper for her course: to prove that the biblical account of a
worldwide flood occurred exactly as written. Vander Lei recounts Marty’s enthusiasm for
the topic, along with the not-so-scholarly evidence to support his ideas. After laying out
the expectations of academic writing and criteria for scholarly sources (e.g., work
published by academic presses and reputable scholars) and gently nudging him in a
different direction, she notices a complete change in Marty’s countenance. She recalls
him leaving “deflated,” acquiescing to her suggestion and choosing a different topic that
Vander Lei cannot remember (94). She wonders what she could have done differently,
how she could have engaged Marty so that he retained his enthusiasm for participating in
the writing process while also adhering to conventions of academic prose and critical
thinking. She admits that her perception of and response to Marty’s topic was largely
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influenced by her assumption of religion “as a private matter, something off-limits to a
teacher” (98).6 Her essay works to renovate this notion by situating belief in “nested
stories,” or by recognizing how narratives, especially one’s own, are not “univocal” but
“rooted in the story of a life and in a community” (103). Put in the context of her
classroom anecdote, she reflects on the potential richness of Marty’s topic had he been
encouraged to bring his topic out of the “private” realm and consider how other narratives
shaped or related to his perspective.
Vander Lei suggests that this recognition and narrativized contextualization could
lead to a more deliberative democracy where citizens understand and negotiate between
diverse arguments in order to sketch out the best course for future action. While noble in
its approach, this strategy also presents a conundrum. The paradox of developing critical
awareness and working toward collective goals, avers Vander Lei by way of political
scientist Diana Mutz, is that as people learn to deliberate, they become less amenable to
participation. “The kind of network that encourages an open and tolerant society is not
necessarily the same kind that produces an enthusiastically participative citizenry,”
argues Mutz. Hospitality toward others’ views, notes Vander Lei, bestows respect and
charitability but does not tend to motivate passionate and visible engagement (critical or

6

Frederick Mark Gedicks traces the relegation of religion to the private sphere (along with emotion and
subjectivity) to a “Lockean tradition of natural rights,” where individuals were free to express and live as
they pleased behind closed doors—provided that they did not inflict harm—but needed to uphold
“objectivity and reason” in the public sphere (674). Logic, argued adherents of this view, led to social and
political stability, making religion and any semblance of “passion” a threat to the health of public life. In
her 1991 presidential address to the American Academy of Religion, Judith Berling argues differently:
“Religion is not just an individual, private concern, something abstract and removed from our lives; it is
inextricably entwined with an array of complex and intractable social and cultural issues” (4). Scholars of
rhetoric, especially pedagogues working with religiously committed students, must recognize religion as
this legitimate epistemological force across spheres of engagement in order to understand how, where, and
why it continues to rear its head in both the classroom and society at large.
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otherwise) with these perspectives. Mutz continues: “We want the democratic citizen to
be enthusiastically politically active and strongly partisan, yet not to be surrounded by
like-minded others” (qtd. in 102). Mutz describes a citizenry who hold belief and
maintain an awareness of difference. One need only turn on the news, have a politically
themed conversation with an acquaintance or family member, or scroll through a Twitter
thread to be reminded of how rare this citizen is, how seemingly impossible it is to say
“enthusiastically politically active” and “not to be surrounded by like-minded others” in
the same breath. Mutz and Vander Lei observe that deliberation and participation seldom
coexist and that if forced to choose, we should privilege the former—to work “to
understand one other, to accept one other, to trust one other.” Vander Lei ends on a
tenuous but hopeful note: “Maybe someday in composition classes and in our public
discourse we will be able to address the goals of deliberative and participative democracy
simultaneously” (103). Maybe.
Enter “Electrate Religion.”
This neologized compound noun, drawing from Gregory Ulmer’s theory of
electracy and the traditions of apophatic theology, is my attempt to respond to Vander
Lei’s “maybe” and, in Chapters 3-5, to show that “maybe” is not only possible but also
happening now online. In this chapter, Ulmer will help name the discursive modes, logic,
and site of this possibility, and scholars of postmodern theology will aid in assembling a
method to perpetually reconfigure religious discourse, especially one rooted in
Christianity, as the mechanism by which participation leads not to closure but an ethic of
openness to deliberate with and respond to diverse others. As we compose this
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assemblage, I must make explicitly clear that the purpose of invoking religion,
particularly one (un)grounded in Christianity theology, is not to make a definitive claim
on belief or to (dis)prove the existence of God; rather, I focus on how these beliefs form
and reform through language, which I provisionally define via Kenneth Burke as an
interpretive framework shaping and shaped by purposeful attitudes and behaviors.
With this caveat in place, let us, like Moses in Exodus 3:5, remove the sandals
from our feet and begin our walk on holy ground.
Assemblage 1: Holy, Holy, Holy
The Holy Apparatus
In the early 1800s, English bishop Reginald Heber penned the lyrics to what
would become a famous hymn in Christendom. “Holy, holy, holy! / Lord God
Almighty!” goes the opening stanza, statements inspired by his reading of the books
Isaiah and Revelation in the Bible. The hymn and its scriptural counterparts meditate on
the greatness and sovereignty of the Divine, invoking monarchial imagery of saints,
cherubim, and seraphim prostrating themselves and “casting down their golden crowns”
to worship the eternal Thee, “which wert, and art, and evermore shalt be.” Herber’s
verses describe Lord God as “perfect in pow’r, in love, and purity,” juxtaposed against
“the eye of sinfulness” that works to hide the glory of God in “darkness,” a state where
humanity cannot recognize God’s majesty. Pastor Laura de Jong notes that Heber
intended the hymn as an accompaniment to a recitation of the Nicene Creed (“Holy, holy,
holy”), which theology scholar Marianne H. Micks calls a widely accepted “normative
statement of what the Christian church believes” (2). Born out of the ecumenical First
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Council of Nicaea in 325 CE, the creed formed against a backdrop of heated debate on
whether the ontology of Jesus was immutable or mutable, the holy Divine or wholly
finite.7 Favoring the former, writers of the creed proposed a schema that continues to
populate liturgies across Christian denominations: God, Creator of the world, donned
immanence to save humanity from sin, iniquity being the condition barring mortals from
eternal life in a celestial realm. After dying a substitutionary death on the cross to redeem
humanity from sin, Jesus—fully mortal and fully God—overcame death by resurrecting
and ascending to heaven, where He now waits to return to Earth and deliver justice to the
living and the dead.
This narrative adheres to a broader definition of religion, which Brian Jackson
defines as a foil to secularism, this latter term described via Charles Taylor as “a turning
away from belief and action oriented to transcendental powers or beings and a turning to
an ‘immanent frame,’ one that exists ‘without reference to interventions from outside’”
(23). Put another way, secularism is concerned with developing and situating an ethic in
the here-and-now, the evidence already available to human comprehension—not
something in the realm of the supernatural. Religion, however, is concerned with that

This debate centered around the Greek term homoousios, denoting “of one substance,” which fourthcentury Christians used to describe the nature of Jesus and, in turn, the Trinity: God the “Son” as fully
united with God the “Father” and “Spirit” and, therefore, fully God—three in One. The alternative,
proposed by the Alexandrian Christian priest Arius, posited that a singular God alone was One, making the
Christ a finite creation of this immutable God. This latter characterization of Jesus, existing under the
umbrella term “Arianism,” compromised the doctrines of monotheism and redemption, as critics of
Arianism saw a mutable Son as more of a polytheistic “demigod” and incapable of restoring “humanity to
the Godhead” through an act of sacrifice, or death on the cross (Britannica). The belief was that only an
Absolute Divine, a Being wholly transcendent, could perform the impossible work of salvation. This
critique of Arianism reinforces the supremacy of God, namely the Christian God, who decrees that there be
“no other gods before Me” (New King James Version, Exodus 20:3) and that Christ alone is “the way, the
truth, and the life” (New King James Version, John 14:6).
7
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which is outside. “The supernatural approach,” contends Jackson, “posits that the cultural
symbol system we call religion invites distinct rhetorical interactions—ones based on
supernatural agents” (24). In other words, a religious worldview develops around and is
motivated by an ethic guided by the “beyond,” or what exists outside of the realm of
beings. In his book A Public Faith, Miroslav Volf adds to this definition of religion,
pointing to its more formal qualities. He characterizes it as “a set of loosely related
rituals, practices, and metaphysical, historical, and moral claims to truth” (129). Thus,
religion is not only allied to a higher power but is also contingent upon lived realities and
recursive acts over time. Martin Medhurst further concretizes these ideas by explaining
that religion typically manifests through practice in sacred settings with the purpose of
forming community (“Seven Propositions”). Knit together, this definition of religion can
be summarized as a rhetorical system of cultivating truth claims through both immanent
and supernatural orientations to and pursuits of meaning that remain embedded in lived
contexts and rely on human actors in collaboration with a Divine.
When brought back to the context of the Nicene Creed, Christian rhetorics model
these characteristics especially well. Micks observes that with a motive to solidify the
divine nature of the Christ, the creed “was not written as a hymn of praise to the Triune
God, but as a way to define orthodox faith and to exclude heretics” (7-8). A recitation and
documentation of the creed, in other words, was ritual used to reify and defend a doctrine
of holiness: God as perfectly powerful, loving, pure, sovereign, and triune. Heber’s hymn
fulfills not only the purpose of reinforcing this Christian orthodoxy, especially of the
“blessed Trinity,” but also of stressing the supernatural qualities of this truth claim by
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singing praises to the merciful and mysterious Holy of holies. According to the Psalter
Hymnal Handbook, his hymn reads “trinitarian in theme, but not in structure,” which
makes it curiously popular in the hymn books even of churches espousing variations on a
theme of Jesus’ divinity (“Holy”). Perhaps it cuts across these doctrinal differences—
edited lyrics notwithstanding—because of its affirmation and celebration of the “holy,”
whether rationalized through airtight hermeneutics or characterized by something much
less certain. Put simply, “holy” seems to create an addressable ambiguity, invoking
responses with varying degrees of openness.
The ideologies and mysteries presented by the hymn “Holy, holy, holy” offer a
microcosm of the approaches meaning makers have taken toward the divine that have
propelled social practices and institutions for better and for worse. Pursuing less vitriolic
orientations to this “holy” and developing deliberative-participatory practices necessitates
a more precise understanding of how these holy responses come in and out of being. To
do this, we will look to apparatus theory as a guide and framework. In Heuretics, Gregory
Ulmer describes “apparatus” as “an interactive matrix of technology, institutional
practices, and ideological subject formation,” which he ties to acts of invention (17). As
such, an apparatus is neither static nor absolute but is a fluid “social machine” that
evolves as its “laws and conventions in a given historical era” create and give name to
knowledge (Arroyo 2). The operative word—invent—is important to note as it implies
that meaning via the apparatus is agnostic. It arrives by being meted out in the world, not
by a primordial Essence or by a motive to achieve absolute Unity but through
assemblages of finite interlocutors, the contexts they inhabit, and the modes of
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communication they employ. Thus, applying apparatus to an examination of “holy” is to
begin from a premise that the holy, despite its invocation of a primordial Essence or
absolute Unity, is a construction and, thus, not immune to discursive constraints.
Apparatus theory is also an affirmation of the social nature and practice of religion as
defined above. The figurations we consider below trace transformations of holiness
across three apparati that Ulmer locates in his body of work: orality, literacy, and
electracy.8
Holy Orality: The Whole
In Electronic Monuments, Ulmer describes the “matrix of orality” as one
involving “natural language” as its technology. Here, “natural” denotes the spoken word,
which Eric Havelock in The Muse Learns to Write describes as firmly rooted in an
embodied, acoustic domain. Orality, he contends, deals with proximate speakers making
articulations distinctly in the here and now. Walter Ong in Orality and Literacy also
emphasizes the temporality and ephemerality of the sonic realm, adding that it seeks to
“incorporate” rather than isolate, involving interlocutors in “immersive” communicative
moments that seek social and epistemological cohesion (70). In other words, meaning in
orality is necessarily relational, fully reliant on a mouthpiece, and, for it to hold, must be
perceived and remembered in unified, repetitive utterances. There is no abstraction
between the known and the knower, explains Ong. As a result, the spoken word takes on

8

While distinct technologies, practices, and subjectivities characterize the shifts, the apparati ultimately
build off of one another and maintain room for their predecessor. In Konsult, Ulmer notes that “these
apparati complement one another in principle, despite the historical record of hostility and mutual repulsion
of the respective institutions” (89).
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what he calls an “interior” function. The body becomes not just a means to project
information to others but also becomes sound’s receptacle. “When I hear,” asserts Ong, “I
gather sound simultaneously from every direction at once: I am at the center of my
auditory world, which envelopes me, establishing me at a kind of core of sensation and
existence” (70). Thus, the technology of natural language serves an ontological purpose,
relating “in a special way to the sacral, to the ultimate concerns of existence” (72).
Orality is not an analytical examination of existence but is when an audience “clapped
and danced and sang collectively, in response to the chanting of the singer” (Havelock,
Muse 78). Put simply, it is the active, immediate, and harmonious participation of bodies,
minds, and emotions—the mechanism by which I know and perceive you in this moment.
Within this matrix of orality, Ulmer finds the “holy” playing a significant role.
More specifically, he recognizes it as an ordering principle, a way to create unity through
embodied, performative, and participatory acts: “the institution of religion with its
mnemonic practice of ritual; the tribe as collective identity; and the individual experience
of identity as spirit (thought experienced as the voice of god or spirit outside of oneself)”
(Electronic Monuments xxiii). Havelock takes up this first idea—the “institution of
religion” as a mnemonic device—in his essay “Pre-Literacy and the Pre-Socratics,”
where he examines the social practices of pre-literate Greeks. He notes that the oral
culture of the time demanded much from memory. The recollections of people in a
society were the primary device to accumulate and hold information, making “rhythmic”
patterns of speech a crucial memory aid. The holy, what Havelock calls a “godapparatus,” was used as “the medium by which the phenomena to be described can be
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most easily cast into the required syntax, and so most easily recalled” (232, my
emphasis). In other words, the holy offered what Marshall McLuhan calls an “extension
of ourselves”—a medium—to host and carry meaning into coherence (Essential 151). In
the case of the ancient Greeks, god(s) provided a vehicle for meaning through narrative—
a grammar of sorts—that could be leveraged as memory cues. Ong makes clear that these
moments of communication were not wielded to attach specific and definitive meaning to
things. Rather, primary orality9 was “empathetic and participatory rather than objectively
distanced,” involving interlocutors in a dynamic negotiation of meaning that worked
toward social harmony (42). Though not immune to change and conflict, meaning was
ultimately “conservative or traditionalist” within an oral framework and primarily waged
to achieve homeostatic, “close-knit groups,” or the “tribe as collective identity” notion
that Ulmer asserts (46). Thus, the holy worked not to divide but to corral.
In addition to serving an organizational purpose, the holy of orality also maintains
its distinctness from the human lifeworld—the “outside of oneself” quality to which
Ulmer points. Ong notes that the biblical God is characterized as one such god: “In this
teaching, God the Father utters or speaks His Word, his Son. He does not inscribe him.
The very Person of the Son is constituted as the Word of the Father” (175). We find this
“Word” in the first chapter of the New Testament book of John: “In the beginning was
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (New King James
Version). Here, “Word” is the Greek logos (λόγος), which the pre-Socratic philosopher

Ong applies “primary” as a descriptor for orality pre-alphabet. This is an important distinction to make
since orality still exists. Our move into what Ong calls “secondary orality” signals the impact of literacy
and electronic technologies on spoken and gestural communication.
9
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Heraclitus, by way of his twenty-first-century translator Catherine Osborne, calls “the
systematic structure which underlies every aspect of our experience” (91). 10 The λόγος,
asserts Heraclitus in fragment 50, is the voice that says “all is one” and orders the
universe (93). Yet, as he says in fragment 1, “people are out of touch both before they
have heard it and once first they have heard it […] it eludes other people what they are
doing when they are awake, just as it eludes them what they do in their sleep” (92).
Operating in this framework, the λόγος encompasses all but hides in plain sight. There is
an inherent ambiguity in the λόγος that Heraclitus does not clarify but, instead, validates;
it is the evident and the elusive—the known and the unknown, that which experience
presents before us and that which exceeds understanding—held in the same breath:
unresolved contradictions. Sarah Kofman finds Heraclitus’ successors, namely Plato and
Aristotle, accusing him of being unnecessarily contradictory and unsound in his logic,
condemning the pre-Socratic for obscuring “a will to truth and clarity” (42), which they
recognized as the correct pursuit of truth. Kofman, however, argues, that to question
Heraclitus’ “obscurity” is not to reprove the philosopher for being vague or needlessly

To be clear, Heraclitus’ use and examination of logos do not point to a deity. In fact, the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes his philosophy as shifting “focus from the cosmic to the human
realm,” making him what we might call “the first humanist” (“Heraclitus”). Nevertheless, including his
human-centric perspective does not make his articulation of logos irrelevant to or incongruent with a
cosmological one. Catholic monk Columba Cary Elwes notes that the apostle John, presumed to be the
author of the book of John, used λόγος in his writing as “an expression of Christian revelation in Greek
dress” (248). Instead of claiming that λόγος in this book is wholly devoid of Greek influence, as some
Bible scholars argue, Elwes contends that John’s λόγος is “taking over the word ‘logos’ which already had
some analogous meanings; apply these meanings, modify them, and make them serve the purposes of
Catholic theology” (249). As a result, he recognizes John not as negating the “Greek dress” but as opening
logos up to include “an infinitely deeper meaning, new meaning, without entirely stripping them of their
original [Greek] content” (249). I present this information not to make a value judgment on which λόγος is
more or less correct. Instead, I emphasize that Christian and Greek iterations of λόγος are no strangers to
each other.
10
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confusing but is “to lend an ear to the logos, to that which has been gathered and
deposited there, modestly held in reserve, in check, unthought, and which he himself has
not thought as such, that which we cannot yet think, and which alone can invite and
provoke us to think” (41). Put simply, the λόγος, the Spoken Divine, the god-apparatus,
the holy of orality cannot be limited to utterances captured by the body experiencing the
world. While serving a function that helps order these experiences, it remains in the
beyond of both comprehension and being. It is that which speaks to and beyond us,
imbuing our selves with meaning and activity, and to which we have no choice but to
collectively and agonistically invoke and respond with voice and body.
Holy Literacy: The Wound
When reduced to a written word, “holy” points to a similar expansiveness in its
etymology, especially through its pre-Christian roots. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED), the term was a derivative of the adjective hailo-, what later became
hál in Old English, meaning “free from injury, whole” (“holy”). From a linguistic
perspective, when paired with orality’s λόγος as Spoken God, we might take this
definition to mean free from discursive limitations and free to hold meanings—manifest
and abstract—wholly. The “holy” of orality cannot be wounded with voice and body,
only engaged or disengaged. It can, however, be wounded and inflict a wound by the pen.
Though not the first instance of humanity’s use of a symbolic system (Sterne), the
advent of the alphabet marks the beginning of discursive and social separation, a chasm
(i.e., wound) built between the known and the knower by a medium not cueing memory
but relieving it of its primary function: remembrance. In its place is what Plato in the
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Phaedrus infamously calls “the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality,” made visible
through the “invention” of the written word, which “will enable them [students] to hear
many things without being properly taught” (275a). Though hyperbolic in its delivery,
Plato’s sentiments toward writing express an anxiety that somewhat pans out; the
technology of alphabetic text enables a transmission of information in the absence of an
embodied speaker. It can manifest through sheer, disembodied, textual appearance, no
repetitions or catchy epithets necessary. What Plato misses, however, is the psychological
and social impact of the technology of writing, especially on himself. He reduces text to a
tool, a means to carry (and, in the process, corrupt) thought to an interlocutor. Ong,
however, argues that this technology not only alters the dissemination of and engagement
with meaning but also “restructures thought” itself (19).
In his lecture “Emergent Ontologies,” Ulmer speaks to this restructuring by using
Plato as a case study. He credits the philosopher with inventing the first concept, justice.
“The concept is an extraordinary invention,” he explains. “Plato took the verb to be,
which was just a way to get from the subject to the predicate, the copula, and turned it
into ontology, asking the first philosophical question, what is justice? That is to say, what
are its features, what is its essence? How do you define it?” (309). Ulmer contends that
this logic and drive to define is a symptom of alphabetic writing—the technology of the
matrix of literacy—which enables Plato to pursue a question of being in the first place.
Havelock, using Greek culture and the development of Western philosophy as his lens,
fleshes out this claim by describing the transition from orality to literacy as a movement
from “to do” to “to be,” the domain of the ear to the domain of the eye: “The first
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beginnings of the alphabetic revolution have occurred, in the creation of a topic as a
subject of a ‘discourse’ made possible by the conversion of acoustically preserved
memorized speech into materially preserved visible artifacts that are capable of
rearrangement” (103). Writing, in other words, exteriorizes and, thus, objectifies
meaning. It enables the writer to reflect on an idea alone, observe it like an artifact in a
museum, and develop a separate consideration of it. Since there is no pressure to defend
ideas in real time via a verbal debate or to recall solely from memory, the writer has the
luxury of space and time to formulate a premeditated and polished critique or a
standalone utterance—to, as McLuhan asserts in Understanding Media, “act without
reacting.” With the introduction of print, writing becomes an extremely linear, solitary,
analytical act11 and, according to McLuhan, creates a citizenry classified by specialties—
that which defines individuals in relation to society—instead of their “unique emotional
mixes” (50). We lose breathing, clapping, dancing, singing interlocutors and replace them
with symbols, a mode of communication that Ong describes as “frozen and in a sense
dead” (“Writing” 22). Yet, he asserts, with the lifelessness of text—what he calls “rigid
visual fixity”—comes an incredible longevity of meaning, a “potential for [it] being
resurrected into limitless living contexts by a limitless number of living readers” (22). In
the absence of a fleshy body comes a body of knowledge, an archive of information that
can be passed down with astonishing accuracy. In the presence of this body of

11

This is not to say that oral cultures lacked structure, analysis, and the ability to reason in their
communication or cognitive abilities. Anthropologists and linguists have taken great pains to emphasize
that pre-print societies had sophisticated systems of reasoning and were not “primitive” in their use of
language. Literacy, in other words, is not a superior tradition to an oral one.
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knowledge, we also see the will to define and master come into clearer focus, especially
when applied to the “holy.”
To better recognize the holy’s alliance to systems of definition and mastery, we
must first examine how it progresses through and adjusts to the literacy apparatus. Recall
that in the orality apparatus, the holy requires embodied participation and ritual—i.e.,
dynamic worship—to stay legible to pious practitioners. In the context of nascent
literacy, Pieter Botha finds early sacred texts being composed with these oral practices in
mind.
The scribal culture of antiquity exhibits a strong bias towards orality, with
even literates often expressing little confidence in writing. There was a
prevailing preference for the “living voice,” and a strong belief that
distinct bodies of knowledge which were never written down, and could
not be written down, distinguished the insiders from the outsiders. (xii)
Here, we see a skepticism toward writing akin to Plato’s, highlighting the impact and
endurance of orality in the apparatus of literacy. Moreover, Botha even locates the active
nature of orality in the formation of ancient Greco-Roman texts: “Writing activities were
collective and participatory, and ranged, depending on the location and period, from
government support to editorial, translation, and facilitation work to entertainment to
legal practice to education, embedded in pre-print contexts without the judicial and social
institution of copyright” (xiv, my emphasis). Botha describes institutional practices
unconcerned with authorship or ownership and emulating, instead, the communal
mentality of orality. In her study on communication in early Christianity, Holly E.
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Hearon adds that “the purpose of the scribal text (like a musical score) was to record the
sound of the voice so that it could, in effect, be replayed” (51). These texts, in other
words, were not intended to be chiseled in stone but were meant to be heard by an
audience and re-embodied. In fact, Hearon notes that writings were not considered
expressive of their full “potential” until they were spoken. She finds evidence of figures
like the apostle Paul writing/dictating epistles to faraway peoples and instructing the
carrier of these letters to deliver not only the content but also its performance—gestures,
vocal inflections, and all.
Despite these similarities to the living apparatus of orality, the holy of the literacy
apparatus also exhibits a penchant for definition and linearity, which ultimately bends in
favor of a logic of mastery. We see this prominently in a Christian context in the
formation of biblical canon and church dogma.12 By way of Gunther Kress, Hearon posits
that resources and practices emerge as a result of a “prompt,” or a sociocultural need. In
the case of early Christianity, she suggests that the growing diversity and persecution
experienced by what she calls “Jesus communities” catalyzed a need for unity. Hearon
via Botha explains that the Gospels, or the written narratives of the life and death of Jesus
Christ, manifested amidst this backdrop and served a purpose “to establish credibility of
witness by appeal, on the one hand, to oral and written sources (Luke 1:1-4) and on the

12

Presenting an extensive history of the Bible as well as the formation and catalysts of Christianity and
Church dogma is well beyond the scope of this project. Thus, we will sidestep this review and, instead,
focus on how the literacy apparatus, broadly conceived, helps facilitate a cohesive Christian identity
through the written word. With this being said, scholars like social psychologist Ara Norenzayan and
sociologist Rodney Stark identify compelling reasons for religious formation and endurance. See
Norenzayan’s 2013 Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict and Stark’s 1996 The
Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History.
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other to a line of testimony (John 19:35; 21:24-25)” (63). In this description of the
Gospels, what would later become biblical canon, we see the will to define a clear ethos
and linear narrative for the Christ, perhaps something around which early Christians,
divided across time and place, could rally. Mark C. Taylor in Erring argues that this plot
consists of five chronological points: “Creation, Fall, Incarnation,
Crucifixion/Resurrection, and Redemption” (65). Jesus, explains Taylor, is the
“revelatory figure” who “is the intelligible event that makes all other events intelligible.
Christ, in other words, is the logos that discloses the logic and rationale of time as a
whole” (65). Within this characterization, the holy is Alpha and Omega; the divine entity
with an ability to encompass and justify the concepts of beginning and end in their
totality; the consistent, historical through line offering unity to the universe. Put simply,
Jesus as “figure,” made manifest through the written Word, enables an ultimate,
replicable act of definition.
Literacy’s Holy Who Wounds
Following Plato’s literate logic, we might ask, what kind of definition does the
Christ of the literate holy enable? What is its essence? While I will ultimately argue, like
Victor Vitanza, for an answer of “some more” (“‘Some More’” 121), let us momentarily
turn our attention to a dominating, dogmatic “one”—the one that wounds through
exclusion and, thus, prompts a need for discursive alternatives. In The Idea of the Holy,
Rudolf Otto, an early twentieth-century German theologian, claims that language
“purports to convey ideas or concepts” and often does so at the expense of the nonrational (2). He explains that an orthodox perspective when it comes to conceptualizing
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God is that “the more clearly and unequivocally” language can perform this task, “the
better the language. And hence expositions of religious truth in language inevitably tend
to stress the ‘rational’ attributes of God” (2). He attributes this reduction of the holy not
to a nefarious motive to oppose “the miraculous” or to excise mystical religious
experiences but, instead, as an inability to find a place for the non-rational elements of
the holy in structures of language: “So far from keeping the non-rational element in
religion alive in the heart of the religious experience, orthodox Christianity manifestly
failed to recognize its value, and by this failure gave to the idea of God a one-sidedly
intellectualist and rationalistic interpretation” (3). Such a logical characterization of God
paves the way for what Otto’s contemporary, Adolph Harnack, calls Christian dogma,
which he defines as
doctrines of the Christian faith logically formulated and expressed for
scientific and apologetic purposes, the contents of which are a knowledge
of God, of the world and of the provisions made by God for man’s
salvation. The Christian Churches teach them as the truths revealed in
Holy Scripture, the acknowledgement of which is the condition of the
salvation which religion promises. (1, my emphases)
Here, we see a “holy” that can be defined in rational terms, studied as “content” through
which specific knowledge of truths can be gained through information captured and
standardized in print. Using the term “apologetic,” Harnack exposes the defensive logic
of the rational holy, one that can protect a divine perspective from variation and enshrine
it as a “condition” for understanding a locatable truth and, in more dire terms, attaining
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salvation. A parallel to Christian dogma is what Taylor calls a “system,” which he
associates with the figure of a circle, or that which “can be neither incomplete nor
unfinished”—in other words, necessarily closed. The systematic theologian, he explains,
“attempts to shape his work into a complete whole, with a clear beginning, middle, and
end” (79). Taken together, this formulation of the literacy apparatus’ holy is one that can
achieve absolute unity through linear, logic-based linguistic structures and can create a
system of language that promotes a totalizing historical and ideological narrative.
Even just a cursory glance at the history of religion, and Western Christianity in
particular, reveals that violent and oppressive hierarchies13 repeatedly follow in the wake
of this iteration of the literate holy. The unwounded, supposedly whole “holy,” expressed
in perfectly rational terms, all too often leads to institutional practices and ideological
subject formations that justify and perform a terrible wounding by excluding or
demonizing that which falls beyond the bounds of the theologian’s circle. Critical applied
linguist Alastair Pennycook finds that many colonizers, especially of the eighteenth
century, cited commitment to a Christian narrative—one where God willed the spread of
the Gospel message to the entire world14—as motivation for their conquest of non-

Here, I reference Kenneth Burke’s notion that humans are “goaded by the spirit of hierarchy” (40).
I reference Matthew 28:19-20 here, commonly known as the Great Commission, where the resurrected
Christ instructs his disciples, “Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have
commanded you: and, lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world. Amen.” Protestant
Evangelicals typically associate this charge with what David Bebbington calls “activism,” or the conviction
that the Gospel message should be widely and openly disseminated. In his exegesis of the Great
Commission, Paul Hertig clarifies that “go and make disciples” does not imbue the disciple with divine
status or a license to convert with force. Instead, he claims that Jesus’ mission “is holistic and without
ulterior motive […] To put it succinctly, ‘Mission is the church sent into the world, to love, to serve, to
preach, to teach, to heal, to liberate’” with or without the recipient capitulating to the divine narrative (348349); however, he notes that when mission becomes bound up with “spiritual activity,” which he describes
as more of a legalistic, abstracted concern for church attendance and sacrament than performing tangible
13
14
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Christian peoples. The English language, explains Pennycook, became a close ally to and
enabler of these colonization efforts. It was the means by which eighteenth-century
British colonizer Charles Grant could teach “Hindus to reason, and to obtain new and
better views of their duty as rational and Christian creatures” (qtd. in 140, my
emphases). It was “used as a template for the analysis of other languages, foisting English
metalanguage on African languages” and, thus, casting sophisticated indigenous
languages as understandable only outside of their native contexts (141). It is currently
“part of a ‘stealth crusade’” to convert Muslims through English language-learning
programs (143), a tactic not unfamiliar to seventeenth and early eighteenth-century
English colonizers of the Massachusett, Narragansett, and Mohegan-Pequot—Native
Americans of southeastern New England. In her article “Dead Men Tell No Tales,”
American historian Jill Lepore asks, “Can literacy destroy? And, in the context of a
broader cultural conflict, can one of the consequences of literacy be the death of those
who acquire it?” (482). Through the life and death of John Sassamon—a seventeenthcentury Massachusett forced into assimilation by way of Christianity and the English
language—Lepore suggests that the answer is yes. Literacy, she explains, enabled Puritan
missionaries to define Christian discourse as a uniquely English phenomenon,15 rendering
Native American languages as “barbaric and even satanic” and justifying violent

acts of “charity” with no ulterior motive, a hunger for control comes into play. “The church has many times
sought control in the name of servanthood: ‘Be a servant’ meant be my servant” (348). Again, we see acts
of holy definition (e.g., ritual and statements of belief to prove fidelity) tied to closure (e.g., be my servant).
15
The same could, of course, be said of other nations employing language in their missionary-colonization
efforts. Vincente L. Rafael, for example, notes that the Spanish Hapsburg empire’s translation practices
were an example of “logocentrism” that worked to “tame the instability and unreliability of language” by
“reducing, framing, governing and conducting the movement of language so as to reproduce and safeguard
a hierarchy of languages” (91).
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responses to those unwilling to assimilate (487). Literacy also required a “graduated
succession of cultural concessions”—especially conversion to Christianity through study
of the Bible in English—and offered the only pathway to an acceptable identity within
the confines of colonial society. Sassamon, liminal in his identities as a literate, “praying
Indian” as well as a Massachusett, was ultimately murdered in King Philip’s War for his
role as “cultural mediator” between colonists and Wampanoag chief Metacom because he
had no definitive answer to a recurring question of definition: “What are you, an Indian
or an Englishman?” (502). Ultimately, Lepore’s account of Sassamon presents what she
calls a harrowing allegory reminding language users that “the acquisition of literacy
acting in tandem with conversion to Christianity can be a dangerous, even fatal
combination” (505). In each of these briefly detailed instances, we have divine sanction
for woundings mediated and made possible by literacy’s grammar of “to be”—ontologies
that tend toward closure at the expense of cultural and epistemological alternatives. You
are a rational, Christian creature. You are purposeful, knowable, or teachable only
through alignment with my conception of the divine narrative. You are socially legible
solely through my penning of this historical narrative and identity.
We continue to see the literacy apparatus’ tendencies at play in more absolutist
interpretations of the Bible, positions typically upheld by Protestant Evangelicals, the
Christian Right, and Christian Nationalists in the United States today.16 According to

16

These three descriptors are neither synonymous nor a monolith, though they can exhibit similar logics.
We might characterize Protestant Evangelicals, the Christian Right, and Christian Nationalism as religious
group, political player, and cultural framework respectively. Evangelicals, characterized by David
Bebbington’s widely accepted “quadrilateral,” is an umbrella term for Christians across denominations who
believe the following: 1) conversionism, “the understanding of conversion as a personal experience that
significantly transforms each Christian’s life”; 2) biblicism, “the premise that the Bible is the ultimate
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anthropologist James S. Bielo, Bible belief relies on the concept of “the sincere speaker,”
or an interlocutor who “speaks truthfully, honestly, and refuses rote formula” (633).
When Almighty, Perfect God occupies this role, that which proceeds from the mouth of
God, codified by inspired writers of scripture, is not just considered sincere but is deemed
Almighty and Perfect by extension—infallible. Bielo finds that Bible believers recognize
the text, much like its omnipotent Speaker, as “unparalleled in power, influence, and
wisdom; wholly unique, revered and read unlike any other text. The notion that
something—a text, an event, an experience—can trump the Bible as a source of guidance
is unthinkable in the Evangelical imagination” (634). In other words, the Bible, by the
transitive property, obtains an inerrant status, creating an impenetrable interpretive
framework claiming Truth. In their 2016 defense of biblical inerrancy, evangelical
writers Norman L. Geisler and Shawn Nelson claim that Christian faith hinges on the
three legs of “inspiration, infallibility, and inerrancy of Scripture,” and to compromise
one leg would result in the total collapse of the belief system (20). Thus, Geisler, in a solo

authority for Christian living”; 3) activism, “the impulse to spread and enact faith through relief/social
work”; 4) crucicentrism, “a focus on the substitutionary death of Christ” (qtd. in Cope and Ringer 107).
While adherents to some of these values, the Christian Right is not an identity or belief system but, rather,
“a loose collection of people and organizations” that are commonly associated with political activism
opposing abortion legislation, divorce, and LGBTQ+ rights and supporting candidates and positions that
advocate for “prayer and other religious symbols in schools and government” (Feld et al. 175). Christian
Nationalism, however, takes the belief structures of evangelicalism and combines it with political
involvement to form identity. Andrew Whitehead and Samuel L. Perry assert that Christian Nationalism is
“as ethnic and political as it is religious” (10). As a “cultural framework,” it, according to Whitehead and
Perry, “blurs distinctions between Christian identity and American identity, viewing the two as closely
related and seeking to enhance and preserve their union. It is undergirded by identification with a
conservative political orientation (though not necessarily a political party), Bible belief, premillennial
visions of moral decay, and divine sanction for conquest. Finally, its conception of morality centers
exclusively on fidelity to religion and fidelity to the nation” (15). I draw these distinctions to emphasize
that their conflation can lead to dangerous assumptions of individuals affiliated with these descriptors. Not
all evangelicals are affiliated with the Christian Right or Christian Nationalism. Not all individuals
associated with Christian Right organizations or movements believe in the vision of Christian Nationalism.
Not all Christian Nationalists are ardent supporters of church and state unity.
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piece clarifying misunderstandings of and “attacks” on the doctrine of inerrancy, argues
that interpretation of scripture is not a matter of imposing external frames onto its literary
elements but, instead, requires exegesis, or “reading meaning out of the text” (6). Such a
method relies on what New Testament scholar W. Harold Mare calls a conservative
hermeneutics, or an understanding founded on “the logical and rational presupposition of
a personal God communicating verbally and in written factual form to personal man in
space and time, telling him all about his created world and his plan to redeem men” (17,
my emphases). Thus, according to inerrant scripture, there is no Truth outside of the Text.
For “outside” to be Truth, it must be redeemed into the likeness of the holy inside or
excised altogether. When conflated with political and ideological motives, this rationale
finds absolute biblical justification for patriarchal gender roles (Scholz; Hoffmann and
Bartkowski), the condemnation of LGBTQ+ individuals (Jaekel; Whitehead, “Sacred
Rites”), corporal punishment for the discipline of children (Ellison et al.), the
“whitewashing” of problematic biblical tenets and practices to both mask and preserve
evangelical orthodoxy (Perry), and the purging of secular values to “restore” the United
States as a Christian nation founded on dominionist biblical ideals (Brockman;
Whitehead and Scheitle; Whitehead and Perry; Aho), to name a few.
Though not the sole motivator for oppression, violence, and exclusion, the logics
of the literacy apparatus, especially as codified through written language, are particularly
adept at creating conditions for impressions of mastery. As evidenced by the formation
and expression of Christian dogma that privileges a rational view of God, literacy’s holy
tends to lock meaning into stable, replicable, divinely sanctioned ideas that catalyze
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participation but often at the expense of deliberation, diverse identities, and cultural
differences. Emboldened by calls to evangelize standardized notions of the holy, holy
rhetors (i.e., mouthpieces of the Divine) must act, collaborate, and commune but with the
intent to close the universe of discourse around a whole God: the objectively all-good,
all-knowing, all-powerful Logos.17
Assemblage 2: Holy, Holey, Wholly
The Negative, The Trace, The Numinous
But, of course, it is more complicated than that.18 Before we get to another
iteration of the holy in our third apparatus—electracy—we must complicate the premises
knitted together in our previous assemblage. Doing so will pave the way for the
“Electrate Religion” intervention we have been anticipating.
Thus far, we have followed literacy’s logic by defining a holy one, exposing its
ties to the apparatus’ penchant for mastery, linearity, fixity, and wounding. Language in
this apparatus works to preserve a constant and consistent portrait of the divine, which
not only enables the formation of set dogma and religious identity but also births the
assumption that these constructs can operate as totalizing systems of reality and, thus, be

In her chapter entitled “Sacred Passages, Rhetorical Passwords,” Cynthia Haynes offers logos
spermatikos—the Stoic notion that “God’s sperm disseminated logic throughout the universe” (42)—as
another reading of this all-encompassing Logos. In this framework, reason is, once again, the highest
principle as it “actively” orders what it deems to be “passive” beings’ action and thought. “In the Stoic
cosmology,” explains Haynes, “the active is the divine logos, the passive is the physical substance in the
world” (42). With God both sanctioning and disseminating logos, reason takes on a solipsistic quality. It
needs no justification, no permission, no claim to authority. It simply is and can, thus, designate (i.e.,
dominate, penetrate) without restraint. Via Andrea Nye, Haynes notes that “this logic kept women out of
the affairs of state because the feminine principle was passive,” an observation we might extrapolate to the
groups and systems we examined in this section (42).
18
See Kenneth Burke’s drama “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven.”
17
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imposed—in many cases through material and symbolic violence—on that which falls
beyond its bounds. Kenneth Burke, Victor Vitanza, and Jacques Derrida ascribe this
ability to the negative element of language, or what Burke calls a “peculiarly linguistic
invention, not a ‘fact’ of nature, but a function of a symbol-system” (20). A term, he
explains, is not the thing it signifies. For example, “tree” is but a representation of the
wooden mass rooted in a forest. Abstracted, as Ong also noted, from the natural world,
terms can only represent through symbolic relation: a signifier (i.e., “tree”) attached to a
signified (i.e., thing). The process of attachment (i.e., signification), which leads to what
Ferdinand de Saussure calls a “sign,” requires negation, or throwing out all other
possibilities of representation: a tree is not a flower, a glass of water, a human. Signs
fulfill what Taylor describes as “need,” which also operates according to the principle of
the negative as “a lack that is ‘like a gap or a ‘hole’ in Space: an emptiness, a
nothingness’” (26). He posits, “The effort to fulfill need embodies the logic of simple
negation that characterizes the struggle for mastery. Satisfaction involves the assimilation
of otherness that occurs when difference dissolves in identity” (27). Thus, for finite
rhetors claiming the inerrancy and omnipotence of the holy across time and space, God as
a sign and stable identity must be uniformly “centered in Himself and is the center of
everything else […] Since plurality is always subject to change, the immutable cannot be
many and must be one […] Unable to suffer any change whatsoever, God’s knowledge
cannot develop and therefore must always be perfect or complete” (36). The holy framed
within the parameters of need and satisfaction must fill the emptiness absolutely; it
cannot be holey.
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While the principle of the negative allows signs to allege wholeness, it also
contains the seed—a trace—of its own destabilization. In Negation, Subjectivity, and the
History of Rhetoric, Vitanza likens negation to a pharmakon,19 a poison and/or a cure,
and warns that “in overdoses, it is extremely dangerous . . . By saying No, we would
purchase our identity. Know ourselves. By purifying the world, we would exclude that
which in our different opinions, threatens our identity” (12-13). He hears poisonous
echoes of the holocaust in this logic of negation and purification of identity, and, in the
context of this present argument, we might also catch hints of the wounds inflicted by
Christian discourse. Vitanza suggests that arriving at a cure requires us to challenge our
symbolic attachments—to “denegate the negative […] Meanings are. Simply put, I would
further problematize them” (13; 16). Derrida in Of Grammatology offers the trace as this
destabilizing element, which he describes as a mark of the negative in the positive of a
sign. Gayatri Spivak, in her translator’s preface to this text, explains, “The structure of
the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever absent […]
Derrida, then, gives the name ‘trace’ to the part played by the radically other within the
structure of difference that is the sign” (xvii). As such, signs are forever haunted by
legion palimpsests of difference and cannot lay claim to an absolute signified, despite
their best efforts. Thus, the remedy is not deus ex machina but originates from within the

In Dissemination, Derrida describes pharmakon as “the drug: the medicine and/or poison,” emphasizing
that while it holds the capacity to be either-and-or, it is ultimately “neither remedy nor poison” (70). Being
neither-nor, the pharmakon, he explains, is an ambivalent “medium in which opposites are opposed, the
movement and the play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross over into
the other (soul/body, good/evil, inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing, etc.)” (127). He
relates writing to a pharmakon in order to illustrate the polysemous nature of language and the blurriness
between terms, even those claiming more definitive meanings.
19
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system of language itself as a recognition of this infinite difference—the excluded others.
In “Structure, Sign, and Play,” Derrida suggests that the “absence of the transcendent
signified extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum” (249). In
other words, the presence of the trace destabilizes meaning by calling attention to the
ambivalence of and multiplicity in signification. One sign simply leads to another sign
and another sign, etc. Therefore, in the play of signification—what Derrida calls
différance—one recognizes the radical opening of discursive possibilities, casting the
need for closure and absolute definition as “a vain and breathless quest of an infinite
richness which it [language] can never master” (260).
Needless to say, the trace poses a huge inconvenience for individuals who make
efforts to tame the infinitude of language and, as a result, establish a cohesive holy. Burke
reminds us that in symbolic systems, God can only show up through words about the
supernatural, which are all subject to deconstruction. Thus, the trace challenges the very
ontology of the Word who became flesh by representing Divinity as but a passing term of
différance. This begs the questions, what do we do with God in the apparatus of unstable
language? What does the holy-who-wounds become when it is itself wounded by the
trace?
Let us tackle these inquiries by first revisiting our characterization of the holy.
While Rudolf Otto20 helped us name a more orthodox approach—God’s transcendence as
“completely good” and “the consummation of moral goodness” (5)—and language’s role

Though Otto’s translator describes him as “more a religious philosopher than a dogmatic theologian,” it’s
important to note that Otto’s ideas draw from a Christian tradition.
20
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in calcifying this more “rational” characterization, the core of his The Idea of the Holy
points to what he calls the numinous, or the non-rational surplus, beyond-good quality of
God. In order for God to, in fact, be God, the holy cannot just be a predictably benevolent
Being in the sky who we learn about in Scripture. God, he argues, is also mysterium
tremendum: deeply mysterious, awe-full, and almost terrifying to human understanding.
Exceeding knowledge and expression themselves, God is necessarily “wholly other,”
operating on a transcendent plane of the ineffable, a dimension that sentient mortals can
only apprehend via analogy and affect (i.e., not through language alone). Otto posits that
we register, or briefly identify with, the holy only in moments of “religious experience”
that “must be awakened,” not through rote instruction or a symbolic system but through
evocation—something felt (7). The event of identification produces an unprompted
“feeling of ‘something uncanny’, ‘eerie’, or ‘weird’” (14), sensations that provoke
“creature-feeling,” or a profound awareness of self, or our own nothingness in relation to
overwhelming strangeness (24). Yet, in this state of self-conscious helplessness and in the
face of almost monstrous presence, the holy, explains Otto, is strangely fascinating. It
births an “untiring impulse,” inspiring “inexhaustible invention” that works not to fully
represent or pin down the numinous but to keep “the religious consciousness alive” (64).
Otto describes this impulse as “a force that knows not stint nor stay, which is urgent,
active, compelling, and alive” (22). Put another way, the holy-as-numinous is like an
elusive, awe-inspiring exigency that simultaneously reminds finite beings of their finitude
and rouses them into spontaneous, affect-driven encounters that excite creativity and are
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necessarily non-rational—they can never end in mastery, definition, or full representation
of that which catalyzed the numinous feeling.
Since we have been dealing with the discursive dimensions of the holy—i.e., the
analogies—we will reserve address of the affective and relational dimensions of the
numinous for later in this chapter. For now, let us acknowledge that Otto’s experience of
the numinous resembles the trace, that ghostly, negated presence lurking in every
manifestation of the transcendent (a paradox in itself!). To adhere to this frame of the
holy is to humbly admit that the Being we invoke is largely unknowable, a stance that
Nicholas of Cusa called “knowing ignorance” (qtd. in Keller 205). Any knowledge we
access will only ever be a taste or a hint of the real thing, if such a thing exists. The
numinous also implies that the very terms “Being” and “thing” are analogies in and of
themselves. All we can do as symbol users is, as Catherine Keller asserts via feminist
theologian Elizabeth Johnson, fold epistemologies of God back into the darkness of
unknowing, which involves terms being “endlessly unnamed and renamed” (203). This
darkness, Keller wagers by way of Meister Eckhart and Cusa, is not pitted against light as
evil (dark) versus good (light). Instead, the dark is “the divine itself” (201)—it is,
paradoxically, a “luminous” darkness (203). Keller continues: “the ‘darkness of our
ignorance’ is not a fault or sin. The sin is to deny the darkness” (205). Thus, to negate the
numinous, luminous trace is not to know more of God but is to deviate from the holy
altogether and succumb to idolatry, creating God in our image through our own medium
of perception: language.
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Apophasis and Khora: Holey Holy
Continuing our pursuit of what to do with God in an apparatus of unstable
language, if we are to see the holy as this luminous dark, an ontological impossibility,21
we must subscribe to an apophatic epistemological tradition—accessing God by what
God is not, since every attempted definition will uncover only a miniscule fraction of the
Infinite and, from the moment of its utterance, also be subject to the trace. This approach
is the premise for a movement of thought called negative theology, commonly known as
and conflated with apophatic theology. Drawing from the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius
the Areopagite, Andrew Louth describes negative theology as “an approach to God that
proceeds by way of negation, by denying attributes of God” (71), or, put another way,
highlighting the infinite difference inherent in the name of God. He clarifies that such
negation “complements cataphatic [affirmative] theology, seems to undermine it, but in
reality undergirds it” (73). This complementarity to cataphasis, not its opposition,
emphasizes what Keller notes of theology more generally: truth “cannot be captured in
propositions, no matter how correct. But neither does it happen without propositions.
Theology is one hulking body of truth-claims, including that made by the present
sentence” (On the Mystery 20). In other words, negation and cataphasis are chiastic. Each
denotes and relies on the other; one cannot deny without first having something to deny.
Moreover, despite their difference in function, both negative and cataphatic theologies
are saturated in the world of ontology and are, thus, fully reliant on language. Shira

Psuedo-Dionysius calls this impossibility hyperousios, which Derrida in “How to Avoid Speaking:
Denials” calls “hyperessentiality,” or a “being beyond Being” (77).
21
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Wolosky echoes this in her examination of Derrida’s iteration of negative theology,
explaining that “both negative and positive [theology] are functions of the rhetoric they
employ; they are the descent and ascent up a ladder of being that itself is also inescapably
linguistic” (267). The difference between a purely cataphatic theology and the apophatic
tradition is that, as Michel Despland notes, negative theologies “serve effectively to
disengage Christian theologians from the habit of naively authoritative utterance” by
acknowledging language’s inability to carry truths absolutely (147)—that when
affirmations show up, they do not, by proxy, take on the transcendent and absolute
qualities of their language-defying referent. He continues, “What it [negative theology]
singularly takes away is the pretence [sic.] of directly communicating true opinion, such
truths as may be assimilated by the acquisition and interiorization of language” (155).
Here’s looking at you, biblical inerrancy.
As such, the negation of apophatic theology, explains Louth, creates a space
serving both an epistemological and ontological function. While space establishes an unfillable hole of meaning in regard to knowledge of God, it also establishes distance
between finite beings and the divine hyperousios. Louth contends that this is not to make
God completely inaccessible but is, instead, the means by which the divine milieu comes
to be:
This distance is not to be overcome: it is a distance that creates a space in
which something can happen. Something: in one sense everything, but in
another quite precise sense not just anything. This distance by which God
transcends all that has come from him defines a space in which the
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fundamental reality of these beings, a reality rooted in their relationship to
their source, is played out, or expressed. (77)
The reason Louth qualifies that not just anything can happen or form in this space rests
on the uniquely theological assumption that, as the end of the block quote asserts, there
can be relationship between being and God, what Louth calls theophany: “The
relationship between God and beings is fundamentally theophanic: beings reveal
something of God and by revealing something of God point beyond themselves to God”
(75). Thus, when it comes to relationship between God and being, the space intends to
create an opportunity for their engagement but does not promise to reveal all, or to
overcome the gap in that relationship. As John D. Caputo asserts in The Insistence of
God, “A God of the gaps is not the gap God fills, but the gap God opens” (x).
In line with the apophatic gesture, we must realize that a relationship with the
numinous trace—the open gap of potential—and its “intention” are not like relationship
and intent between material, finite beings. For fear of idolatry, God cannot be “friend,”
“lover,” or anthropomorphic other, though its affirmations may momentarily create this
illusion. Instead, this is relationship with the impossible, which Mark Taylor
characterizes as an economy of desire. As opposed to need, which requires closure,
“Desire desires desire […] The desiring subject discovers an other within that forever
disrupts the calm of simple self-identity. By refusing to transform desire into need, the
subject consents to its own incompletion” (147). Once again, beings in relationship with
God are brought to a profound understanding of their limitations, which Taylor asserts is
not commensurate with dissatisfaction within the economy of desire. Since desire needs a
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limit (i.e., a lack) and “if lack entails no deficiency, one might become free of the
dreadful need to overcome it. If the subject does not need to repress the other ‘within,’ it
is not driven to oppress the other ‘without.’ When desire forsakes the prospect of
complete satisfaction, it opens the possibility of delight” (147). Fusing Taylor’s
understanding of desire with theophany illustrates a relationship to God that does not
materialize in oppressive hierarchies or closure. In fact, Taylor describes delight as
“enjoyment without possession” (147). A possessed God (i.e., an idol) and/or a God that
possesses (i.e., an unnecessity for a God that is the always-already) would cease to be
God. As Owen Ware puts it, “The apophatic desire to experience God beyond the finite
structure of language must renounce itself in order to preserve the inaccessibility and
invisibility of the divine” (175). We need the space for the impossibility of relationship to
be possible, and this space “intends” for us not to colonize but to delight. Therefore, what
we “do” with God is joyfully exist in the space of this ever-holey relationship.
Put succinctly, the potential of relationship-as-desire is not the erasure of distance
but is its delight-filled celebration. Thus, “space” is a ripe analogy for exploration of our
second inquiry: What does the holy-who-wounds become when it is itself wounded by
the trace? With whom are we in relationship? To attempt an answer to this equally
impossible question, Derrida in his lecture “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials” might ask
us to reconsider the premise of the first part of our inquiry by changing “what” to
“where.” Pursuing the “what” is a fraught exercise, and Derrida disquietly wonders how
to speak of that which cannot be spoken, especially when we are dealing with the trace
that “means”—“hence does not mean anything—is ‘before’ the concept, the name, the
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word, ‘something’ that would be nothing, that no longer arises from Being, from presence
or from the presence of the present, nor even from absence, and even less from some
hyperessentiality” (79). We fail the moment we speak or think “what,” leaving silence as
our only and best option; but, as symbol-using animals (Burke), we must also concede to
needing some semblance of something to even register the impossibility of the trace.
Therefore, we might look instead to “where” this moment of perception occurs to get a
sense of “who” we might be in relationship with/to.
By way of Plato in the Timaeus, Derrida offers khora as the “where” to the
“what” of the trace. Plato describes khora as a “third type of space, which exists always
and cannot be destroyed” (52b). He contrasts it with 1) a type of inhospitable space that
neither has perceptible form nor holds anything and 2) a type of space that can be
perceived and is “begotten,” or can be created. Khora, itself not a creation, mediates the
two by providing an always-already space for being but does so by itself being neither a
place nor a space.22 Plato likens this quality to a base ointment that must remain odorless
if fragrance for perfume is to be added (50e). As such, khora must remain formless in
order to host form and, thus, cannot take on the characteristics of that which receives
place. Continuing this metaphor, the fragrance—the placed—cannot be perceived by a
simple sniff of the nose, or through a seemingly correlative sense faculty. Instead, things
in khora can only be “apprehended by a kind of bastard reasoning that does not involve
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We might conceptualize space and place as Yi Fu Tuan does in Space and Place: The Perspective of
Experience. He posits, “Place is security, space is freedom: we are attached to the one and long for the
other” (3). Thus, we might see “place” as actualized and “space” as potential. Tuan continues, “‘Space’ is
more abstract than ‘place.’ What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better
and endow it with value” (6). Put simply, defined space is place. Khora exceeds both of these
conceptualizations as it is neither but, rather, acts as their host.
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sense perception, and it is hardly even an object of conviction” (52b). In other words,
khora does not deny or discriminate against guests who seek residence in the land of
perception; however, being perceptible requires a different logic entirely. Thus, according
to Derrida, khora is “neither sensible nor intelligible” as either a non-space or to our
linguistic sensibilities (“How to Avoid” 105). If it can be apprehended, we must, as Plato
puts it, use a logic analogous to dreaming, one that defies our cravings for a tangible,
symbolic something. In his take on Derrida’s iteration of this enigmatic space, Thomas
Rickert finds that many in their description of khora default to the something by using
metaphors like “matrix (womb), mother, receptacle, nurse, or bearer of imprints” (62);
however, he clarifies that Derrida’s khora is none of these things because it is not. Khora,
argues Rickert by way of Derrida, is “puzzling given that it does not, in fact, take part in
symbolicity as we understand it, live it, and converse with it; rather, it gives place for
those metaphors to emerge” (63). Rickert asserts that khora, this pre-space non-space, is
akin to a passage between the purely abstract (e.g., Plato’s Forms, Lacan’s Real) and the
“physical world” (54). It is because of this function that Derrida claims khora “‘receives
all,’ makes possible the formation of the cosmos,” doing so by way of a radically nonexclusive logic (“How to” 105). From khora comes limitless creative potential, perhaps
even for a trace of God.
A Passage to the Wholly Other
This profoundly enigmatic characterization of “where” leads us to the second part
of our inquiry: in the space of khora, with whom are we in relationship? What is this
trace of God, and furthermore, what exactly are we doing in khora? Without addressing
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these questions, we are left spouting hot, impractical philosophical air. Again, to elide the
temptation to idolize the trace, Derrida would ask us to reconsider our premise, changing
“with whom” to “how.” How does the passage, the potential for relationship with the
holy, function, especially if symbolicity is off of the table? How do we grasp a God if it
cannot show up in perceptible form and, instead, operates by way of a bastard reasoning?
In her examination of Derrida’s khora, Zina Giannopoulou suggests that Derrida would
claim that there is nothing to grasp, insisting that we are trapped in our symbolicity.
Rearticulating Derrida’s essay “Khôra,” Giannopoulou explains,
the nonbeing of the chôra23 can only “be declared,” namely, “caught or
conceived” in a net of verbal allusions to the notions of giving and
receiving, but does not itself “give place by receiving or by conceiving.”
The receptacle, then, does not “give” or “catch” anything, but is helplessly
caught in linguistic signification, all of which are destined to miss its
inscrutable nature. It is “anything but a support or a subject,” for it is an
‘inaccessible, impassive, “amorphous” entity’ (95).” (175)
Put another way, in khora, it is passage—i.e., différance—all the way down, which
Giannopoulou and Richard Kearney in Strangers, Gods and Monsters argue functions
like an abyss that being-seekers must semi-nihilistically traverse as if in a Beckettian
desert. Meaning (and, by extension, God) becomes wholly intangible, and Kearney finds
this characterization leaving us in a state of existential dread, voiceless and staring
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Giannopoulou uses the spellings khôra and chôra interchangeably, as I will also do throughout this
project.
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indefinitely at the monstrous potential of Godot with no escape—altogether too bleak a
picture and, ironically, too deterministic.
Derrida and John D. Caputo might both agree but, in their concession, ask us to
reconsider the “how” of deconstruction itself. Derrida reminds us that without the endless
play of signification, “God” falls prey to definition and both ceases to be the impossible
and defaults to potentially hierarchical ways of knowing and being. In his critique of
negative theology, Derrida remarks that even calling God a hyperessentiality (i.e., an
ultimate non-Being that cannot be known) keeps a kind of Neoplatonic expectancy alive
that, in its self-imposed negation, still makes known the unknowable as “unknowable”
(Wolosky 263). Thus, différance is not the complete eradication of God, not the means by
which Godot never shows up, but is its necessity. At the same time, Caputo by way of
Swedish philosopher Martin Hägglund understands différance not as “an immaterial spirit
but requires a material substrate, that the ‘play of traces’ cannot take place except as
spacing-timing” (“The Return” 49, my emphasis). In other words, différance as the
“how” of khora is capable of bringing the trace of Godot into being but does so only
temporarily. In The God Who May Be, Kearney echoes this assertion but adds that “it is
divinity’s very potentiality-to-be that is the most divine thing about it […] to pass beyond
being you have to pass through it. Without the flesh of the world, there is no birth” (2;
35). We need a God that is negative theology’s elusive, wholly Other and also calls us to
“taste and see” (Psalm 34:8), who exposes fresh wounds and bids us “reach your hand
here, and put it into My side” (John 20:27). Just as signs imply their traces and apophasis
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relies on cataphasis, God exists paralogically24 to being. Therefore, Caputo contends that
we see deconstruction less as a fate of the passage descending into sheer relativity and/or
nihilism and more of an interruptive performance—what he calls a “per-ver-formance”
(51)—that, much like Otto’s numinous, keeps a desire for the impossible alive. Caputo
clarifies that this performance is not in the business of tacitly destroying everything that
takes shape or helplessly groping in the luminous dark but is, instead, an attempt “to
make something happen, or rather let it happen, which means to minimize the conditions
that block things from happening while maximizing the conditions that allow them to
happen” (51). Similar to how Louth described the role of space in apophatic theology, the
passage does not definitively kill off God via deconstruction or plunge us into an
unavoidable pit of despair but is generative and opens God to possibility—it lets God
happen again and again.
To be clear, this is not a “let go, and let God” proposition that gives over to the
Almighty, a perspicuous eschatology, and/or theistic belief in a display of worshipful
submission. Neither is “letting happen” a resignation to the fate of unknowability nor an
expectation that God will magically materialize once and for all. Instead, to let happen
begins in listening for a divine “perhaps” with no strings, no apologetics, no big-t Truth
attached. Caputo asserts,

Vitanza likens paralogical thinking to being “against,” which does not mean “at war with” (i.e., either/or)
but rather existing “alongside” (i.e., both…and). To remain in this relation to meaning, Vitanza (citing
Jean-François Lyotard) advocates for “‘just-linking’ (drifting),” which asks us to operate in the world not
looking for consensus or prescribed ways of linking meaning to things but to instead “bear witness to
differends [phrases in dispute] finding idioms for them” (qtd. in “‘Some More’” 133, brackets in the
original). Paralogical reasoning, thus, is in the business of generating and/or giving place to that which falls
beyond a system of meaning and valuing, rather than marginalizing, that information—to make peace with
our paradoxes.
24
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I treat the name of God as the name of an inexistence, an insistence, a call
that is visited upon us and demands our response, so that God and the
divine omnipotence are more radically emptied into the world. “God,
perhaps” means that the name of God is the name of the chance of the
event, one of the names, one of the events, which are innumerable and
impossible. (The Insistence 14, my emphasis)
This insistent call, he contends, is not a command for or from God’s literal happening but
is an opening, an invitation for beings to risk exposure to the possibility brewing in the
khoric abyss, whether monstrous or benevolent or something altogether otherwise.
Without referencing God, Diane Davis in Inessential Solidarity terms this call to
exposure “rhetoricity,” or a preoriginary “affectability or persuadability—that is the
condition for symbolic action” (2). Rhetoricity, in other words, exists not in the domain
of language but precedes it; it is that which summons beings to be, as Davis says it,
response-able or capable of playing in and with our symbolicity. Citing Sigmund Freud,
she emphasizes that registering the call “cannot be produced through reason or critique”
(35). Put another way, rhetoricity is less a conscious happening and more an unconscious
impulse. Davis likens this to a person unknowingly tapping their foot to a song playing
on the radio. Thus, rhetoricity does not operate according to literacy’s definitional logic
seeking identity. Instead, it happens through something felt—khora’s dreamlike
reasoning seeking possibility or even Otto’s numinous “feeling of ‘something uncanny’,
‘eerie’, or ‘weird’” that births the creative inclination (14). Bringing “God, perhaps” back
into the picture, Caputo calls this a “poetics of the impossible,” or “a discourse with
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pathos” that “does not describe the domain of what is, but of what calls” (The Weakness
104; 105). Similarly, Kearney calls this a “prereflective carnal response” in which the
body “ponders” before the mind has a chance to name what it perceives (Anatheism 46).
It is through this felt sense that we begin fashioning a response to the call, which is an
attempt to grasp the event, or what Caputo ultimately characterizes as a provocation.
“Events,” explains Caputo, “are what names ‘mean’ in the sense of what they are getting
at, what they are trying to actualize, the source of their restlessness, the endless ends
toward which names reach out, hurling themselves forward toward something, I know not
what, toward God knows what” (3). He qualifies that events are not essences but, rather,
what keeps us on our toes, keeps us desiring what could be. Therefore, our response to
the event of the name of God—the luminous dark, the bottomless passage, the ineffable
transcendent, that which endlessly provokes our “creature feeling”—is where and how
“God, perhaps” may be.
At the end of the day, no matter how we attempt to describe call and response,
response must be perceptible if finite beings are to be involved. In order to desire and let
God happen, we need something to grasp, however provisionally. While a response may
materialize in language—an actual name for/of God, which restarts our journey through
literacy’s holy or re-capitulates to the trace/différance—Kearney suggests that it can also
occur through relationship, a claim perhaps pointing in the direction of theophany. This
keeps the drama of call and response playing out not in some inaccessible celestial realm
or in a symbolic, colonized concept but in our dynamic world of flesh, blood, joy, and
pain—the bodily site of encounter where we have no choice but to, as Baruch Spinoza
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puts it, “persevere in our being” (qtd. in Nadler). Kearney explains that poetics—the
substrate of the call of rhetoricity—“makes us strangers to the earth so that we may dwell
more sacramentally upon it” (Anatheism 13). Within this paradigm, rhetoricity affects us,
exposes us to a relationality between self and an other where “I” and “Other” do not
recognize each other as familiars, not ontotheological25 God and pious believer, but in
flashes of something strange. Put differently, this is not humans singing the hymn “What
a Friend We Have in Jesus” but is the two disciples walking alongside the stranger on the
road to Emmaus. Martin Buber might call this an I-Thou relationship where all parties
involved (i.e., I and You) do not lay claim to (i.e., identify) or attempt to objectify (i.e.,
changing “You” to an “It”) one another but simply “stand in relation” as wholly others
(55). Thus, those who risk response are not suddenly obligated to take marching orders
from Almighty God (who allegedly has a plan for your life) or forced to know the Who
behind this address; rather, response is simply saying yes to the call of a divine
rhetoricity. Via Derrida and Avital Ronnell, Davis explains that “each yes is already a
yes-I, both an opening and a cut. There is no way to respond to an other who or that has
not been marked off from ‘me’ in some way; and yet to open toward is already to have let
in […] There can be no yes without an I and no I without a yes” (“Rhetoricity” 439). Put
back into our holy context, saying yes to rhetoricity simultaneously acknowledges that

Via Martin Heidegger, Kearney describes the ontotheological God as “the metaphysical concept of a
highest and most general Being abstracted from the lived world” (Anatheism 73). The operative word here
is “Being,” which makes the definitional claim of “to be.” The ontotheological God, explains Kearney, is
who Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx declared “dead” within the parameters of secular society as a result of the
terrible evils committed in His name. Kearney notes that the ontotheological God often became immanent
through acts of “accusation and condemnation,” erected and reproduced through rigid structures of material
and ideological control and justified by way of a higher Divine Plan. We might say that literacy’s holy, in
many ways, resembles the ontotheological God.
25
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yes, we know and will continue to know little to nothing of God (i.e., the cut). And yet, it
is because of this unknowability, this un-fillable hole in knowledge and being, that we
can continue to desire yes (i.e., the opening) and recognize something potentially sacred
about the here and now, or what Brian Jackson at the top of this chapter called the
secular.26 Kearney posits, “it is only if one concedes that one knows virtually nothing
about God that one can begin to recover the presence of holiness in the flesh of ordinary
existence” (Anatheism 5). Thus, Caputo’s “God, perhaps” happens like the God in
Matthew 25 who appears as the hungry, the thirsty, the stranger, the naked, the sick, the
imprisoned—the others in our midst who could or could not be, as Davis puts it, our
response-ability. Matthew’s Jesus remarks, “Inasmuch as you did [or did not do] it to one
of the least of these My brethren, you did [or did not do] it to Me” (Matt. 25:40; 44).
Caputo qualifies that this is not a pantheistic claim that says “God’s existence is in ours
and ours in God’s. But in a theology of ‘perhaps,’ God does not exist; God insists, and it
is our responsibility to bring about something that exists” (49). Put simply, response to
the call of God’s rhetoricity is not the dissolution or domestication of difference through
definition or abyssal symbolic relativity; rather, the divine rhetoricity summons us to the
limits of definition and asks us to feel and question the lines we draw anytime we
encounter the face (to paraphrase Davis citing Emmanuel Levinas) of a fellow finite
entity.

It might seem more logical to associate “not knowing” with openness and “here and now” with the cut;
however, we must remember that when dealing with the holy of apophasis and khora, to not know is a
semi-definitive statement that can easily lock the idea of God in the abyss. It is to cut off being from the
possibility of God indefinitely. Thus, to seek presence within this framework is an act of radical openness
to the potential God. It is opening the passage between being and God.
26
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Thus, what always follows the response is a choice relative to hospitality: to be or
not to be response-able to/for the Stranger in our midst. Kearney finds that “hospitality”
and “hostility” share an etymology in the Latin terms hospes and hostis, which both
presuppose a stranger. The terms carry what he calls “ambivalent” meaning as either
could imply “enemy or host, adversary or guest” (hostis) or “the host who receives, or
refuses to receive, the stranger as guest” (hospes) (Anatheism 38). The hermeneutic one
uses to interpret or inform an ethic of engagement determines how the terms skew. Such
ambivalence, explains Kearney, accounts for religion’s “double story of violence or
compassion, of genocide or justice, of thanatos or eros. And often both at once” (38). As
we saw in literacy’s holy, when the “I” responds to the call by conjuring the divine
rhetoricity into a cohesive Whole with a Divine Plan, every “other” becomes a potential
enemy who we must refuse if they evidence incongruent qualities; however, when “I,” as
Kearney wagers by way of Paul Ricoeur, responds “by opening itself to other possibilities
of being”—staying open to the event of the unknowable God—and “becomes Other to
itself as it encounters the Other beyond itself,” we operate like khora and can be
“exposed to difference, alert to alternatives of alterity” without feeling defensive. Instead,
we can, as Caputo describes of hospitality, simply say “‘come’ to what we cannot see
coming, to what may or may not (‘perhaps’) be welcome, to welcome the unwelcome”
(The Insistence 40)—a radical, unconditional openness to the other, any other (including
ourselves). Kearney concedes that such radical hospitality to the other is impossible for
finite beings:
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Unconditional hospitality is divine, not human. Which does not mean that
we should not try to emulate the divine, while acknowledging our limits.
But the divine is always a surplus, an excess beyond and beneath us, more
than we can humanely manage: hence forever a stranger who beckons us
toward the other always other than ourselves. (48)
Therefore, when we welcome the happening God through our yes to a divine rhetoricity,
we, in turn, say yes to the irreducible others, the strangers who baffle us, who we cannot
place, who provoke us. In other words, our act of hospitality, of choosing to move within
the roles of host, guest, and receiver, is also an act that makes the impossible possible
until the next other comes along. Kearney says it beautifully: “To be truly hospitable one
must be prepared to host not just those within one’s faith culture, but those alien to it.
Love of self and love of neighbor lead ineluctably to love of strangers, which is no doubt
why the commandment says: ‘Love God [the Stranger] and love your neighbor as
yourself” (48, brackets in the original).
We will return to the drama of hospitality in Chapters 3-4, where we will examine
conditions and rhetorical strategies that help open beings to the call of rhetoricity, acts
that, I will argue, rely on empathy. What I have attempted to sketch out in Assemblage
Two, however, is an alternative to the holy-who-wounds by drawing our attention to the
incredible potential of the numinous holy to provoke us not away from but toward
difference. In order to configure this disposition, God first passed through the apparati of
orality and literacy, where we saw the holy eventually manifest in power, definition, and
oppression. We then took this holy and made it holey, which led us to what Kearney calls
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an “anatheistic moment,” which occurs anytime we experience “instants of deep
disorientation, doubt, or dread, when we are no longer sure exactly who we are or where
we are going” (5). In our case, Derrida’s trace helped us destabilize the “what” of God,
which we complicated further by asking “where” and “how” God happens. This, in turn,
led us to khora, where we encountered the wholly Other and, as a result, were faced with
a call from the numinous, or what Kearney describes as “a primary scene of religion: the
encounter with a radical Stranger who we choose, or don’t choose, to call God” (7). The
ana in anatheism, he explains, is a perpetual return to this moment of choice, and only an
act of radical hospitality—an event that materializes here on earth in the company of
finite entities—can offer the Stranger a place with no strings, holy needs, or expectations
attached. Thus, the sacred and secular (conceived as the here-and-now) are not polar
opposites. Within an anatheistic framework, “the sacred is the secular; it says it is in the
secular, through the secular, toward the secular […] anatheism proposes the challenging
route of embracing complexity, diversity, and ambiguity […] For anatheism the universal
can only be reached through singular others—that is, others that are other to each other”
(166; 178-179). This mystery keeps us asking what Augustine of Hippo, Derrida, and
Caputo have repeatedly asked: “What do I love when I love my God?” (Caputo, The
Prayers 334). The answer, it seems, is up to each singular other to continue desiring
through communion with the Other.
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Assemblage 3: Electrate Religion
The Electrate Apparatus
Through this loose, anatheistic schema, we have taken our operative terms in this
chapter—participation and deliberation—without naming them overtly and made them
not mutually exclusive but chiastic.27 Participation, conceived here as response to a
divine rhetoricity and roused through a felt sense, is the necessary precondition for
deliberation, or discernment for whether or not to be hospitable. Then, in every
deliberative gesture, which necessarily involves an unfamiliar other, we are faced with
another provocation, or a trace of the happening God that invites us to keep participating
by pursuing the impossible, returning again and again to the stranger without imposing
our/an agenda. This is a version of religion that can exist alongside entities—whether
adjacent Christians, believers from different faith traditions, or secular individuals who
lack belief in god(s)—as true assemblage, providing options for less combative and more
hospitable approaches to encounters with difference through retention of difference;
however, this iteration of religion places huge emphasis on the body (felt sense,
recognition of the other), and the literacy apparatus ultimately struggles to
comprehensively host the holey holy filled with wholly others. Brian Rotman argues that
“the alphabet omits all the prosody of utterance and with it the multitude of bodily effects

27

As illustrated in the relationship between apophatic and cataphatic theology, a chiasm can be described
as “words in reversed order, a reverse parallelism that can be represented as ABBA” (Thomas-Fogiel 92).
Using Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s use and examination of the chiasm, Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel argues that
chiastic language is not simply a clever device but, more importantly, exposes a novel and necessary
relationality between terms. She asserts, “This thinking of the relation makes it possible to explore all the
fields previously ignored by philosophy and so to extend its range of investigation” (111-112). This is what
we have sought to do in our examination of deliberative participation and participatory deliberation.
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of force, significance, emotion, and affect that it conveys” (qtd. in Morey 218). These
limitations lead us to our third apparatus: electracy. Assemblage Two purposefully
followed the developing logics and operations of this apparatus, so our task now is to
translate and plug in the theoretical pieces we have fashioned to program our next social
machine. Recall that we asked three primary questions of the holey holy: what, where,
and how. In this brief overview of the electrate apparatus (which we will continue to
probe in Chapter 3), we will ask the same of electracy by starting with origins of its
name.
“Electracy” is a neologism coined by Ulmer that combines the words “electricity”
and “trace,” namely Derrida’s trace. In his body of work, Ulmer’s scholarly project
focuses on applying the logic of the trace to our compositional and pedagogical practices
by acknowledging the impact electronic technologies have had on our institutional
practices and subject formations (and vice versa). Ulmer pinpoints the electric shift from
literacy to electracy occurring in the 1800s with the advent of photography, sound
recording devices (e.g., phonographs, gramophones), and telegraphs, which, argues Ong,
ushered in a “secondary orality.” Coupled with screen-based devices like the television
and computer, these technologies, Ong explains, bear “striking resemblances to the old
[orality] in its participatory mystique, its fostering of a communal sense, its concentration
on the present moment” due to the reincorporation of images and voice in communication
(Orality 133)—our singing, dancing, clapping interlocutors. Already, we see participation
as a core part of this apparatus. Such participation, however, happens not just with fellow
beings but also technologies that use electricity to “extend,” as McLuhan would say in
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Understanding Media, the modes by which we communicate and make meaning. In their
chapter “Cyborgs” in Imagologies, Mark Taylor and Esa Saarinen claim that electronic
media “are supplements to the human organism. Computers become the brains, engines
the legs, video cameras the eyes, telephones the ears, and wires the nerves, veins and
arteries of the world organism” (5). One of our first participatory acts in electracy, thus, is
between our bodies and our technologies. McLuhan argues that such extensions via any
medium do not simply copy and paste an analog functionality. Instead, media necessarily
introduce a “change of scale or pace or pattern” in the human lifeworld—“it is the
medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action”
(Essential 152). In the literacy apparatus, for example, alphabetic text introduced a mode
of communication that enabled separation, precipitating increased linearity, claims to
stable and replicable Truth, and wholeness through exclusion. The change electricity
brings, on the other hand, is increased speed and compressed space, which unlocks a
different logic and communicative mode altogether. Timothy Druckrey observes that in
an electronic culture, information “comes as an array rather than as a sequence or
[cohesive] narrative”; it’s decentered and inundates us at the speed of light from all
directions, which perpetually disrupts anything purporting to be a Whole. Interpreting
this array, he asserts, comes not from parsing things neatly into categories or hierarchies
of information (i.e., the modus operandi of literacy) but occurs “within a social logic of
contingency” (25, my emphasis). McLuhan suggests the same in The Medium is the
Massage as he says that electricity-mediated information “pours upon us, instantaneously
and continuously. As soon as information is acquired, it is very rapidly replaced by still
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newer information. Our electrically-configured world has forced us to move from the
habit of data classification to the mode of pattern recognition” (63). Put another way, in
order to keep up, electric speed forces us into connectivity instead of separation, and
Taylor and Saarinen add that connection is seldom stable. In electronic environments,
being contingent and recognizing patterns, they claim, “opens the space of the aleatory.
In the absence of time for planning, reflecting and organizing, thought becomes free to
roam—even to err” (Imagologies, “Telewriting” 6).
With thoughts free to roam, information disseminating at lightning speed, and
bodies beamed via electronic mediations, we have conditions for what McLuhan perhaps
infamously terms the “global village,” an environment where “time has ceased, space has
vanished” (The Medium 63). Much like khoric space hosting traces of the happening
God, the global village simply facilitates the assemblage of meaning in a way that does
not prescribe boundaries or an order of operations but simply lets meaning happen
anytime, anywhere. Updating this metaphor for the twenty-first century, electracy points
to the Internet as an analogue of the global village. “The internet,” explains Ulmer in
Internet Invention, “brings into potential communication all the institutions of society”
(1). On the Internet, we rub shoulders not just with familiar entities but with strangers,
human and machine, potential friend or foe, singular and plural, famous or unknown. We
log on for work (e.g., Learning Management Systems), to connect (e.g., LinkedIn,
Facebook), to express and socialize (e.g., Twitter, YouTube), to lurk (e.g., Instagram), for
entertainment (e.g., Netflix), for news. We do this all in a location that, as Taylor and
Saarinen put it, “is nowhere and yet it exists […] it is possible to move without changing
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your address. People can find you [and you can find them] even though they have no idea
where you are” (Imagologies, “Netropolis” 4). This temporal-spatial dexterity results in
literal traces of information, trails of data left by the aleatory connections, disconnections,
and reconnections of those interacting or participating online. Arroyo explains that “these
traces, when juxtaposed, make up the electrate experience,” which she says “emphasizes
a multiplicity of meanings for any one concept, supports imagination, and encourages
creativity and invention” (7). She is also quick to note that in the spirit of multiplicity, the
electrate experience does not negate the literate experience but exists alongside it. Ong
even notes that secondary orality ushered in “a more deliberate and self-conscious orality,
based permanently on the use of writing and print” (133). Jeff Rice by way of McLuhan
corroborates this assertion in The Rhetoric of Cool, zooming in on computer
programming and media usage in particular: “Programmers of computers are still using
the old print technology—storage. Computers are being asked to do things that belong to
the old technology” (qtd. in 81). We see this in the metaphors used for desktop
organization—folders, files, documents, etc.—where traces of the analog world of
writing remain embedded in the digital. Thus, literate logics—i.e., separating knower
from known, preserving concepts through perfect replication—still persist in electracy.
Rice, however, suggests that instead of abandoning or critiquing these literate structures,
we “reimagine the logic of structure as well; they [composers of/with media] must
appropriate structure itself so as to discover how digital culture engages more than one
kind of structuring principle” (58, my emphasis). Electracy, in other words, is motivated
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not by mastery but an attitude of discovery that desires a more paralogical relationship to
meaning.
Electrate Reasoning and Invention
These ideas should all sound familiar. Thus far, the “what” and “where” of
electracy parallel many characteristics of Assemblage Two’s holy. Their greatest
resonance, however, lies in the “how.” Recall that the holey holy, brewing (perhaps) in
the khoric abyss, needs a passage to be perceived by finite beings. We determined that a
linguistic medium would inevitably devolve into a desert of negations but that an
affective substrate could evoke the possibility for an affirmative (but provisional)
response to a divine rhetoricity, leading us to relationship with the irreducible Other.
Electracy operates similarly because of its modes of communication and the reasoning
they inspire. Ulmer recognizes digital media as the “language” of electracy, analogous to
the role alphabetic text played in the literacy apparatus. Digital media, he argues, perform
an extension of the necessary modes for felt reasoning and create conditions for chance
linkage to occur in an electricity-infused medium. Due to its storage capabilities, the
online world preserves digital assertions that, like writing, last beyond the moment of
their utterance or composition; however, these assertions, as Sean Morey notes in his
examination of information delivery in electracy, “cannot simply be spoken, but must be
shown and felt in a way not optimized by print forms of delivery” (75, my emphasis).
This requires more of our senses, not just literacy’s domain of the eye. An aspect of
electrate delivery, Morey contends, is to “attempt to reveal the unknown, which may
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remain unspeakable affective28 sensations, but also realizing that part of the process is
dealing with these unknown complexities, and in fact, embracing them as part of a
delivery strategy” (195). The felt, in other words, is not an optional factor in electracy but
is an integral part of its delivery mechanism through digital media.
To text, digital media add images (moving and static) and sounds as potential
modes of delivery, which open up new possibilities to work with the unspeakable
affective. Via W. J. T. Mitchell’s What Do Pictures Want?, Morey notes that images
have a certain aliveness, not just in content but also in function. “[P]ictures are not just
representations of living things, but are representations that are living as well” (145).
They have an inherently “poetic nature” that carries not “some literate kind of
information, but a spirit that desires, that wants” (148). He qualifies that they do not
literally want or desire a specific thing (maybe), but their affect calls out to a unique
quality in the individual viewer, which begs their (un)conscious participation. Roland
Barthes explores this affective call in Camera Lucida, where he introduces the punctum,
or a trigger derived from an image that results in a “sting, speck, cut, little hole—and also
a cast of the dice” (27). Barthes illustrates this effect by explaining how a certain
sequence of pictures “sting” him. A family portrait by James Van der Zee, for example,

Thus far, I have used “emotion” and “affect” semi-interchangeably, but Morey offers a much clearer
delineation between the two that is helpful for our discussion here. He describes emotion as “the raw
material that helps develop feelings […] Emotions recognize the materiality of the world and help to
establish an attitude toward that material reality” (96). Much like Tuan’s “place,” emotion is somewhat
known, workable, and connected to the human lifeworld. It is the material we can mold into nameable
feelings. “So if emotions are a feeling factor,” explains Morey, “affect provides the substrate, the general
condition that makes emotion possible. Affect is not an emotion factory per se, but affect provides the
current that allows emotions to exist” (99). Analogous to Tuan’s “space,” affect is more potential than
actual, or is rather the potential that enables the actual.
28
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depicts three African American adults posed in formal attire, an image that Barthes
admits “interests me but does not prick me” (43). He notices, however, a tiny detail—that
one of the women pictured wears “strapped pumps,” which takes him to a moment in his
own memory that he can’t quite place. What he perceives in the space of this ambiguity is
the arousal of “great sympathy in me, almost a kind of tenderness” (43). This feeling is
what the image means to him, information only he could perceive, contribute, and
experience by chance (a cast of the dice) as a result of following the trigger. Ulmer
explains that this type of affect-driven information is an “obtuse meaning,” or what
Barthes describes as a “signifier without a signified […] the obtuse meaning appears to
extend outside culture, knowledge, information” (qtd. in Teletheory 97). This is meaning
that is intensely specific to and centered in me, something that I cannot know ahead of
time or logic my way into; it simply happens, often at random and without conscious
knowing. It is, perhaps, analogous to a divine rhetoricity or the “creature feeling” evoked
by the numinous that provokes our recognition of the uncanny—a call and response that
carries potential for multiplicities of meaning, each derived from the unique relationship
cultivated between viewer and viewed.
Similarly, the sonic mode carries an inherently affective, response-inducing
quality. In their review of scholarship in sound studies, Joshua Gunn et al. observe that
scholars generally agree that “sound persists whether or not it has taken on meaning (i.e.,
whether or not the sonic has been delivered to, by, or with language). Those laboring
under the aegis of sound studies do not presume the semiotic, only the affective” (476).
Sounds, like images, do not require signification and can be perceived outside of the
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realm of language. When they do strike a chord—whether through an ear canal or some
other bodily sensation—they produce what Byron Hawk calls “resonance,” or a kind of
entanglement with a “measurable wave vibration and an affective perception” (316).
Paraphrasing Michelle Comstock and Mary E. Hocks, Hawk describes resonance as
“both the intimate materiality and movement of sound and the excitation of memories,
feelings, and thoughts that the vibrations evoke” (322). The sonic medium, thus, also
carries a punctum of sorts that calls up felt knowledge residing somewhere in the body or
our storehouse of memories. Registering this information requires deep listening, which
artist and composer Pauline Oliveros distinguishes from hearing: “To hear is the physical
means that enables perception. To listen is to give attention to what is perceived both
acoustically and psychologically” (xxii). Deep listening, thus, is tuning not just our ears
but our perceptions—what Oliveros likens to meditation—to “the whole space/time
continuum of sound/silences” (xxiv). We must, in other words, take in and connect
ourselves to the context from which sound stems. McLuhan stresses that this context is
potentially everywhere: “We can’t shut out sound automatically. We simply are not
equipped with earlids. Where a visual space is an organized continuum of a uniformed
connected kind, the ear world is a world of simultaneous relationships” (The Medium
111, my emphasis). Therefore, to practice deep listening is not to define meaning but is to
relate to what happens to be here (for now)—to “facilitate creativity in art and life
through this form of meditation. Creativity means the formation of new patterns,
exceeding the limitations and boundaries of old patterns, or using old patterns in new
ways” (Oliveros xxv). Again, we have another mode capable of generating multiple
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meanings and, in the process, encouraging creativity—characteristics of the electrate
experience.
Like Oliveros, Ulmer emphasizes that discovery or recognition of the felt senses
are not the conclusion in electracy. These insights derived from the self are not the whole
self or a means to fashion a cohesive, stable identity. Rather, they become the way we
reason and create in the apparatus. Arroyo clarifies that electrate reasoning is not like
literacy’s tendency to analyze and seek categories. “In electracy,” she explains, “one does
not critique media; one uses media to perform critique: critique and performance become
symbiotic” (16). Put another way, much like the per-ver-formance of Caputo’s happening
God that keeps a desire for the impossible alive, electrate reasoning occurs through
performances that keep the electrate experience of multiplicities, imagination, and
creativity alive. As such, the electrate reasoner cannot stop desiring, cannot stop
performing, cannot keep from being holey. They must use the affordances of digital
media to perpetually stay in motion. In Heuretics, Ulmer sketches out how this might
take place theoretically, offering choragraphy as a provisional method. Another
neologism, choragraphy fuses the words chora (yes, the same khora we explored in
Assemblage Two) and geography, which denote the theoretical location and function this
method takes on. Choragraphy operates by way of khora’s generative passage that
utilizes a “dreamlike reasoning,” reconceived here as the punctum that desires what the
body does not yet know but only intuits. Ulmer explains that an “important aspect of
choragraphy is learning how to write an intuition” (37). Much like a relationship with
“God, perhaps,” we as finite writers need something to manifest, something tangible to
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work with. Ulmer suggests that these manifestations begin by recalling and charting
obtuse meanings across situations, environments, and discourses and feeling out how
they might resonate.29 He emphasizes that in this type of inventive exploration,
necessarily involving pattern recognition, creators need not welcome certain intuitions
and exclude others. “An inventive culture,” he notes, “requires the broadest possible
criterion of what is relevant” (6), which means that anything, anywhere is viable as
material for creation. We must, in other words, be as hospitable to potential meanings as
possible. The goal of this exercise is to assemble discovered information into something
that does not necessarily make a solid determination through critique or analysis (i.e., the
domain of the literacy apparatus) but, instead, helps the creator better understand or
“intuit a certain path or direction, that is also experienced in everyday life as conatus, a
striving to persist in one’s own being (to live)” (Konsult xx). Put differently, by pursuing
and configuring obtuse meanings, we gain personal insight into the drama of flesh, blood,
joy, and pain and scope out ways to keep participating in it. In his later works, namely
Electronic Monuments, Avatar Emergency, and Konsult, Ulmer clarifies that these
personal insights are not an exercise in extended navel gazing but can, instead, be used to
catalyze civic action. They help individuals develop what he calls “‘flash reason,’ a

In Teletheory, Ulmer introduces an exercise called “mystory” that he later develops in Internet Invention.
The mystory encourages writers of an intuition to recall poignant personal memories from four formative
discourses: family, school, entertainment, and career/community. Next, writers note recurring patterns in
each discourse in order to create a “map of its maker’s psychogeography” (81). In other words, the goal of
mystory is to pinpoint what resonates across discourses and “be able to notice and make use of our bodily
experience as part of our reasoning—to use ‘recognition’” (82). He suggests that writers use digital media
like websites and video to excavate and deliver these patterns. In my experimentation with this exercise, I
created a mystory called “Strings Attached,” which can be viewed via this URL:
https://youtu.be/4JTFTePsAmg. This piece helps concretize the oftentimes abstract method of electrate
invention.
29
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deliberative rhetoric for public policy formation, making democratically informed
decisions in a moment, at light speed” (Avatar 8). We will flesh out these ideas (the pros
and the perils) and how they function further in Chapter 3, but for now, we must
recognize that choragraphy offers another framework for participation and deliberation as
complementary processes and, in many ways, operates in similar ways as the holey holy.
Further fleshing out electrate reasoning and writing, Arroyo’s Participatory
Composition offers us an actual medium and site where these operations could take place:
video and the online video-sharing platform YouTube. Again, we will take a much closer
look at these ideas in Chapters 3-4, so the following offers just a broad overview. Arroyo
explains that the video medium—mixing the affordances of images and sounds—“allows
image-events to be realized without having the burden of ‘putting into words’ felt
knowledge” (14). Video, in other words, hosts the modes that make visible our felt
intuitions. Through the capture of still and moving images through cameras and the
juxtaposition of visual and sonic media assets through editing software, videos also
enable the exercise of choragraphy’s inventive logic. Writing well before the ubiquity of
video online, Ulmer hypothesized in Teletheory that just “as the features of alphabetic
writing […] provided the prosthesis of analysis, so is the prosthesis of invention available
in video. The implication, and this is a premise, is that video permits the institutional
dissemination of inventive thinking” (71). Arroyo updates and actualizes this premise
through her study of YouTube—what she calls “the platform for video culture” (19)—
and the inventive practices its participants (i.e., YouTubers) propagate. She finds the
platform enabling and playing host to performances of all kinds, from educational content
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developed and democratically disseminated by Khan Academy to endless musical
remixes of Phoenix’s “Lisztomania” to vitriol-fueled, quotidian exchanges between
YouTubers like CopperCab and IshatOnU who feud over the former’s red hair. Citing
Jean Burgess and Joshua Green, she also notes the other behaviors the platform permits:
“quoting, favoriting, commenting, responding, sharing, and viewing” (21)—all actions
and reactions to viewed video content that, in turn, influence the development of more
video content and the formation of online communities. In both content and engagement,
YouTube provides an excellent analogy for electrate performances and, as seen in its
modes of operation, presupposes participation along with exposure30 to the countless
others on the platform.
The Trace of Religion
The parallels between the holey holy and the electrate experience are striking. To
be clear, they are not resonant because of their content but because of their modes of
operation. In other words, for “religion” to be considered “electrate,” it does not
necessarily need to rely on electronic technologies; the physical and virtual technology
piece is beside the point. Rather, the shift in reasoning and creation that these media
cultivate—the change in pace or scale or pattern—is what constitutes the message, as
McLuhan would say, of the medium, which is where religion and electracy converse.

In “Exposing the Idiocy of Videocy: Four Studies of YouTube’s Underbelly,” Arroyo, Robert Lestón,
Geoffrey V. Carter, and Sherrin Frances argue that exposure is the condition to participate on YouTube,
which can be risky business. Not only are viewers exposed to content that may or may not be ethical, but
creators of content also expose themselves anytime they post. Quoting Diane Davis’ Inessential Solidarity,
Lestón et al. explain that risking exposure as viewer and/or creator is to form community “where it is
recognized that there can only be a community without unity, without solidarity, one founded on difference
where the singularities (rather than individuals) are exposed to their ‘irreparable exposure’ of finitude.”
30
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Thus, religion becomes electrate the moment it agrees to look into the darkness of “God,
perhaps” and see it not as stable but as luminous. It occurs every time the numinous stirs
in the face of an other and provokes a response, an obtuse meaning, a like, a share, a
remix. It happens not in wholes but in traces that keep the holy holey, a process that
digital media and platforms like YouTube can help facilitate on a much larger scale and
with greater frequency. It does not negate the other iterations of the holy (e.g., the holy
who wounds) but continuously reminds those versions that that is what they are: a
version. By remaining paralogical to meaning of all kinds, it continuously performs the
anatheistic wager to return or not to return to a divine. The result? All heaven (and hell)
breaks loose, scattering strange traces of the God-who-may-be anywhere, anytime—
traces that provoke us not to fill the gaps of ambiguity but to keep them open, to keep
desiring, creating, imagining, (dis)assembling. This is electrate religion, and while it can
be sublimely poetic, it can also be terrifying. Anything can happen in the electrate, khoric
passage, and it is ultimately up to us—finite creators, linking and unlinking with
electracy’s affordances in aleatory ways—to determine what/who shows up.
TL;DR: Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we fashioned a framework for deliberation and participation
through the lens of apparatus theory by tracing the “holy” through three movements in
communication. We witnessed the Spoken Word become Flesh in the orality apparatus—
the “unwounded” holy—which humans abstracted through symbols and attempted to
inscribe in the literacy apparatus. While maintaining the communal, participatory aspects
of orality, literacy’s holy evolved (and continues to evolve) into a standardizing and
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violent force that used Christian discourse as a means to oppress and coerce, inflicting a
critical wound. I qualified, however, that to reduce the holy to this characterization
absolutely would be to misunderstand and underestimate its ontological and
epistemological potential as well as the aim of this project. I examined dogma and its
formation not to demonize and excise it from my secular iteration of the theologian’s
circle. Instead, we dwelled in the wound in order to rub salt in it—to stimulate and attach
responsibility to the social and cultural pain tied to its Name and, following Vitanza’s
lead, to expand the “one” to “some more.”31 It is in this expanded notion of the holy that
we discovered that perhaps God is much larger than asserted truths and that to more
wholly engage in and with the holy, our relationship with the Divine must be holey. For
if, as the hymn contends, the holy is “immortal, invisible, God only wise, in light
inaccessible hid from our eyes,” our mere human understanding must concede to this
discursive threshold. The electrate apparatus continued rubbing salt in the wound,
returning us to our bodies and, via digital technologies, providing a different substrate
(i.e., affect and emotion) and logic from which to invent and access the ambiguous,
happening God. Such invention, we theorized, does not deny the formation of solidified
utterances and practices under the moniker “God,” but keeps the space of God—what we,
by way of Derrida, called khora—and our claims to this God holey. Paired with
postmodern theology, I suggested that holey-ness creates the potential for less hostile
relationships with others and, thus, more opportunities for deliberation that does not deny

While the idiom “pouring salt in the wound” typically refers to the amplification of pain, salt is known to
serve a medicinal purpose by mitigating infection of an open wound (Wannamaker). Like Jacques
Derrida’s pharmakon, the holy has a paradoxical capacity to poison and cure.
31
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participation or the unique differences that interlocutors bring to the table. Taken
together, electrate religion positions God—conceived as a numinous exigency—as a
divine rhetoricity to which finite beings respond through affect, relationship, and
invention. Whether we believe in the literate holy, the numinous holy, or lack belief in a
holy altogether, the manifestation of this holy is ultimately a decision left to those who
agree to hear and feel provoked by this call, for better or for worse. While this chapter
theorized these possibilities, the next chapter will focus on electrate religion’s
manifestations via new media, particularly on YouTube. This medium and platform, as
Arroyo helped us see, provides conditions for both participation (of all kinds) and
(perhaps) deliberation. Because of electracy’s paralogical relationship to meaning, we
will examine the multiplicities of meaning that arise through performances online but will
advocate specifically for electrate practices and rhetorical strategies that promote
possibilities for hospitality.
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CHAPTER THREE
HOL(E)Y SPACE: COMPOSING, COMMUNING IN, AND NEGOTIATING
ELECTRATE RELIGION
“[D]igital religion is religion that is constituted in new ways through digital media and cultures
[…] digital culture negotiates our understandings of religious practice in ways that can lead to
new experiences, authenticity, and spiritual reflexivity” (3). —Heidi A. Campbell, Digital
Religion
“‘Platforms’ are ‘platforms’ not necessarily because they allow code to be written or run, but
because they afford an opportunity to communicate, interact or sell” (351). —Tarleton Gillespie,
“The Politics of ‘Platforms’”
“E.O. Wilson has said, ‘The problem with humanity is that we have Paleolithic emotions,
medieval institutions, and godlike technology.’ We need to embrace our paleolithic emotions in
all their fixed weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We need to upgrade our institutions to incorporate
more wisdom, prudence, and love. And we need to slow down the development of a godlike
technology whose powers go beyond our capacity to steer the direction of the ship we are all on.”
—Tristan Harris, “Big Tech’s Attention Economy Can Be Reformed. Here’s How.”

A Hol(e)y Online Rabbit Hole
Let’s wander in the wilds of YouTube, where participants leverage the
affordances of this video-sharing platform to “communicate, interact or sell” their ideas
with varying degrees of “wisdom, prudence, and love.” Through their negotiations of
“religious practice” and ideology, we witness firsthand the (oftentimes ornery) character
of the electrate religion examined in Chapter 2, the research site we will excavate in
Chapters 4-5, and the communicative challenges we are up against. Let us bring this
project to life.
On May 14, 2020, Dr. Josh Bowen (an atheist and Old Testament scholar) and
Laura Robinson (a Christian and New Testament scholar) met on YouTube to livestream
a mediated conversation on biblical views of slavery. Hosted on the channel Shannon Q,
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whose eponymous atheist creator facilitated the dialogue, Dr. Josh, as he is affectionately
known on the Internet, and Robinson engaged in a robust back-and-forth, not to spar but
to add nuance to the extreme and oft-caricatured positions held by their respective
ideological camps. Dr. Josh noted that a common refrain from atheist YouTubers is that
the Bible operates as a manual for gaslighting humans into slavery, using edicts from
God to justify abuse. On the other end, Robinson noted that a common Christian reading
purports that New Testament theology can conveniently “explain away the problem of
slavery” and, in the process, make Old Testament slave ownership more palatable to 21stcentury sensibilities. Defying these stereotypes, both agreed that these perspectives
ignored the ambiguity of interpretation and defaulted to positions that sought not to
understand but to align with a preestablished stance. After over an hour of sharing
perspectives, citing relevant scholarship, and answering questions from people interacting
in YouTube’s live chat function, Shannon Q asked the conversation partners what each
would take away from their extraordinarily civil interaction. Dr. Josh identified a
continued need to keep “wrestling with these things” in the Bible instead of neatly
categorizing them into inerrant hermeneutics and also to be mindful that, as a Catholic
priest once told him, “these are texts that are communities interacting with the Divine
[…] Personally,” he added, “I don’t think that there was a Divine behind it interacting
with them, but I think this is the product of communities interacting with the numinous”
(Q, “Biblical”). Despite his lack of belief in God, Dr. Josh graciously granted the premise
to emphasize that the numinous—a concept we examined in Chapter 2 via Rudolf Otto to
denote the non-rational, beyond-good, mysterious quality of God—inspires a multiplicity
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of interpretations. To this, Robinson added that these interpretations need not necessarily
claim a winner when pitted against one another. “I don’t know if you’ve noticed,” she
tells viewers, “I am the only Christian in this conversation right now, and it does not
matter at all. Like, I can absolutely respect what Josh is doing, and I can respect his
expertise and what he brings to the text. And I can do this without trying to convert Josh,
and Josh can do this without trying to convert me. And I’m not saying that that doesn’t
mean you shouldn’t argue passionately for what you believe or respectfully for what you
believe or that you shouldn’t try to understand other people’s perspectives. But, at the end
of the day, the Academy at its best and inter-religious dialogue at its best is not about
winning; it’s about mutual understanding. So, this is what I would just like everyone to
take away with them.” Dr. Josh agreed: “Very well said.”
After officially posting the video, Shannon Q poses a question in the comments
section to the people who have viewed the video: “I’m interested to hear what your take
away was from this conversation?” she writes. User “K3evin999” is an early respondent,
commenting, “This is the most balanced discussion on this subject that I have ever
heard.” User “ben green” (BG) agrees, making an added reference to Shannon’s
catchphrase—“elevate the discourse”—that she says at the end of every video: “it’s hard
to elevate the discourse any further,” opines BG. Soon after, user “MultiCappie” (MC)
engages Dr. Josh and Robinson’s content, distilling their dialogue to a broader question
of definition: “To me, the obvious question is: are these books divine or not?” MC
suggests they are not and tangentially references Galileo’s “40-year” imprisonment to
support this idea. BG replies to MC with a warning: “steady—you’ll have the apologist
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hit squad after you for exaggerating the story of Galileo. I don’t thikn [sic.] it was 40
years […] He was treated shittily, but don’t give ‘em anything they can use to dismiss
what you say by getting the facts wrong. There’s nothing more annoying than having a
bunch of ignorami harping on about how ‘atheists are making up a victim narrative’ when
these sorts of mistakes get bandied about—as if they’ve actually got a leg to stand on.”
MC takes the advice and fact checks their comments, adding follow-up revision
comments to the discussion thread. Simultaneously, user “Dirty Texan” chimes in to add
their takeaway on Dr. Josh and Robinson’s exchange: “As others are saying, this level of
discourse is WHERE IT’S AT. The poignant points are not easy bites of selfconfirmation […] As someone who has rejected certain beliefs while attempting to live in
a culture of religious belief, my psyche craves this type of dialogue (as much as it
indulges in the quick bites; it’s gratifying to flip off a douchebag after all). Giving you
the credit, Shannon, for facilitating it on this platform.”
While others offer similar, narrative-fueled affirmations of the video, BG’s advice
becomes prescient as user “Ken Shiloh” (KS), a Christian apologist, enters the scene. He
begins with a response to the content, conveying the same Christian argument that
Robinson sought to complicate: “it is not a just measure to judge OT [Old Testament]
slavery in light of today’s world,” he exhorts, arguing that, when put in their “proper”
context, OT references to slavery could be neutralized through New Testament doctrines
pointing to Jesus. He continues, “Jesus said to love your neighbor as yourself, to do to
others as you would have them do to you, and to not ‘lord it over’ others, but be a servant
of all. Do you think you can follow the teachings of Jesus and enslave anyone?” He
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concludes his lengthy comment with a direct appeal (i.e., a “lording over,” one might say)
to his atheist host: “Oh Shannon, you seem like one of the nicest people on YouTube. A
true Christian is a person who knows the Lord. I met Jesus Christ when I was 17. We are
extremely close friends. I know God’s judgments seem harsh and cruel, but are you open
that—you could be wrong about Him? Are you open to the fact that—you are turning
people away from life and love and truth?” He ends with an ultimatum: “That’s you,
Shannon! Either you glorify God as good or point to others how your version of reality is
superior. You can know the truth by having a heart to heart with God. Bring your protests
to Him. Ask, and you shall receive.”
Rushing to Shannon Q’s unsolicited defense, user “Rembrandt972” (R972) replies
to KS by fact-checking his statements, referencing historical events and biblical texts to
reaffirm the atheist stance Dr. Josh sought to complicate. “Read Ezekiel 20:25,”
challenges R972, exposing an edict from God to condone “burning children on an altar to
Ba’al.” R972 ends with an indictment: “Don’t accuse Shannon of turning people away
from truth in a post where you [are] clearly lying your ass off.” KS responds by tackling
R972’s critique line by line, offering counterarguments and issuing more proclamations
like, “It is great to know Christ!” R972 counters the counters, adding “lying little weasel”
to their repertoire of insults and offering a slew of new facts to combat KS’s response,
also line by line. They continue in this manner until Dirty Texan (DT) reappears,
reproaching KS for ignoring R972’s “fair criticism” and encouraging a stance of
humility. “You may think you are just ‘doing the right thing’ and spreading the word of
Jesus, but you just come off as arrogant and prideful. Not very Christlike. In fact, in this

118

forum of conversation it’s probably counterproductive to the goal of evangelizing
Christ,” remarks DT. KS refuses to give any ground, responding with more biblical
evidence, making parallels to other faith traditions, and justifying his method of response:
“I may or may not owe someone an apology for this or that. However, that is totally
irrelevant to the fact that Christ is always good. He is the light of the world. If you miss
that, you miss everything!” User “Johannes Richter” jumps in with a question to KS,
similar to the one KS originally asked Shannon: “Are you open to the fact that having
open and quality discussions about the realities of the Bible might lead be [sic.] TO life
and love and truth?” KS evades the question and, instead, doubles down with more
apologetics, ending each threaded response with “Jesus Christ is the light of the world.”
DT makes one last attempt to reason with KS, explaining the intent behind their
engagement: “my criticism had nothing to do with moral authority or even the Bible.
Some of the points you are making, and the facts you assume, are debatable regardless of
belief in the Bible. If you want your position to be seriously considered then meet the
critical points directly, and be willing to say ‘maybe you have a point’ every once in a
while. I realize you may be viewing my comments as an attack, but I haven’t indicated
that my moral authority is any different from yours. My point is just about facts/data and
how you might be mistaken. Not even that you are. You do you. Cheers.” To this
splintering olive branch, KS replies, “My standard is the Bible. It tells of Jesus Christ,
Who is the light of the world.” From that point on, we never hear from DT again.
KS gains new sparring partners, many who identify as atheists, and we see the
same drama play out again and again. Some of these new interlocutors, however, nix
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reasoning with KS and default to trolling him—i.e., a purposefully facetious form of
internet-speak—instead. User “Abigail Parker,” for example, thanks KS for his insights
and reports, “I did ask and God told me the book [i.e., the Bible] is just another holy book
and not divinely inspired. Namaste!” Others skip over KS’s diatribes altogether and focus
their comments on the cuteness of Shannon Q’s tailless kitten who made an on-screen
appearance toward the end of the livestream. “Maddie is soooooooooo cute!!!!!! Kittens
are so cute! But I remember when I had kittens I couldn’t wait for them to grow up🤣,”
exclaims user “Stephanie,” who also adds, “So we gotta accept the historical context?
Why isn’t God coming back to give an update?” A few bring dimensions of race into the
conversation, like user “Randell Mathews” who shares, “I’m a 60 year ago black man,
also an atheist. The word ‘slavery’ rings a slightly different bell to me. It’s heartbreaking
to hear people who don’t understand speak about slavery ‘back then’, as if the
consistency of it aren’t deeply felt today in 2020.” Even in 2021, users are asking similar
questions, and we still find them responding to, interpreting, negotiating, warring over
Shannon Q’s video content and the incredibly diverse reactions from fellow commenters.
Of the 444 comments currently posted to Shannon Q’s video,32 the above
happened in roughly 40. Of the 133 videos Shannon Q currently has on her YouTube
channel—many of which are empathy-driven, mediated conversations between
individuals who hold different worldviews—we burrowed into only 1. Of the 500 hours
of content uploaded to YouTube every minute and the over 2 billion monthly logged-in
users who generate billions of views each day (“YouTube for Press”), we watched only

32

As of June 2021

120

1.5 hrs that got viewed a little over 10,000 times. Put simply, our snapshot barely
scratches the surface of the extremely complex information abyss that is YouTube, which
constantly proves its vivacity through its users’ enthusiastic participation and formation
of loose, fluid online communities. This snapshot also complicates common assumptions
of new media, YouTube in particular, as sites of Internet drivel, vapid and uncritical
interactions between participants, and “corporate-made community” (see Juhasz). As
evidenced by the back-and-forth happening in the comments section, we saw strategies of
negotiation and argumentation—even attempts at deliberation—in an online medium that
not only makes visible and stores users’ ideas but also actively facilitates their
engagement, calling them to leave threaded replies, “like” and “dislike” content, have
live face-to-face conversations, click on hyperlinks in the video’s description box, peruse
archived video performances, and explore content recommended by an algorithm. Side
by side, we found gracious interlocutors, fact-checkers, apologists, trolls, inquisitive cat
enthusiasts, PhDs, laypeople sharing lived experiences, etc., each tackling the wicked
problem that is biblical slavery and possessing an opportunity to influence the flow of
conversation and others’ perceptions of content. Some, like Shannon Q, Dr. Josh, and
Robinson, modeled dialogue seeking not persuasion but understanding, which elicited
admiration and openness from viewers (e.g., Dirty Texan) used to seeing fights between
Christians and atheists online. Some, like MultiCappie and ben green, favored more
logos-driven approaches to protect their in-group and strove to support claims not just
with any evidence but accurate evidence, information they grounded and refined through
additional research, peer review, and revisions to their writing—approaches we might
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find in the traditions of composition pedagogy. Some, like Ken Shiloh and
Rembrandt972, emulated the logics of Chapter 2’s holy literacy apparatus, which seeks
mastery in airtight hermeneutics and claims to objective Truth. Some, like Abigail
Parker, Stephanie, and Randell Mathews, utilized more electrate logics, which adhere to
aleatory, pattern-driven inventions and associations, many of which occur through a felt
trigger derived from some external source. No matter the strategy or orientation to the
content, each assertion remained “holey” because of the digital platform; at every turn,
something—a well-made point, a questionably written comment, a kitten jumping into
frame, an unexpected reaction—punctured a hole in anything boasting stability or
wholeness. Despite lofty proclamations or appeals to scholarly sources, there was (and
still is) no clear-cut winner, no one takeaway or definitive answer to biblical views on
slavery. All utterances remain paralogical to each other. As a result, we cannot help but
feel caught and exposed in this unpredictable, unruly web of differences.
Where does this condition of online exchange leave us in our pursuit of sacredsecular communion that both participates and deliberates (maybe)? What can we learn
from the ever-confounding, hol(e)y spaces of digital media that might be useful to
composition praxis? This chapter takes up these questions by first returning to the field of
Rhetoric and Composition in order to establish the relevance and application of
examining digital media (e.g., YouTube) to gather insights on sacred-secular
communication in the writing classroom. We will extend the work begun in Chapter 1 to
challenge the conflict narrative in composition theory and, drawing from posthumanism
and scholars of Digital Rhetoric, note how changes in communication brought about by
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electronic technologies—or what we called “electracy” in Chapter 2—have shifted linear,
argument-based perceptions of composing and writing pedagogy toward more ecological,
relational models of meaning-making. Next, we will note the parallels between these
moves in the human-technology relationship to shifts in religion as it exists through
online communities. Scholars of Digital Religion will help us see that what we called
“electrate religion”—the holey iteration of religious systems and individuals prone to
more orthodox practices and understandings of a Divine—is quickly becoming a more
visible and viable practice of religion on the Internet, which perpetually exists alongside
dogmatic iterations as well. I will suggest that electrate religion’s potential for radical
hospitality and exposure to otherness is preconditioned by strategies of negotiation and
mediation that involve what Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin call “invitational rhetoric,”
what Lisa Blankenship calls “rhetorical empathy,” and what Jeffrey Ringer calls
“vernacular religious creativity”—all strategies that have direct applications to and for
the composition classroom and religiously committed and/or secular individuals. This
will prepare the way for our in-depth examination of how YouTube—namely its
Christian and atheist communities—operates as a potentially effective medium to
facilitate (and shut down) these strategies. In our next chapter, we will meet and analyze
YouTube creators who actively utilize the empathy-driven, deliberative-participatory
strategies introduced in this chapter. The model of communication that they emulate and
elicit is what we are pursuing in this project and will eventually apply.
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Composing in the Digital Age
Ungrounding Rhetoric and Composition
All roads in this dissertation ultimately lead to the writing classroom, even those
that navigate by way of rabbit holes on the Internet. Thus, to better understand the
relevance of these hol(e)y paths, we must examine broader pedagogical and theoretical
frames of rhetoric and composition that beckon us toward the online world. To do this, let
us return to the scene excavated in Chapter 1, the field of Rhetoric and Composition, and
the logics of electrate religion explored in Chapter 2—only this time, we will don slightly
different lenses. Recall that in the brief history I outlined of the field and its fraught
relationship with religion, the central dilemma was dogma and the conflict narrative it
nurtures between what Doug Downs terms the discourses of Inquiry (secular, university
ideals) and Affirmation (religious, fundamentalist ideals). We explored several
approaches—Phillip Marzluf’s formalistic, tolerance, and process frames—that
challenged this binary by exposing the foundationalist assumptions inherent to both and,
instead, positioning religious discourse, particularly of the Christian variety, not as a
means to close but to open students to deliberate—to actively engage in critical inquiry,
affirmations of difference, and with diverse others. Elizabeth Vander Lei revealed
another tension in these approaches, however: deliberation often yields passive
engagement, a condition I argued precludes Michael-John DePalma’s reimagination of
religious rhetorics as a way toward “political decision-making and civic action” (256).
Active participation, Vander Lei observed, frequently operates by way of echo chambers
filled with intolerant interlocutors convinced of their certainty. This was Chapter 2’s
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starting point, where we theorized ways to make deliberation and participation not so
mutually exclusive. Through apparatus theory, I suggested that the linear, logic-driven
nature of the literacy apparatus often reifies the will to master and define, which, when
paired with Christian discourse, frequently participates in egregious and insular ways.
Through the numinous, aleatory, pathos-driven character of electrate religion, however,
we recognized the potential for participation that extends radical hospitality to the Other
but requires a different form of reasoning or way to deliberate. This chapter begins by
remixing these oscillations in reasoning between closure and openness.
In The Homesick Phone Book and Participatory Composition, Cynthia Haynes
and Sarah Arroyo respectively identify a common tendency in composition theory: a
reliance on ground, or a locatable and relatively stable place from which to reason.
Haynes points to the teaching of argumentative writing as exemplary of this approach,
which she describes as “the cornerstone of composition pedagogy” wherein students
learn “that positioning matters more than thought, and reason more than distance sought”
(103). Tracing this idea back to sixteenth-century humanist Peter Ramus, whose
philosophy of pedagogy privileged logic and reason in an effort to mitigate
epistemological abstractions, Haynes explains that the legacy of this approach “amounts
to sheltering students from the deep (and too-fluid) regions of language (and Being)”
(64). They are, instead, encouraged to discover what she calls the “why,” or theoretically
identifiable reasons underpinning the effects of what orders and operates our world.
Arroyo highlights similar ground-affirming legacies in composition scholarship and
practice, gesturing to stasis theory, another staple of the field. She describes this approach
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as the practice of “finding a place on which to stand and generate arguments” (52). When
applied pedagogically, stasis theory asks students to pursue what K. A. Raign condenses
to three questions: “fact, definition, and quality, which teaches students to engage in the
process of elenchus” (88). Raign argues that elenchus, or refutation, sharpens students’
critical thinking abilities by helping them concretize and navigate more ambiguous and
conflict-driven issues. Arroyo ultimately recognizes stasis theory as providing “a
systematic guide for ‘how to’ invent written arguments and assumes that answering the
question, What is x? will be no problem for writers” (53). Combined, these two
approaches boast a method for uncovering what and why things—perhaps wicked
problems like biblical views on slavery included—happen in the way that they do. Byron
Hawk in A Counter-History of Composition attaches these approaches to empowermentoriented outcomes, citing James Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric and critical pedagogy
as particularly supportive of this end. Within these frames, students are “citizen-rhetors”
in training who become the locus of interpreting the “cultural codes” comprising their
lived environments. Developing critical awareness of how they might figure into systems
and ideology would, again theoretically, empower them to not only make sense of and
dialogue with oppressive cultural codes but to also resist (i.e., argue against) these
hegemonic structures by recognizing either their own complicity or marginalization (i.e.,
their positioning) within these systems.
Without disparaging the sincerity of these endeavors, Hawk ultimately sees the
empowerment-oriented approach as complicit with the very ideology it seeks to resist. It
proposes what he via Paul Kameen characterizes as a process instead of a method, the
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former being “linear and pre-directed” and the latter following “an open, circuitous path,
resulting in unpredictable outcomes” (215). In other words, empowerment-as-process
works to cultivate a specific form of critical consciousness by grounding reality in a
particular politic. The degree to which a student might claim agency is, thus, determined
by the level of their alignment with and fluency in social-epistemic rhetoric’s and critical
pedagogy’s intended outcomes and analytical frames. Citing Victor Vitanza, Arroyo adds
that this process—i.e., locating answers to stasis theory’s inquiries—does not amount to
discovery or critical enlightenment but, instead, “uncovers what has already been
predetermined by the modes, or the social codes, of production and representation” (qtd.
in 54). Students, in other words, would not be in the business of resisting but of
reproducing the very structures they seek to complicate. Moreover, in a world haunted by
irreconcilable tragedy—or, as Haynes puts it, the fact that “[a]irplanes hit towers, and
structures implode with people in them. Refugees drown in sinking boats, and pernicious
people traffickers (so-called ‘travel agents’) camped on the fringe of refugee camps count
their money” (62)—these efforts toward stasis through argumentation assume that we can
find logical reasons for why logic-defying things happen and that, in the process, we
might navigate a way out of this mess. Hawk, Arroyo, and Haynes strongly suggest that
these assumptions are not only inadequate (and unrealistic) ways of excavating problems
but are also counterintuitive to any effort striving for student empowerment.
Thus, each proposes a more open-ended method to navigate in a different
direction without presupposing a set destination or relying on the logics of argumentation
to support liberatory ways of knowing and being. Haynes offers “writing offshore,”
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which she describes as a “suggestive” approach that calls composition and rhetoric to
“relinquish its role in teaching students to rest rather than dance, to reason rather than
detach, to face the eroding coastline of ground metaphysics rather than the open sea”
(74). This work of casting off into the open sea begins, she explains, in wresting the field
away from its need for reasons—i.e., discipline-specific answers to and outcomes for the
“why” question—and toward abstraction, or what she characterizes via Martin Heidegger
and Meister Eckhart as “detachment” or “writing nomadically” (105). Detached, nomadic
writing does not seek a particular subjective home from which students can occupy and
argue; rather, it (un)positions the writer as an itinerant who exists in dynamic relation to a
world perpetually in motion, unstable, “without why” (103). Their job in composing is
not to find the reason but is to learn, discover, or invent “a language not ruled by the
sovereignty of ground logic”—by recognizing, instead, how language itself “draws you
away, how it seduces you,” how it, perhaps, unmoors us from our grounded
preconceptions, whatever those may be for you (103; 106). Arroyo takes up the operation
of this type of writing in her exploration of Gille Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s holey
space, which they also associate with the nomad. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and
Guattari offer three models of space—striated, smooth, and holey—which illustrate what
Brent Adkins calls epistemological “tendencies” (231). Being neither opposed nor
disconnected, these tendencies focus less on ontological distinctions or value judgments
between the three iterations of space and more on their intensity, or their capacity to
facilitate “flows” of meaning (239). Via Stuart Moulthrop, Arroyo explains that striated
space facilitates a more static flow, manifesting in “hierarchical and rule-intensive
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cultures” that become “champions of order—defenders of logos” (qtd. in 63). Adkins
adds that striations seek conformity and “homogenize by making everything subject to
the same rule, the same coding” (232). Generally, this is the bedrock from which many
institutions and writing conventions necessarily stem. Smooth space resembles more of
Haynes’ writing offshore, producing “dynamic” flows of information by introducing “a
matrix of breaks, jumps” that destabilizes striations (qtd. in Arroyo 63). It promotes not
conformity through uniform code but heterogeneity through a state of becoming. “In
smooth space, movement occurs and cannot be controlled or resisted in the traditional
sense; rather, we charge into the very thing we are trying to resist,” asserts Arroyo (63).
Put another way, smooth space disallows domestication of problems through tidy
solutions and, instead, forces us to contend with the multiplicity inherent in every
linguistic and interpretative gesture. Holey space—much like Chapter 2’s khora—
facilitates the flow of both striated and smooth space, functioning as the site where
striations and smoothings communicate. Deleuze and Guattari note that holey space “is
always connected to nomad [smooth] space, whereas it conjugates with sedentary
[striated] space” (415). They liken this relationship between the three spaces to mining,
where (holey) workers cannot simply skim the surface (of smooth space) but must bore
holes into the earth (of striated space). In other words, holey space neither negates
smooth and striated space nor dictates how they flow; rather, it constellates their
intensities, becoming “invented and reinvented, persistently ‘flowing out,’ never to be
filled up” (Arroyo 64).
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Writing offshore in holey space creates a condition where writers can no longer
rely on ground or “stable” meanings to reason. Neither can they claim to be the locus for
interpreting the world. Instead, they become part of a larger, more complex system of
flows and intensities that generate and morph meanings ad infinitum, not through
predetermined trajectories but through holey, unpredictable relationships between the
smooth and the striated. Argumentation-as-reason in this system shifts to what Hawk via
Vitanza calls dissoi paralogoi, or the “ongoing movement that produces complexity or
heterogeneity” between linguistic, noetic, and structural factors (186). Dissoi paralogoi
privileges not one discourse, mode of reasoning, or ordering principle; rather, it keeps
these elements paralogical—that is to say, alongside in tension. Meaning-making, thus,
occurs less as a linear process of elenchus and more as, in Hawk’s words, an “ecology,”
which Nathan Stormer and Bridie McGreavy excavate in “Thinking Ecologically About
Rhetoric’s Ontology.” An ecological approach, they explain,
considers qualities of relations between entities, not just among humans,
that enable different modes of rhetoric to emerge, flourish, and dissipate.
The most general relational quality is struggle; rhetoric emerges from and
for struggle. However, ecological struggle is striving pursued with, not
contesting against, other things. It is struggle in dependence, not between
“independents.” (3, emphasis in original)
Writing ecologically, therefore, necessarily happens in communion with diverse others
and requires the writer to be agile and adaptable, not tacitly committed, to the forces and
factors that comprise the world of knowing and being. It also requires not just a critical
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awareness of how these forces and factors come in and out of existence but calls for
active involvement—the “striving pursued with”—in determining how, where, when
intensities flow. Hawk notes that such participation first necessitates a shift in how the
writer perceives their own subjectivity. “The subject is not simply the political position or
identity someone chooses but the relationships established through those identities and
the effects of those relationships on bodies,” he explains (189). As such, the writer is not
a singular interpreter of cultural codes but is a multiplicity of contingent selves that
impact and are impacted by their unique entanglements with the world (189). Stormer
and McGreavy emphasize that perceiving and making sense of these entanglements
happens through the writer’s vulnerability, or condition of “being at risk in varying
passive-active relations” (13). They characterize “at risk” not necessarily as being in
impending danger but as being open to affectability (which, to be clear, does not negate
the possibility of danger). Hawk further clarifies that such affectability—what traditional
theories of rhetoric conflate with pathos—is not just a strategy of persuasion used to
emotionally move an audience. Instead, pathos is a substrate of ecological vulnerability
that drives the potential to move and to be moved; “it is a body’s capacity for relations
within a network” (190).33 Taken together, these characteristics point to a compositional
approach where the writer, in both mind and body, is involved in—not the centerpiece
of—negotiating flows of meaning that circulate in on- and offshore environments,
remaining neither stable nor whole but in a constant state of ecological struggle, or of
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This take on affectability echoes the “divine rhetoricity” concept we explored in Chapter 2.
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holeyness. In our next few sections, we pick up and unpack these threads of subjectivity
and affectability as they relate to and fuel negotiation in our digital age.
(Re)cognizing Negotiation in the Digital Age
In the shift we have examined from ground to offshore, holey ecologies become
less a suggested compositional approach and more of an imperative when contextualized
in our digital age. As we examined in Chapter 2, electracy has thrown us into a world that
moves at lightning speed by partnering with electronic technologies that mediate
multimodal information—e.g., text, images/bodies, sounds/voices, etc.—into the tangled
web of the Internet. Sid Dobrin notes that “as the relations exposed by the digital age
have emerged as deeply complex, writing theorists have needed more complex ways for
theorizing writing” (Ecology), a charge many scholars have answered through the lens of
posthumanism. Posthumanism, or what Jay David Bolter describes as “a series of breaks
with foundational assumptions of modern Western culture” (1) and N. Katherine Hayles
calls an “historic phenomenon” most noticeably of the twentieth century (321), offers a
framework to recognize and re-cognize the ways we conceptualize and negotiate these
complexities. Though posthumanist theories span disciplines and schools of thought, each
unites in a common critique of “traditional Western humanism” that extrapolates maxims
by Protagoras and René Descartes34 that claim human beings are at the helm of cognizing
reality, of self-determining provisional truths through critical self-reflection (Chertkova).
Casey Boyle explains that posthumanism is not “after the human” (i.e., not attempting to

I think specifically of Protagoras’ “Of all things the measure is man: of those that are, that they are; and
of those that are not, that they are not” and Descartes’ “cogito, ergo sum.”
34
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erase or trivialize the human) but is “after” this human-centric version of Western
humanism, “or, perhaps, ‘among humanism’” (539). Much like Stormer and McGreavy’s
explanation of ecologies, the posthuman approach works to (dis)place the self by
acknowledging how people, animals, machines, etc.—all human and non-human
participants in epistemological endeavors—intra-act in the world, an idea Karen Barad
coins to describe the relationality between actants that pre-exists any semblance of
meaning. Intra-action, they explain, “recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but
rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that […] agencies are
only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as individual
elements” (33, emphasis in original). Put simply, entwinement is the wellspring from
which agency originates. Thus, the writer intra-acting cannot begin to think “selfefficacy” and “empowerment” until they are entwined with others. Even then, the point,
according to posthumanist scholars, is not to become a self-conscious writer-agent. As
Marilyn Cooper suggests in The Animal Who Writes, writing is not a “behavior
dominantly driven by intentions or purposes but rather by responding to possibilities that
arise through intra-actions, and finally not a behavior governed by effectiveness or
efficiency but rather by creativity and accountability” (19). She characterizes writing as a
distinctly distributed, ethical, and generative practice, which involves “developing habits
of paying attention to the relationalities of becoming and always entertaining the
possibility that ‘what everyone knows’—and what you believe—might be wrong” (6).
Writers, thus, are never sole possessors or in control of knowledge but operate more as
negotiators, dependent upon other actants to discover, invent, and navigate complex
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information that is continuously emerging between them. They engage not by arguing
for/against but, as Cooper puts it, by “monitoring, nudging, adapting, adjusting—in short,
responding to the world” (qtd. in Boyle 538).
For posthumanists, key co-actants in this web of relationalities are digital
technologies. Thus, in addition to complicating understandings of the human subject and
agency, posthumanism also challenges common perceptions of digital technologies and
the way they intra-act with individuals negotiating in increasingly digitized terrains. In
Multiliteracies for a Digital Age, Stuart Selber speaks to these common (mis)perceptions,
noting that a “dominant trope” in examining the relationship between humans and
electronic devices, particularly computers, reduces the technology to a tool—a “kind of
prosthetic device that increases efficiency, enhances cognition, and spans temporal and
spatial boundaries” (31; 36). The tool metaphor assumes unidirectional, human-centric
influence: that the user manipulates a device to achieve their desired end, often through
what is perceived as the device’s amplification of a human functionality. This view,
explains Selber via Andrew Feenberg, casts technology as “instrumental,” or “subservient
to social values established in the spheres of politics and culture” and, therefore,
“neutral” in its interaction with users and “indifferent to its own ends” (38; 39). In other
words, technology is the innocent, apolitical puppet, and humans pull the strings. Though
Selber finds the tool trope useful in keeping humans accountable for their technology use,
and while he also acknowledges a degree of technical skill required in order to operate
electronic hardware—what he calls “functional literacy”—he ultimately argues that
technologies are neither neutral nor indifferent but “instantiate the values of disciplines
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and institutions and individuals” (87). Because of their intentional design, they encourage
and limit specific behaviors and interactions with their interfaces (147). The corrective to
the primarily skills-based approach, he argues, is the cultivation of functional, critical,
and rhetorical literacies, or the respective development of individuals who are “users,”
“questioners,” and “producers of technology” (25).
Selber’s three literacies help elucidate the myopic view of technology-as-tool and
point toward a more entwined relationship between humans and the digital.
Posthumanists might caution, however, against positioning machines as objects of
practical, critical, and rhetorical use. Scholars working at the intersection of
posthumanism and digital rhetoric35 rework this relationship to emphasize the coconstitutive nature of their intra-action. Boyle et al. explain that the “digital,” what we
might conflate with technology in general or a specific electronic device in particular, is
“no longer conditional on particular devices but has become a multisensory, embodied
condition through which most of our basic processes operate” (252). Put another way, the
“digital age” is no longer humans selectively partnering with or ubiquitously using
By “digital rhetoric,” I reference the term neologized by Richard Lanham in the 1990s to describe what
Casey Boyle, James J. Brown Jr., and Steph Ceraso call “the scholarly analysis and visual logics of digital
genres and screen-based conventions” (253). Doug Eyman applies a more rhetoric-focused definition to
such scholarly analysis and logic, describing digital rhetoric as “the application of rhetorical theory (as
analytic method or heuristic for production) to digital texts and performances” (44), which touches
everything from the ways these texts and performances function to the identities, communities, and
agencies they proliferate and/or limit. Boyle et al. emphasize that these digital texts and performances are
“multisensory,” encompassing not just the visual but also aural and haptic modes and accounting not just
for the analysis of these modes but also the immersive environments that they create and mediate.
Moreover, these modes and environments are not limited to one type of technology (e.g., a desktop
computer) but involve “the pervasiveness of digital practices” stemming from use of, say, wearable
technologies, smartphones, etc. (252). Justin Hodgson’s articulation of digital rhetoric summarizes the
operation, modes, and scope of these perspectives well: “digital rhetoric means the study of and practice
concerned with (1) acts and artifacts of mediation, (2) systems (computational, cultural, communicative,
etc.) that produce or allow for particular types of digital and nondigital creations, and (3) humantechnology assemblages at the center of contemporary making practices” (37, my emphasis).
35
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technological objects but is a condition of being immersed in, extensively connected
with/by, and, in many ways, reliant on the affordances these devices mediate. “We cannot
assume distance from the digital since even the most innocuous of activities, such as
grocery shopping, now rely on computational procedures that connect local purchases to
global supply chains,” Boyle et al. contend (252). Justin Hodgson calls this collapse of
distance the “post-digital,” which, as he explains in a video lecture on the term, does not
imply that we are beyond the digital but are, instead, “so saturated with digital
technologies, with computational media, with screens of all kinds, that to speak of the
digital as something separate, as removed somehow from the muck and the minutiae of
everyday reality, is to ignore just how pervasive the digital is […] It is everywhere”
(“FDI”). In Post-Digital Rhetoric and the New Aesthetic, Hodgson clarifies that within
this post-digital world, digital technologies are not, in a dramatic switch of fates, the
puppeteer pulling at the strings of helpless human props. Without defaulting in the other
direction to a humanist resuscitation of the subject, Hodgson explains that a post-digital
subjectivity operates through “the very flows by which they [humans and technologies]
set upon one another, accommodate and respond to one another, and come together to
produce new platforms, perspectives, and preferences for making sense of the world”
(122). The operative idea here is that the human-digital relationship has influence going
both ways, and then some. The information flows collaboratively produced and
negotiated feed into epistemologies and practices that remix extant forms of knowing and
making, innovate new configurations, and even give rise to unanticipated outcomes and
opportunities for response.
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In Unthought, Hayles unpacks the logics underpinning these flows and functions
between the human and the technological, each of which she attaches to cognition, or “a
process [not limited to human brains] that interprets information within contexts that
connect it with meaning” (22). By “process,” she emphasizes that cognition occurs, much
like agency in intra-action, as an entwined activity, or what she describes as “a dynamic
unfolding within an environment in which its activity makes a difference” (“The
Cognitive Nonconscious” 793). In other words, cognition is a function of actants
embedded and waging influence within a particular context. By “interprets information,”
Hayles stresses that within this context, choice36 must be available. “There must be more
than one option for interpretation to operate,” she explains (793), and actants must be
able to select from distinct “courses of action” that yield different outcomes. The context
itself, she adds, also influences these decision-making processes as it often calls for a
choice of particular relevance to a particular situation. These capacities, which Hayles
summarizes as “flexibility, adaptability, and evolvability,” are what characterize a
cognizer, and she (re)cognizes both humans and technologies as such. 37 She underscores,
however, that the human and the technological cognize in markedly different ways.

In “The Cognitive Nonconscious: Enlarging the Mind of the Humanities,” Hayles makes an important
qualification in her use of the word “choice.” From a humanist perspective, choice often implies free will,
but when taking account of technical cognizers, choice becomes decision-making by way of a programmed
functionality, often for a particular situation or context, exercised through encounters with other technical
and/or human actants. Thus, Hayles suggests shifting choice-as-free-will to choice-as-interpretation-ofinformation to account for “the consequences of the actions the assemblage [of actants and their
environments] as a whole performs” (806).
37
Hayles reinforces this point in her distinction between “thinking” and “cognizing.” She affiliates
“thinking” with consciousness, assigning it to an activity performed only by “conscious entities such as
humans (and some animals).” Cognizing, on the other hand, refers to any activity that “has the effect of
performing complex modeling and other informational tasks” (“Cognition Everywhere” 201). Framed in
these ways, technologies cannot think, but they can cognize.
36
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While living organisms (with a few exceptions) must be understood
retroactively (for example, by reverse engineering the evolutionary
processes), technical objects have been made. Leaving aside emergent
results (a special case that requires careful orchestration to succeed), each
technical object has a set of design specifications determining how it will
behave. (Unthought 84)
Here, Hayles emphasizes the engineered nature of technical cognizers not to reify the tool
trope but to, instead, emphasize that their modes of operation are no accident; their
programmers tell them what to do and when. She is quick to qualify that these
predetermined ways of knowing and being stop being determinable the moment they
begin intra-acting in the world, producing what she calls a “cognitive assemblage,” or
“hybrid” systems wherein actants “create, modify, and interpret the flow” of information
through “choices and decisions” (“The Cognitive Nonconscious” 116). Hayles finds that
in the era of computational media—what she describes as especially “smart” technical
cognizers—and the Internet, technologies leverage their programmed capacities with
immense sophistication and fluidity, becoming particularly adept at flexibility,
adaptability, and evolvability in various contexts and, thus, incredibly influential in how
decisions and information flows are made in the world. These technical actants, she
contends, “are the quintessentially cognitive technology, and for this reason they have
special relationships with the quintessentially cognitive species, Homo sapiens” (803,
emphasis in original). They are not, in other words, simple mediators of the human
experience that increase user convenience and/or efficiency (e.g., an escalator, the chirp
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signaling a dying battery in a smoke detector). Rather, they are active and consequential
participants that influence our intra-actions—our ways of knowing and being in the
world. Thus, as Hodgson puts it, we must frame our relationship to digital technologies,
particularly computational media, as working “with” rather than “on” (Post-Digital 116).
In this posthuman, post-digital relationship, human and technical actants are mutually
affected and culpable.
Since affectability, as we noted in our examination of rhetorical ecologies,
involves a degree of risk, the human-technology relationship never precludes the
possibility of danger or, in the very least, concern. Alerting us to these dimensions,
Martin Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology posits that “technology is a
mode of revealing” (13), and what it often exposes in humans is a proclivity for ordering
and organizing with the intent to control or master reality. Heidegger calls this tendency
enframing and argues that technologies not only expose but also enable this logic, thus
transforming the way humans behave and relate to their environments as well as
themselves. Heidegger contends that by gaining the means to enframe, people inevitably
objectify and regulate themselves, reducing the human to what he calls “standingreserve,” or a capacity to be useful.38 Marshall McLuhan echoes aspects of Heidegger’s

In “The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust,” Steve B. Katz calls
this capacity to be useful “expediency,” or “technical criteria as a means to an end” (257). Using Nazi
Germany as a case study, wherein “science and technology became the basis of a powerful ethical
argument for carrying out any program,” he reminds us that the extreme logical conclusion of an ethic of
expediency is objectification of human life to such a degree that facilitating their mass murder is not only
seen as justifiable but also virtuous. He argues, “the ethic of expediency is an exclusively logical,
systematic, even quantifiable one, can lead to a rationality grounded in no other ethic but its own, and is
symptomatic of a highly scientific, technological age” (266). This potential will never be off the table in
our human-technology relationships, and we must be accordingly vigilant.
38
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assessment of technology. In Remediating McLuhan, Richard Cavell notes that McLuhan,
after the launch of Sputnik, saw “earth becoming an artifact of technology, contained by
technology rather than being its container” (111, emphasis in original). Put another way,
he saw technology operating as an objectifying mediator. McLuhan posits that the
impulse of the objectified is not necessarily mastery but anxiety. Technology, he
theorizes, alters “sense ratios or patterns of perception” by subtly and, perhaps,
imperceptibly assaulting humans with data at such a speed that they have no choice but to
shield themselves from its effects. “We have to numb our central nervous systems when
it is extended and exposed [through electronic technologies], or we will die. Thus the age
of anxiety and of electric media is also the age of the unconscious and of apathy,” he
argues (Understanding Media). For better or for worse, McLuhan condemns us to the
Matrix. Redirecting the spotlight from human effects to technologies themselves,
Friedrich Kittler takes McLuhan’s premise several steps further. In Gramophone, Film,
Typewrite, he boldly asserts, “Media determine our situation” (xxxix), a line of thought
he continues in “Protected Mode” wherein he suggests that technologies, once working
on relatively equal terms, have surpassed their human counterparts. “Industry,” he
observes, “has condemned human beings to remain human beings. The evolutionary
potential of ‘man’ to mutate into a paper machine has been blocked with great cunning”
(The Truth 210). While [hu]mans may have maxed out their potential for mutation,
technologies, contends Kittler, possess an uncanny ability to mutate and self-evolve at a
much faster and increasingly inaccessible rate, enabling them to outgrow the human—
perhaps something akin to the highly intelligent virtual assistants in Spike Jonze’s Her.
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Put simply, technology in Kittler’s view does not extend the body or central nervous
system; it secedes from them altogether. Beyond Hollywood, we witness manifestations
of Kittler’s, McLuhan’s, and Heidegger’s perspectives running rampant in, for example,
strategies of digital marketing framed around behavioral control (Nadler and McGuigan);
the rise of deepfakes, or the manipulation of sonic and visual media by artificial
intelligence (Kietzmann et al.); algorithms that suggest and circulate sensationalist,
potentially dangerous content (Ehrenfeld and Barton; Gallagher); social media platforms
that “operate on a business model of commodifying the attention of billions of people per
day, sorting tweets, posts, and groups to determine which get the most engagement
(clicks, views, and shares),” which have “led to narrower and crazier views of the world”
(Harris); and human (i.e., tech companies’) complicity in platforms not necessarily
designed for but capable of spreading fake news (Creech), to name a few.
Though this post-human, post-digital condition seems perilous, and while we
must be increasingly mindful of the concerns raised around threats to agency, we must
also recognize that while humans may no longer be captains of the ship, they still play a
significant role in the human-technology relationship. By way of Robert Ansen’s
characterization of public discourse as a “network of relationships,” Dan Ehrenfeld notes
that “the ailments of the networked public sphere are always both historical and
systemic” (307, emphasis in original). In other words, problems emerge not through some
natural order or deterministic cycle but through “particular historical moments”
involving, of course, technical cognizers but also influential human actants. He argues
that “when we develop relationships with the ‘others’ in our midst—both human and
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nonhuman—we build and maintain infrastructures that lay the groundwork for seemingly
spontaneous phenomena” (317, my emphasis). Put simply, we—not just hyper-evolving
technologies—are all architects of this rhetorical ecology. Hayles avers that instead of
seeking human/technical control within this system, “effective modes of intervention seek
for inflection points at which systemic dynamics can be decisively transformed to send
the cognitive assemblage in a different direction” (Unthought 203, my emphasis). There
is, in other words, a steering wheel in our vehicles of cognition. Amit Pinchevski,
drawing from Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of media, might characterize these inflection
points as “interruptions” that call attention to “the possibility of a beyond” (62). He
explains that media, particularly audiovisual, convey beyond the sterile codes and
processes of their programming by capturing “the material traces of mediation,” which
include the “physical effects of relation” (63). Put differently, technologies can mediate
the affective modes that prime us for (hopefully better, less objectifying) relationship.
They bear the capacity to throw us into what Richard Kearney called an anatheistic wager
where we look into the face of a Stranger—in our case, human or technical actants—and
determine whether or not to extend hospitality (see my Chapter 2). These inflection
points, opened by moments of recognition, are where we re-cognize an opportunity to
negotiate away from tendencies to enframe (as Heidegger termed it) and toward what
Hayles uniquely attributes to the human cognizer: “emotion, an encompassing world
horizon, and empathetic abilities to understand other minds” (“Cognitive Assemblages”
54). She reminds us, “We need to recognize that when we design, implement, and extend
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technical cognitive systems, we are partially designing ourselves. We must take care
accordingly” (55).
From offshore flows to the post-digital condition, we finally have a clearer view
of the rhetorical ecologies in which writers find themselves embedded. Understanding
their complexity further underscores the imperative to unground composition, which
begins in acknowledging that, as Nicholas Gane asserts, “human subjects cannot be
placed at the starting point or centre of all analysis, but thought of instead in connection
to objects, technologies and even forms of information that increasingly have their own
power” (40). While rethinking agency through a posthuman lens and giving due credence
to technical actants, we (humans) must also hold ourselves responsible for the crucial role
we play in the complex flow of digital information, using our unique human affordances
to inflect digital cognitive assemblages in a direction that promotes non-objectifying
relationships cognizant of diverse others.39 Moreover, human actants constellated with
increasingly intelligent technical cognizers must elide the tendency to inflect through
grounded arguments and, instead, keep the world holey—that is to say, keep negotiating
between the striated and the smooth. Bruce McComiskey in Dialectical Rhetoric asserts
that ours is a “newly emerging digital media ecology that emphasizes mediation and
negotiation, not unification or opposition,” requiring us to reconceptualize the ways we
form, unform, and reform the meaning-making flows that build and destroy online

39

Scholars addressing the intersections of rhetoric and technology remind us of the important
positionalities involved when conceptualizing “diverse others,” especially in terms of disability (Tucker,
Dolmage, Cherney) and race (Banks). Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, these dimensions—
e.g., discursive efforts to counteract ableism and racism—are crucial to our understanding of “nonobjectifying relationships.”
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ecologies (147, my emphasis). In our next section, we get a better view of how this might
play out by looking to religion’s entrance into the digital age, an arrival that continues our
remix of and oscillation between openness and closure.
Communing in the Digital Age
Prefacing Digital Religion
But first, a caveat: while posthumanism and digital rhetoric have taken
precedence in composition and rhetoric theories and practices, examining religion’s foray
into the digital age is less common. Embedded in Communication Studies scholarship,
digital religion (which we will define below) may seem a strange bedfellow. I look to this
area of study with Sidney Dobrin’s Postcomposition in mind, where he encourages
composition and rhetoric scholars to look beyond the classroom for insights on writing
and the processes that drive our understanding of composition. He contends that writing
theory should “describe/explain writing as phenomena that are sorts of producing
machines through which other phenomena manifest” (24). Put in the context of Cooper’s
description of writing as responding to—not endlessly critiquing—the world, Dobrin’s
frame propels us to escape the gravitational pull around “theories of student subjectivities
or around writing pedagogies, programs, or administrations” and to redirect focus “to the
writing itself and the systems in which it circulates” (25; 58). Because this project hinges
around religious-secular tensions in the writing classroom and looks to electrate religion
as an intervention, we must traverse beyond the classroom for insights into the systems
(i.e., the complex rhetorical ecologies) that undergird religious-secular intra-actions.
Thus, our examination of digital religion will serve two functions: 1) to analogize the
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above orientations to composing in the digital age and 2) to gather insights on digital
ecologies of religion, especially Christianity.
And we’re back: thus far, we have examined an alternative to grounded notions of
writing by excavating the ways digital technologies have shifted human-centered agency
to a complex, relational model of engagement that requires agility and adaptation
between both human and technical actants. While my allusions to these parties have been
quite broad, this section narrows our focus to religious humans (namely Christians) and
internet-based technical actants. As we witnessed in our opening anecdote, their intraactions do not always maximize the affordances of human empathy and technical fluidity,
though they perpetually provide the option to “interrupt” or “inflect” a cognitive
assemblage in that direction. Unpacking their ever-evolving, ever-dynamic relationship
will help us understand what it means to commune—and, by extension, to compose—in
our digital age and how human interlocutors might negotiate with each other and
mediating technologies (perhaps in less hostile ways). Chapter 2 exposed the tendencies
of religion to striate and smooth, and electracy provided theoretical approaches to keep
these poles in holey flux. Scholars of digital religion will help us extend these approaches
into Internet environments and provide us with more precise terminologies to describe
how agency, relationality, and affectability get not only reshaped but also expressed
online in religious communities. The goal here is to locate conditions for inflection points
so that the religious-secular assemblage might cognize with and/or toward greater
hospitality to the Other.
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To better understand the complex connection between religious (Christian)
humans and technical actants, we must first examine their rather storied past. In their
examination of the “religion and media nexus,” or what they call “media theology,”
Menahem Blondheim and Hananel Rosenberg argue, “Religion, like everything else, is
about communication or, rather, about the lack of it” (44). They explain that analyzing
the communicative dimensions of a media theology requires three perspectives: 1) the
impact religious practices and thought have historically had on “the ways we have
created, modified, applied, and established a relationship with media technologies” (4445); 2) the impact media have had on religion; and 3) “the ways communication
technologies serve to complicate theology” (45). Thus, we will begin by reiterating the
overarching “holy” values that Christians hold dear, which drive the way their humantechnology interactions have taken shape. Then, we will note the reciprocal impacts of
media on religion before examining complications that our above posthuman framework
brings to this relationship.
Despite hailing from every corner of the globe and forming disparate pockets of
over 300 denominations (Rhodes), Christians generally rely on three central principles:
belonging, believing, and behaving (Guite). Anglican priest Malcolm Guite finds that
Christians strongly value “belonging in a faith-community,” one which forms within
public, accessible spaces to foster relationships between believers as well as with God;
believe in the redemptive power of Jesus Christ; and recognize that the way humans
behave on Earth “has eternal significance” (2-3). For many Protestant Christian
denominations, the natural outgrowth of these principles is evangelism, which Daryl M.
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Balia and Kirsteen Kim define as “proclaiming the good news of the kingdom of God”
for the purpose of converting nonbelievers (212), an edict taken straight from the Bible in
Matthew 28:19. Enacting this scripture-backed charge builds and reinforces the faith
community, spreads the message of Christ’s salvific power, and, thus, constitutes “right”
action on the part of pious practitioners. The methods individuals have devised to carry
out this spiritual commission have varied over time, being heavily contingent upon
available platforms from which to speak. Bill J. Leonard notes that “old time religion”
evangelistic tactics in the United States often involved “revivals” where a “traveling
professional evangelist” would hold mass meetings “in local churches, rented halls and
football stadiums” (502). Lay individuals, also tasked with professing the gospel,
participated in similar efforts but on a smaller, person-to-person level, leading the
“unchurched” to Jesus by living attractive lives of “power and beauty” (Nichols 630).
The emergence of electronic media prompted a fusion of these approaches, and
Christians, specifically Protestants, began making a definitive shift from analog to digital
evangelistic efforts, especially through television. Threats to a cohesive Christian identity
by “secular media” also motivated this partnership with technology as Christians sought
to “assert their own beliefs to themselves, on the one hand, and to legitimize their
particular beliefs to the rest of society, on the other” through their use of the same media
platforms (Schultze 19).
In 1958, a conservative Southern Baptist magazine coined the word
“televangelism” (i.e., television evangelism), sparking a movement that would not only
embolden formations of a cohesive Christian identity but would also grow into a
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mammoth media industry. Christian films in particular were intended to “wage a
missionary offensive” by using the television medium as a vehicle through which a
specific Christian agenda could be fed to the general public (Bekkering). Eventually, with
more air time and an expanding audience, these efforts became less discreet and more
centered around specific, charismatic personalities—televangelists—who began to
emulate the “glitz and glam” of mainstream television and preach a less denominationspecific message for broader appeal. For a personal touch, televangelists also engaged in
other computer-mediated platforms, email being a primary one, to “create the illusion of
interpersonal bonds” through their television sets between themselves, their message, and
their audience (Bekkering). Opponents of these tactics accused televangelism of
attempting to replace the material church experience with a digital prosthetic that
pandered too much to the secular tastes of audiences. Additionally, critics saw
television’s commodification of Christianity as a perversion of the Gospel’s deeper
themes, which they claimed were being appropriated by conservative religious
influencers for political means (Abelman and Neuendorf 152-153). Early research around
these concerns, however, revealed that while these claims were not completely baseless,
they did not account for a more complete picture of televangelism and its effect on both
viewers and believers. For example, studies showed that there was no correlation between
decreased church attendance and religious television viewership in the 1980s (Litman and
Bain). In fact, researchers found that there were links “between the nature and intensity of
religious beliefs and televangelical viewing” as television programs enabled the
churchgoer to extend their religious expression at home, providing an outlet not for their
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secular tastes but their sacred practices (340). Moreover, any invocation of politics by
televangelists in the late 1980s into the early 2000s tended to be “presented in a neutral
light,” focused around primarily religious or social themes, and delivered with a less
confrontational or blatantly dogmatic approach (Abelman and Neuendorf 184; Feld et
al.).40
Despite these nuanced critiques, televangelism’s intended aims—to preach the
gospel through an amplified, technology-mediated, personal approach—eventually hit a
wall. Denis Bekkering observes that televangelists were “unable to form religious
communities around their personalities, as the unidirectional nature of television
communication did not allow viewers to interact with each other” (“From
‘Televangelist’”). Participation, in other words, was a missing ingredient in forming that
sense of “belonging.” The era of new media, however, changed this tune, which is when
the field of Digital Religion took off. Heidi A. Campbell, a leading scholar in religion and
new media studies, describes digital religion as the study of “how digital media and
spaces are shaping and being shaped by religious practice” (Digital Religion 1).
Important in her articulation of this concept is the equal emphasis and reciprocal
influence placed on digital media, religion, and its human practitioners. To highlight the
importance of this distinction, she contrasts the term “digital religion” from “religion
online” and “online religion.” She explains that scholars studying “religion online” view
the Internet as an extension of analog religion, enabling practitioners to bend the

40

We cannot say the same of our current cultural moment in the 2020s as Christian nationalism runs
rampant.
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boundaries of religious traditions, perhaps similar to the 1980’s churchgoing TV
consumer. “Online religion,” however, focuses on the development of “new forms of
religiosity and lived religious practices” as a result of the Internet’s capacity to be “fluid
and flexible” (3). This view looks to born-digital iterations of religion and does not so
much focus on offline counterparts. “Digital religion,” on the other hand, combines and
extends these two foci, seeing religion as “constituted in new ways through digital media
and cultures” while also being “a bridge that connects and extends online religious
practices and spaces into offline religious contexts, and vice versa” (3; 4). Put differently,
digital religion obscures the online/offline binary and considers a more holistic, contextbound view of religion, its practitioners, and the technologies that mediate them.41 This, I
argue, resonates with the posthuman, post-digital condition we explored above, making
digital religion a particularly important conversation partner. Campbell asserts that
studying the shifts and effects of digital religion are not specific to religious communities
but are characteristic of “our emerging information culture.” She emphasizes that “the
internet serves as a mirror to highlight social shifts occurring in the public understanding
of social practice at many different levels, the performance of religion being just one of
those” (“Understanding” 84). Thus, as we excavate digital religion, we also gather
insights on broader trends and practices in the digital age.

41

In her survey of Digital Religion Studies, Campbell notes four waves of Digital Religion scholarship and
theory. Wave 1, she explains, was the “descriptive era” where scholars simply described and documented
religious phenomena that they saw proliferate online. Wave 2, the “time of categorization,” developed
terminologies for and located prominent trends from the descriptive era. Wave 3, “the theoretical turn,”
cultivated frameworks and methods to study analog religion’s use of and impact by new media. Wave 4,
which characterizes current digital religion scholarship, focuses on “religious actors’ negotiations between
their online and offline lives, and how this informs a broader understanding of the religious in the
contemporary society” (“Surveying” 17).
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Understanding Religious Humans and Technical Actants
In Networked Theology: Negotiating Faith in Digital Culture, Campbell and
theologian Stephen Garner offer a framework for these insights, walking readers through
both new media theory and its intersection with religion. Though they describe new
media42 in more concrete terms—i.e., “a whole range of digital technologies and forms of
media, including computers, the internet, cell phones and smartphones, social networking
software, and digital recording devices” (40)—they emphasize, via Lev Manovich, that
these media signal a change in the logics and environments through which information
gets disseminated. Due to what Manovich calls numerical representation (the translation
of data into manipulable code), modularity (digital information comprised of distinct and
moveable parts), automation (programmability of encoded data), variability (the capacity
for rapid and easy change), and transcoding (fluidity of information across platforms and
formats), new media have the unique ability to make digital spaces “navigable” and
flexible, not just by computer programmers but also the “prosumer,” or lay audiences
who have “become both producers and consumers of media content” (44). Campbell and
Garner credit these shifts to evolutions in the World Wide Web. The 1990’s Web 1.0,
they explain, hinged more around information transfer via websites, emails, and

In his survey of new media pedagogy, Collin Gifford Brooke calls the term “new media” a misnomer as
scholarly interest in the impact of digital media on communication has existed longer “than the vast
majority of students entering our first-year classrooms” (178). Thus, drawing from Lisa Gitelman’s Always
Already New, he describes the “newness” of media not in terms of their technical novelty but through “the
transitional context in which they appear; they call attention to ‘the contested relations of force that
determine the pathways by which new media may eventually become old hat’ (6)” (179). He points to
“audience, institutions, and context” as factors that shift and/or influence changes as media enter new
environments and are used/configured in new ways. Thus, as Eyman via Brooke’s Lingua Fracta explains,
new media might be thought of less as things we study or characterize as “new” and more of as a “process
or activity that occurs at the interface, which ‘functions as a dialectical space, in Burke’s terms, and a
rhetorical space par excellence . . . the interface is where rhetoric and technology meet’ (xiii)” (55).
42
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specialists. They describe this era of the Internet as “a broadcast medium produced from
the top down” (45)—ultimately an accurate depiction of the televangelist’s approach. The
early 2000’s Web 2.0, however, saw a spike in more participatory sites that enabled
content creation by non-specialists (e.g., bloggers), social networking (e.g., Facebook,
Twitter), and media sharing (e.g., videos via YouTube, photos via Instagram, sound via
podcasts and music streaming services). They characterize this phase as interactive and
democratizing43 due to lower “technical barriers to online engagement” that gave voice to
“otherwise marginalized groups of people, such as young people and members of
minority cultural and linguistic groups” (46). The current development of Web 3.0
continues these participatory trends but expands their mobility. Campbell and Garner
point to cloud computing, or “centralized data storage” accessible on multiple devices
(e.g., Google Drive), and portable “smart” devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets) as driving
the “pervasiveness of the internet and its integration into daily tasks and routines” (48).
This paves the way for Web 4.0, which they affiliate with augmented reality technologies
(e.g., Google Glass) that usher us deeper into a post-digital condition. Taken together,
these trends point to an increasingly communal and malleable environment in which
users of new media “not only consume but also have power to deconstruct, control, and

43

That is, Web 2.0 at its best is interactive and democratizing, exemplary of what Henry Jenkins calls
“participatory culture,” or “a range of different groups deploying media production and distribution to serve
their collective interests” (Spreadable 2). In his retrospective to Convergence Culture, Jenkins
distinguishes “participation” from “interactivity,” emphasizing that the former “is a property of the
surrounding culture and is often something communities assert through their shared engagement with
technologies, content and producers” (“Rethinking” 283, my emphasis). Interactivity, on the other hand,
emphasizes “the idea of technology as itself liberatory (or constraining),” which supports a more
deterministic view of the human-technology relationship. In his updated introduction to Textual Poachers,
Jenkins accuses Web 2.0 of nurturing the “interactivity” mentality, propagating a “business model which
seeks to capitalize and commodify participatory culture” (xxii). This is a far cry from the seeming
openness, accessibility, and dynamic relationality afforded by participatory culture.
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re-present the reality they are presented with in a given media product” (48).44 In short,
new media seem to facilitate the participatory culture that televangelism could not (see
footnote 43).
With increased participation comes a shift in belonging, believing, and behaving.
Campbell offers a framework to observe these changes through what she calls
“networked religion,”45 which consists of five core characteristics: “networked
community, storied identities, convergent practices, shifting authority, and multisite
reality” (Campbell and Garner 65). Under the aegis of new media, Christian
community—what we might have conceived of in the analog literacy apparatus and early
televangelistic efforts as a “closed system” or “top down”—operates on both horizontal
and vertical axes where community members are not so much directed by a head-ofchurch (e.g., a pastor) or determined by a specific church denomination but are, instead,
driven into community via common spiritual interests (which, while more horizontal in
their configurations, do not preclude the possibility for top-down or closed systems to
form). Campbell observes that this enables “individuals to choose the extent of their

From the Rhetoric and Composition sphere, these “powers” are commonly framed discursively as a
means to rethink traditional composing processes. Strategies typically upend striving for whole, linear,
grounded approaches to language and, instead, lean into the scattered nature of online ecologies by seeking
(albeit temporary and unstable) connections between traces of information.
45
Hayles finds the concept of networks to be an insufficient descriptor of the information flows that occur
between intra-actants. She characterizes a network by “edges and nodes” which, she argues, conveys “a
sense of spare, clean materiality” (“Cognitive Assemblages” 33). Preferring the term “assemblages”
instead, she highlights the “fleshy” dimensions of meaning-making that emerge through “information
transactions occurring across membranes, involuted and convoluted surfaces, and multiple volumetric
entities interacting with many conspecifics simultaneously” (33). This vantage point offers a more “threedimensional” (perhaps even more true-to-life) view of meaning being meted out in the world. While
Campbell uses the term networked religion to describe digital landscapes and modes of engagement
involving religion, her conceptualization of “network” resembles more of Hayles’ assemblage than the
sterile nodes of a network. This is especially apparent in Campbell’s emphasis on the hybrid configurations
and sites of reality for digital religious practices and communities.
44
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involvement and connect multiple social contexts simultaneously” (66). As a result,
community is a perpetually fluid and hybrid idea, coming in and out of being because of
its members’ disparate and unpredictable contributions. Since there is no material edifice
under which members gather and worship, no guaranteed shared set of rituals, and no
human or institutional ringleader, community becomes more a virtual felt assemblage
than a static group identity. In his study of online Christian fundamentalist communities,
Robert Howard Glenn makes clear that “virtual” does not imply “fake” and does not just
denote a gathering place on the Internet (e.g., a discussion forum, online world-building
platforms). Rather, he characterizes the term as “manifest by effect” wherein members
feel belonging by sensing “an emotional stake in a shared social aggregate that has no
physical or geographic existence” (12; 13).46 Put differently, member buy-in to a
religious community is neither nominal nor explicit; it is driven by varying degrees of felt
commitment to spiritual ideals and practices that individuals express, unite over, and
justify in vastly different ways.
These differences stem from the fluidity not just of community but members’
identities as well, which Campbell characterizes as “storied.” She finds that “religious
identity is not simply absorbed through internet engagement, nor is it purely imported
from the offline context. Identity is both constructed and performed, as internet users
draw on multiple resources available online” (“Understanding” 71, my emphasis). Wendi

Glenn notes that the term virtual “comes from the seventeenth-century realization that some plants
possessed ‘virtues’ that could only be recognized when ingested as medicines” (12). He traces this
characterization to Physics, where “virtual” became a reference “to subatomic particles that were invisible
to microscopy but could be detected by studying the behavior of the particles around them” (12). Thus,
virtual communities are determined and studied by the felt effects they produce, not so much by their
material or digitized qualities.
46
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Bellar points to a more concrete example of identity-as-constructed in her study of
Evangelical Christians’ use of mobile Bible-reading applications. She finds that users
select apps based on their analog practices, maintain their spiritual identities with greater
“ease and convenience” due to the app’s mobility, and feel either encouraged or
discouraged by the quality of their own spiritual commitments based on feedback the app
provides on their reading habits (123). Put another way, unlike consumers of
televangelism who used media as an extension of their offline religious persona, users of
new media often de-center the notion of a static religious identity through content they
bring from, layer with, and augment through analog and digital sources. As such,
Campbell describes identity as “a process lived out online and offline, created in an
attempt to bring connection between different spheres of interaction and the Christian
narrative of faith” (70, my emphasis). This articulation of identity resonates with Leonard
Norman Primiano’s “vernacular religion,” which he similarly portrays as a process and
describes as “religion as it is lived: as human beings encounter, understand, interpret, and
practice it” (43). He emphasizes that this lived dimension of religious practice makes
belief specific to the individual, developing through “conscious and unconscious
negotiations of and between believers” (44), a condition that Campbell finds flourishing
exponentially in networked communities. Considered together, identity in networked
religion is simultaneously individualistic and contingent: it is uniquely constructed and
vernacularly expressed but also reliant on actants—human and technical—in its
formation.
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Because identity and community in networked religion rely on linkage, the
practices (i.e., behaviors) that emerge through intra-actions are often convergent, an idea
Campbell likens to a “marketplace” where users “pic-‘n’-mix” information from offline
to online environments and/or “co-create activities and narratives that provide spiritual
meaning for life events” (Networked 71; 72). This description corroborates Henry
Jenkins’ broader definition of convergence culture, which, he claims, involves the
construction of “our own personal mythology from bits and fragments of information
extracted from the media flow and transformed into resources through which we make
sense of our everyday lives” (Convergence 3-4). Convergence, thus, continues to blur the
distinctions between on and offline selves, environments, and meaning-making practices,
both enabling and encouraging the remix of online/offline behaviors. For example, Oren
Golan and Michele Martini find that monastic Catholic groups that share live video feeds
of religious services in the Holy Land—an experience previously accessible only through
in-person visitation—instill an “aura of holiness” through their virtual content and allow
viewers to “approach the divine whenever and wherever they want to, albeit through
electronic means” (449; 447). This increased accessibility, they explain, leads the viewer
to believe that they are being faithful, even remotely, and can “act on the world through
divine intervention” (448). On the other hand, Chelsea Starr et al. observe that
convergence enables what Paul McClure calls “religious tinkering,” where online
communities provide a place for “renegotiations of religious meanings [to] take place”
(496). They observe that individuals who may have religious doubts or may be
“geographically or socially isolated offline” can explore their private concerns within

156

public digital spaces and discover alternate ways of knowing and being. This, they
explain, enables the individual to “transcend geographic and ideological isolation to find
new ideas” (497). Convergence, thus, generates and legitimates multiple options for what
one might deem “right behavior.”
While the operations of secular convergence may enable the online remix and
“remediation” of more “low-brow” content with “a certain absurdism and even humor”
that we see in more mainstream Internet culture (Sundvall), the order of operations that
determine “right behavior” online is more closely regulated for Christian communities.
Since God is considered an ultimate authority who calls believers to evangelize, and since
those eligible to evangelize are both clerical and lay, convergence often occurs in service
to proselytization. Campbell and Garner note that for these groups, “the internet is framed
simultaneously as a threat to and a tool of empowerment for religious authority” (73).
Threats occur when, as Campbell via Stig Hjarvard observes, the Internet loosens
“religious symbols and images from their original context as they are manipulated,
reinterpreted, and shared across digital networks” (“Surveying” 19). This ultimately shifts
influence away from “institutional structures” and frames authority as “temporary,
personalized, and based on connective actions” (19). Authority, in other words, is
distributed and relational rather than solely delegated from the top down. We saw this
play out in our opening anecdote as Dr. Josh and Robinson negotiated and offered varied
interpretations for biblical views on slavery, participating alongside viewers offering their
own takes in the live chat. We also saw, however, the panic that ensued when users like
Ken Shiloh sensed a specific interpretation of the Bible slipping away. To stay the tide of
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this shifting authority, religious internet users—particularly those with significant offline
influence—often leverage digital platforms to create “exhortative online echo chambers
of a spiritual nature” in an effort to “present a virtual, coherent self by communicatively
reinforcing their distinctiveness and collective understanding” (Cheong 29). In other
words, they order online participation on a vertical axis with God at the top and the
human influencer as a static conduit feeding a straight-lined message to listeners. Stephen
Pihlaja finds that religious talk online commonly involves users who “assert their position
as correct and make an invitation for others to agree with them” (87). Put another way,
what might appear to be participatory behavior is simply a means to co-opt shared
spiritual interest for a specific purpose. In her 2021 study of religious authority online,
Campbell suggests that this reification of traditional authority structures, when facilitated
online, can yield widespread impact. She posits that “when individuals enact a certain
cultural pattern, the group is shaped by that performance” (29). Thus, the negotiation
strategies of authorities, whether grassroots or top-down, have potential to significantly
influence broader flows of meaning and masses of human actants.
Despite this influence, however, the paralogical nature of the Internet and the
vernacular religious expressions of human actants precludes one authority to reign
supreme absolutely, no matter how tightly curated a certain form of belonging, believing,
and behaving may be conveyed online. Put simply, intra-actions are messy and always
brimming with meaning of all kinds. Being neither purely static (striated) nor
categorically fluid (smooth), online environments stay holey (the communication
between striated and smooth), which keeps negotiations, however acerbic or
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authoritarian, in play. For example, in her ethnographic study of online discussion boards
for women from the Church of Latter-day Saints, Catherine Matthews Pavia finds that
even in digital religious “enclaves”—or online spaces dedicated to “bonding” that fosters
“loyalty and solidarity,” which can often reinforce and legitimize intolerance and bigotry
(89)—there are “critical and civic possibilities” (98). She observes that enclaves that
cultivated intimacy and trust between members elicited more vernacular expressions of
belief, which provided opportunities for participants to discuss the nuances in their
respective perspectives on faith and belonging, even those they seemingly held in
common. In many cases, Pavia found members growing in their openness to and
cognizance of difference, which complicates the notion that online enclaves are hotbeds
for insular thinking. The consequences/affordances of these online discoveries have
potential to impact offline behaviors and beliefs as well, pointing to the final
characteristic of networked religion: multisite reality. Campbell and Garner explain that
“internet-based social activities frequently serve as an extension or supplement to offline
engagement and in some cases may stimulate rather than reduce social interaction” (77).
With this blurring of online/offline realms, what happens online can be highly
consequential to participation in offline communities (and vice versa), identities, and
authority structures.
All things considered, Digital Religion underscores the co-constitutive nature of
religious meaning in the digital age. Because each characteristic of networked religion
maintains a certain ambivalence (i.e., an oscillation between closure and openness) in the
way online communities, identities, practices, authority, and sites of reality form,
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negotiation—understood here as intra-action between religious humans as well as
technical actants—becomes crucial in locating or creating opportunities for inflection
points. Perpetually, there remains the potential for networked religion to reproduce
cognitive assemblages that wound (see Chapter 2) and/or (en)frame online relationality as
a tool for proselytizing. When bound up with the will to master and define, “sharing
belief” quickly polarizes or shuts down dialogue, leading to fewer acknowledgements of
difference (e.g., the YouTube users Ken Shiloh and Rembrandt972 in our opening
anecdote) and driving wedges between groups that may have more in common than they
think (e.g., Dr. Josh and Robinson). Yet, as Anne Applebaum and Peter Pomerantsev
optimistically opine, “An internet that promotes democratic values instead of destroying
them—that makes conversation better instead of worse—lies within our grasp” when we
more intentionally attune ourselves to the roles we play in designing our online
environments (“How to”). Charles Ess suggests that Digital Religion privilege design
around “virtues of loving, equality, respect for persons, and democratic norms and
practices—as fostering and fostered by relationally autonomous selves” (40), which
Angela Williams Gorrell says are values especially well-suited for online Christian
communities. “Hybrid Christian communities,” or Gorrell’s term for networked Christian
groups at their best, “embody God’s love and ‘make the message believable’ through
meaningful conversations and faithful habits that are both in person and mediated, that
take place at various times, and that happen in both physical and digital spaces” (50). She
explains that this multisite reality and convergent practice, when emulating “God’s love,”
aims to create “a healing Christian community in a new media landscape” built around
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human flourishing, which Miroslav Volf in A Public Faith describes as “care for our
neighbor’s well-being—including their tranquility—for their own sake, not just ours”
(71). Mary Hess suggests that communities of faith highlighting this relationality,
especially those committed to evangelism, will shift meaning-making from a model of
sharing “about the world” to “learning through engagement with the world” (14),
proceeding with a “deep sense of the humility necessary for conversation about infinity
[i.e., God]” (16). These aims and principles of online religious belonging, belief, and
behavior orient us back to electrate religion, where any invocation of “God” necessarily
begins with a sense of mystery, play, and entwinement. When we approach God as a
divine rhetoricity that happens again and again, we are brought to the feet of the Stranger.
To be or not to be hospitable in a networked religion? To build or not to build hybrid
Christian communities of human flourishing? That is the question…
Negotiating in the Digital Age
…a rhetorical question—that is to say, a question for rhetoric. How do we begin
this process of negotiation? Moreover, if religion is about communication or the lack
thereof, how might the affordances and limitations of Digital Religion inform
communication strategies that work to open opportunities for dialogue? I propose that a
response to these questions begins in moving toward what Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin
call “invitational rhetoric,” which realigns the target of rhetoric from persuasion to
understanding; enacting what Lisa Blankenship calls rhetorical empathy, which involves
the conscious and strategic “choice to connect with an Other—an inventional topos and a
rhetorical strategy or pisteis—that can result in an emotional response” (introduction);
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and practicing what Jeff Ringer calls vernacular religious creativity, which he
characterizes as a “process whereby religious believers adapt or adjust their beliefs to fit
their social context” (37). These three approaches in tandem provide a framework for
negotiation that, I strongly suggest, is best suited for inflection with hospitality and
toward human flourishing. Below, I outline why this might be the case, especially in light
of insights drawn above on composing and communing in the digital age.
Invitational Rhetoric
Foss and Griffin developed invitational rhetoric in a 1995 article in response to a
common conflation of rhetoric and persuasion, a cocktail they attribute to a “patriarchal
bias” running rampant in rhetorical scholarship (2). They explain that central to the
rhetoric-persuasion pairing is the rhetor whose primary goal is to change an audience, a
motive they often find stemming from “a desire for control and domination, for the act of
changing another establishes the power of the change agent over that other” (3). This
perspective provides yet another instance of the hubris embedded in a human will to
master and define that we have found in this and the previous chapters. At this point,
reiterating the troubling ideological and material consequences of this approach borders
redundancy. Foss and Griffin’s alternative model—invitational rhetoric—draws from
feminist principles of “equality, immanent value, and self-determination,” which they
position not as endpoints but as a “starting place” for theorizing a “new rhetoric” (4). In
other words, they make clear that invitational rhetoric is not in the business of
substituting one essentialist outcome or structure with another or reifying an adversarial
communicative model. Instead, they see equality (i.e., flattened relational hierarchies that
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cultivate what bell hooks describes as “intimacy, mutuality, and camaraderie”), immanent
value (i.e., the a priori assumption that all living beings have worth), and selfdetermination (i.e., holding respect for and viewing interlocutors as capable of having
legitimate beliefs and making decisions) as guiding principles (qtd. in 4). Each, they
explain, works toward understanding multiple perspectives and interlocutors involved in
an issue, whether or not such understanding amounts to a change in viewpoint. In a
thirteen-year retrospective of the article, Griffin et al. clarify that invitational rhetoric
does not advocate for a wholesale erasure of persuasion from rhetoric’s identity. Instead,
they suggest that “rhetoric could profitably be defined as more complex than solely
persuasive communication” (Emerling Bone 439). Put in the context of an ecological
framework, the invitational approach, in addition to framing rhetoric as a means to
convince or sway an audience, also includes attending to and cultivating the relationships
that form in intra-actions between actants. Agency, thus, is not solely in a rhetor’s ability
to persuade but is also “the means used to create the environment that leads to
relationships of reciprocity, self-determination, and increased understanding” (446). The
paralogical focus of invitational rhetoric is, therefore, on the how of relation rather than
the what or why of persuasion.
To establish these non-adversarial relationships, Foss and Griffin propose three
“external conditions” for rhetorical engagement: safety, or “the creation of a feeling of
security and freedom from danger for the audience” (10); value, or “the
acknowledgement that audience members have intrinsic or immanent worth” (11); and
freedom, or the “power to choose or decide” (12). Safety in an invitational framework is
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not the erasure of difference or discomfort in an effort to accommodate or shelter an
audience. Instead, safety involves holding space for the perspective of an other without
their fear of tacit dismissal. It is, perhaps, akin to Jonathan Alexander and Jacqueline
Rhodes’ resistance to “flattening effects,” or the conflation of “common humanity” with
“radical alterity” (431). They suggest that “what may be most productive in listening to
and caring for each other’s stories is an acknowledgement of radical alterity—an
acknowledgement, for instance, that if you are straight, you cannot know the queer—at
least never completely” (450). To create space for such alterity necessitates standing in
the presence of an unknown and acknowledging—not rejecting—it as such. This ability,
explain Foss and Griffin, is predicated on recognizing one’s alterity as inherently
valuable, catalyzing what Jennifer Emerling Bone et al. describe as a person’s ability to
“step outside their own standpoint in order to understand another perspective” (437).
Krista Ratcliffe offers listening as a method for such perspective-taking, which, she
clarifies, is no passive sport. Rhetorical listening, she explains, “turns hearing (a
reception process) into invention (a production process)” wherein listeners hear not to
prepare for response but to create an opening for more ethical engagements. She suggests
that these engagements stem from understanding, or “standing under—consciously
standing under discourses that surround us and others, while consciously acknowledging
all our particular and fluid standpoints. Standing under discourses means letting
discourses wash over, through, and around us and then letting them lie there to inform
our politics and ethics” (205, emphasis in original). Put simply, listening as a rhetorical
practice seeks not to appropriate the experience or discourse of an other but is “a process
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of ‘giving voice’ to a perspective” in its own terms, prompting the listener to consider
how/where they stand in relation (Emerling Bone 436). This also means that, when
operating under the premise of safety and value, interlocutors “do not place restrictions
on an interaction” but promote freedom to choose the attitudes, perspectives, and/or
outcomes each might bring to a communicative situation (Foss and Griffin 12). While
these external conditions do not guarantee more ethical interactions between rhetors, and
while Foss and Griffin are in no way prescribing these methods for all rhetorical
situations, the invitational approach ultimately seeks an alternative frame to one driven
by “dominance and mastery so common to a system of oppression,” offering in its place
possibilities for “a reality of equality and mutuality” (17).
Operationalizing an Invitational Approach
Foss and Griffin were not alone in their desire to inflect rhetoric from persuasion
to understanding. In fact, in 1951, American psychologist Carl Rogers proposed a similar
premise in his article “Communication: Its Blocking and Its Facilitation” but for a
completely different context. He claimed that “the major barrier to mutual interpersonal
communication is our very natural tendency to judge, to evaluate, to approve or
disapprove, the statement of the other person, or the other group” (84)—in short, to
assess the assertions of another through an imposed or appropriative lens. Similar to Foss
and Griffin’s suggestion, Rogers’ strategy for overcoming this barrier was to practice
perspective-taking, or “to see the expressed idea and attitude from the other person’s
point of view, to sense how it feels to him, to achieve his frame of reference in regard to
the thing he is talking about” (84). He applied this insight specifically to a therapy
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context, intending to shift the therapist-client dynamic from seeking knowledge “about” a
person to one seeking “understanding with a person” (85). This would, he argued, keep
interlocutors from defaulting to evaluative communication tactics. In 1970, Richard
Young, Alton Becker, and Kenneth Pike wrote Rhetoric: Discovery and Change where
they attempted to operationalize Rogers’ premise but for rhetorical studies, dubbing the
approach “Rogerian rhetoric.” In her review of their work, Maureen Daly Goggin
summarizes the goal of Rogerian rhetoric as opening “a space for constructing an
epistemic rhetoric” that works to “reduce the reader’s sense of threat” and, as a result, to
prompt awareness of one’s own belief structures and to sustain communication (190).
Building off Young, Becker, and Pike’s articulation of Rogerian rhetoric, Maxine
Hairston in 1976 proposed actionable steps to achieve these goals, which began in giving
a “brief, objective statement of the issue under discussion”; journeyed through summaries
of one’s own and the opposition’s perspectives, using “impartial language” and more
“objective” statements devoid of “moral superiority”; and concluded in proposed
solutions built from “common ground or mutual concerns” or reciprocal gains (375-376,
emphasis in original). The hope was to not get caught up in the emotion of rhetorical
engagement but to seek a more objective mode of sharing perspectives and coming to a
provisional consensus.
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, Rogerian rhetoric imagined in these terms faced
critique from rhetoric scholars who questioned if the approach, once operationalized, was
actually “Rogerian” or feasible. Lisa Ede in 1984, for example, found Rogers’ method
relying on in-the-moment, “non-directive” interactions between interlocutors (i.e.,
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therapist and client) who established “unconditional acceptance or positive regard”
toward each other and expressed genuine “empathic understanding” through their live
exchanges, or “complete immersion in the emotions and experiences of the person with
whom one is communicating” (45). Ede claimed that when transposed from therapy—a
primarily oral context—to writing, the dynamic, empathetic dimension of Rogers’
approach was severely compromised. The written word, she explained, failed to support
or replicate the emotionally grounded, back-and-forth of oral, therapeutic
communication. In addition to limitations in modality, Doug Brent in 1991 argued that
the objectivity required in Rogerian Rhetoric—i.e., the avoidance of evaluative
language—was also quite impossible. Via Richard Weaver and Kenneth Burke, he
posited that there is no such thing as “neutral description” and that language is inherently
evaluative and assumptive (461). A year earlier, Phyllis Lassner made a similar claim,
pointing to women and other people from marginalized groups who often view language
as “inhibiting rather than expressive” (223). Pairing neutral language with improved
communication, she explained, “is therefore problematic because in the experience of
many no language is neutral, nondirective, or nonjudgmental” (223). These critiques
demonstrate Rogerian rhetoric’s tendency to flatten differences in favor of strategies that
seem to reduce potential for conflict but, instead, force interlocutors into sterile,
seemingly objective, and inappropriate modes of engagement.
What Rogerian rhetoric and its critique reveal is that the invitational approach,
when operationalized, is not—or, perhaps more strongly, should not be—devoid of
tension or emotion in either its approach or methodology. Speaking to this idea, Chris
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Mays and Maureen McBride argue that we need not make a Rogerian approach—what
they call “collaborative”—and a more “adversarial” one mutually exclusive. Referencing
Patricia Roberts-Miller and Hannah Arendt, Mays and McBride explain that the
“adversarial approach” necessarily acknowledges difference and interacts in what Arendt
calls a “playful and competitive space” (qtd. in “Learning from”). Agonistic engagement,
in other words, foregrounds and preserves difference and contact, which are components
that can work toward or set the stage for more nuanced and invitational conversational
practices. Thus, the question they encourage us to ask is not “what can we sacrifice to
make the other collaborators happy, but rather, what is the best strategy to respond to
these fundamental differences within an argumentative framework?” (my emphasis). Put
differently, when operationalizing the invitational approach, we need not avoid or only
seek to neutralize tension but learn to face and work with it.
Rhetorical Empathy
So, how might we best respond? With understanding (not just persuasion) as a
guiding principle for relationships between interlocutors, set against a backdrop that does
not deny emotion and tension from rhetorical engagement, how might we work in an
invitational direction? Lisa Blankenship suggests rhetorical empathy, which “rests on the
premise that listening precedes empathy, and empathy precedes understanding”
(epilogue). Empathy, in other words, functions as a bridge in the process of
understanding. To better grasp this point and the rhetorical potential of empathy, let us
briefly examine broader conceptions of this term, many of which mirror and reinforce the
aims of an invitational approach.
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Mark H. Davis describes empathy as an “episode” where an observer encounters
and subsequently responds to the “experiences of another” with cognitive, affective,
motivational, and/or behavioral outcomes (282). Cognitive outcomes typically involve
conscious efforts to approximate the perspectives, emotional/lived experiences, and
qualities of another person. Affective outcomes often yield “parallel” or “reactive”
emotions that either mirror or express concern for another’s emotional state/expression.
Motivational outcomes are the resolve observers adopt when compelled by a certain
attitude towards another (e.g., forgiveness). Finally, behavioral outcomes—also called
“interpersonal outcomes”—are characterized as cognitive and affective dispositions
toward others “that result from prior exposure to that target” (285). This breakdown
demonstrates that empathy is a multifaceted response catalyzed by contact with an Other,
resulting in any number of outcomes and driven by different tendencies and emotional
reactions to stimuli. In other words, there is no one “right way” to do empathy, to be
empathetic, or to predict an empathic response. In many cases, these determinations are
specific to each observer, shaped by past experiences and socializations, and resultant in
different kinds of relationships. Put simply, empathy is necessarily situational.
One of the most attractive relationships and commonly studied situational
outcomes in empathy scholarship is “prosocial,” which Tracy L. Spinrad and Diana E.
Gal define as “voluntary behavior intended to benefit another, such as helping,
cooperating, donating, and sharing” (40). When considering the participatory attitudes of
online communities and Volf’s articulation of human flourishing, we might see prosocial
behaviors as an especially appealing outcome for relationships in the digital world.
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Through observations between children and parents, Spinrad and Gal find that prosocial
behavior, while partially dispositional, can also be nurtured or enhanced through
“empathy-related skills” (42). Put differently, extending help and valuing cooperation can
be learned behaviors. Though researchers like Daniel Batson et al. find empirical links
between empathy, prosocial behaviors, and altruistic motivations (Batson et al.), Jean
Decety et al. remind us that such learning need not be motivated by selflessness. They
characterize empathy—conceived as an affective process—as a consequence of
evolution: part of a process to determine “a way that maximizes odds for surviving and
thriving” (6). Prosocial behavior is, thus, resilience in the face of another’s perceived
suffering and an intentional decision to alleviate such distress, guided by a belief that
prosociality will contribute to human thriving. Framing empathy in this way speaks to
Stanford psychologist Jamil Zaki’s simile of empathy as a “gym” where interlocutors
consciously practice and work toward prosocial behaviors and principles. He argues that
rather than an innate quality, empathy be conceived as “something we can sharpen over
time and adapt to the modern world” (15).
Blankenship’s theory of rhetorical empathy begins from this premise, where she
emphasizes that “emotions and empathy are rhetorical […] empathy is encompassed,
created, and expressed within and through language and cultural codes” (introduction).
This is not to imply that emotions and empathy are neatly controllable factors. Rather,
they are shaped—inflected—through often-unpredictable and subjective discursive
communities and lived experiences. The way one wields the inflection mechanism (i.e.,
sharpens the empathy skill) in-context determines the behavioral outcome, prosocial or
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otherwise. The challenge of this act rests not necessarily in the presence of empathy—a
quantity question—but in the quality. Eric Leake, for example, notes that cognitive and
behavioral empathy often default in one of two directions: an appropriative conflation of
difference (e.g., “I see and can relate to where you’re coming from. Therefore, we are the
same.”) or a privileging of in-group thinking (e.g., “My actual motive is to persuade you
to my side, so I’ll cooperate with or help you in order to win you over.”). Though
resembling empathic tendencies, these outcomes do not qualify as empathy; instead, they
shirk responsibility on the part of the privileged by providing an easy way out wherein
there is little need to adjust to another’s language and cultural codes. In “Empathic
Understanding and Deliberative Democracy,” Michael Hannon asserts that in an
adversarial sociopolitical system, empathy has no choice but to default in this direction
since “people are unlikely to be persuaded by reasons when dealing with issues that
threaten their core values or identity” (595). Thus, rather than a rigorous attempt to
understand others and, in turn, contribute to human thriving, empathy often adopts the
guise of prosociality and peaceful deliberations with others when, in actual practice, it
remains a tool of convenience and comfort—of reinforcing the status quo. Leake,
therefore, argues not for more empathy but better empathy, which begins with a shift in
the way we perceive empathic acts. Regardless of the motive, for empathy to, in fact, be
empathy, it must begin “with a recognition of unknowability,” where identification is not
an act of sameness but of acknowledged difference (Leake). Similar to the invitational
rhetorical approach, the empathy bridge from listening to understanding also requires
eliding the need for mastery and definition of the other in our own terms.
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Operating as such, the strategy of empathy occurs in the way we negotiate this
unknowability with an interlocutor. Paired with invitational rhetoric, the target of
rhetorical empathy is, again, not to win but to seek understanding of the unknown by
becoming vulnerable to it—to open ourselves up to being moved through our nonappropriative identification with/of difference. Whether such identification results in
prosocial behavior is up to the parties involved, but Blankenship argues that the success
of this approach be measured not in specific relational outcomes (e.g., helping, adopting a
new perspective) but the degree to which empathic engagement “leaves the door open for
future engagement and gradual shifts rather than immediate change” (epilogue). She
offers the following strategies that work toward this open-ended goal and/or trigger
opportunities to practice empathy:
•

Yielding to an Other by sharing and listening to personal stories

•

Considering motives behind speech acts and actions

•

Engaging in reflection and self-critique

•

Addressing difference, power, and embodiment
(chapter 2)

Though requiring slightly different types of interactions with others, which we will
unpack and exemplify more closely in Chapter 4, these strategies unite in their
legitimation of pathos and the personal—the messy affective plane so integral to electrate
religion and so often dismissed in more sanitized iterations of Rogerian rhetoric.
Rhetorical empathy, thus, is not in the realm of stasis and tidy argumentation but intraaction and holeyness. The goal here is not to co-opt but to approximate the experiences of
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another through emotional connection and paralogical relation. Combined with the notion
of empathy-as-skill, practices like personal story-telling and story-receiving, critical
introspection, and attunement to the potential relational inequities Leake identifies can
help pave the bridge from simple listening to deep understanding of others.
Vernacular Religious Creativity
Approximating perspectives is tricky business, though. How do we know if our
invitational listening and empathetic exchange of stories are working toward the
understanding so crucial to negotiating away from conflict and toward productive, civil
communities of human flourishing? Moreover, what do we do with information received
from our interlocutor(s) when it is not open and vulnerable? Religious discourse and
engagement with difference, especially those prone to apologetics and a desire for
sameness, necessitate an added layer of discernment in addition to the vulnerability
catalyzed by rhetorical empathy. Jeff Ringer’s theory of vernacular religious creativity
(VRC) offers one way to conceptualize how a rhetor might apply these approaches with
religious negotiation in mind.
Similar to Digital Religion’s view of identity as “storied,” Ringer emphasizes that
practiced religion is uniquely expressed and experienced, regardless of the individual’s
identification with a unified religious or denominational category. This vernacularity
leaves room for more creative and malleable interpretations of belief since the rhetor is
not necessarily speaking on behalf of the all. When conceived of in this way, religious
negotiations do not necessarily happen on the level of doctrinal belief (i.e., a dimension
that necessarily tends toward static definition) but lived realities—on the personal
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contexts wherein religious rhetors find themselves expressing, defending, developing
their faith. Ringer describes VRC as a “process” beginning, like empathy, in a moment of
contact with an other and/or a situation that exposes difference. Rhetors who practice
VRC consciously choose to adapt their beliefs to this new context, not by throwing out
their religious commitments or convictions but by making a series of adjustments. Ringer
likens this process to “bricolage or assemblage,” which Jan Holmevik takes up in
Inter/vention: Free Play in the Age of Electracy. By way of Claude Lévi-Strauss,
Holmevik describes the bricoleur as someone who considers “an already existent set
made up of tools and materials” and, through engaging “in a sort of dialogue with it,”
locates a set of “possible answers” to context-specific problems—the “potential” rather
than definitive uses of discursive means (qtd. in 23-24). Holmevik characterizes bricolage
not as abandonment of the urtext but as creation “through the act of re/making” (24,
emphasis in original), of working with rather than in opposition.
Applied to VRC, the religiously committed bricoleur seeks to create not their own
brand of religiosity47 but, instead, a “common reference world” predicated not on
consensus but understanding of one’s unique differences (Ringer 48). Bricolage in this
context, thus, is more applied to the formation of invitational, empathic relationships than
ratified iterations of personal belief. Ringer via Gerard Hauser calls this

Religion scholars often call personally branded spiritual practice “Sheilaism,” coined after an interviewee
named Sheila Larson who claimed to follower her “own little voice” instead of organized religion. Bruce
A. Greer and Wade Clark Roof call this phenomenon “religious individualism, or privatism,” which
considers religion a “deeply personal concern which in its most radical expression need not involve
communal loyalties” (346). Put differently, religious individualism is belief without a context, known and
legitimized entirely by one’s own convictions. To be clear, vernacular religious creativity does not imply
Sheilaism as it is always contextually bound.
47
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“intersubjectivity,” where, similar to invitational rhetoric, rhetors recognize their
interlocutors’ value and discursive freedom and aim for a moment when “the
combination of multiple, legitimate perspectives come to constitute new social meanings
or strengthen existing ones” (qtd. in 69). Ringer suggests three rhetorical strategies that
work to foster intersubjectivity through bricolage: casuistic stretching, values articulation,
and translation. I briefly parse them below to emphasize their resonance with invitational
rhetoric and rhetorical empathy.
In Attitudes Toward History, Kenneth Burke describes casuistic stretching as a
process whereby “one introduces new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to
old principles” (72), an act useful for the religious rhetor seeking intersubjectivity
without total compromise of their worldview. When taken at face value, casuistry often
smells suspicious. As Paul Lynch explains, it has had an historical reputation for
legitimizing “half-truths,” of fudging the details so that they go down easier. At base,
casuistry is “the recognition that the present situation calls for an exception to the normal
rules of behavior” (Lynch 268). The example Lynch offers to illustrate the suspicious
version of casuistry is the “unfaithful partner” trope wherein one party deems details of
an affair unnecessary to disclose when the other party cannot “handle the truth” or when
maintaining relational peace is more important than honesty—all problematic
assumptions in and of themselves. Lynch clarifies that casuistry need not always default
to an ethical conundrum. Instead, he repurposes it as an attempt “to maintain
responsiveness and responsibility of judgment within ambiguity” (268). The goal, in
other words, is not deception but phronesis, practical wisdom. When put into practice,
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this casuistic wisdom is a necessary but temporary “improvisation” that seeks to attend to
the context at hand with greater thought and, even, care (276). Casuistic stretching, thus,
involves using linguistic means to locate a moment to fashion such response. TJ Geiger
notes that stretching entails “finding a broader third term or proposition around which
rhetors with divergent perspectives may identify agreement” (174). For the religiously
committed individual, this might mean abstracting a tightly held belief so that it
accommodates a once-conflicting perspective. We saw this play out in Dr. Josh and
Laura Robinson’s YouTube conversation that stretched an interpretation of biblical
slavery—or the common tendency to hyperbolize or misconstrue interpretations of
biblical slavery—so that both Christian and atheist perspectives were represented.
We also saw Dr. Josh and Robinson prioritize rigorous and historical study of the
Bible over winning a specific interpretation, recognizing differences as a way to
strengthen rather than compromise their own perspectives. According to Ringer, this
illustrates “values articulation,” or rhetorical dexterity in the way one rearticulates or
reprioritizes belief in a moment of ambiguity or tension (53). Ringer emphasizes that
such agility does not imply watered-down or discarded beliefs but, rather, a connection
of “values in different ways, often by subordinating one belief to another” (53). We
witnessed the antithesis of this approach in Ken Shiloh’s stubborn refrains, where the
value of “Jesus Christ is the light of the world” overwhelmed Dirty Texan’s appeal to
humility. In their work on deliberative inquiry, Martín Carcasson and Leah Sprain assert
that conflict does not stem from values, as “most audiences share common values” like
freedom, equality, justice (49). Trouble arises in how interlocutors rank them.
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Articulating values with VRC, thus, encourages and requires flexibility in the strategy of
ranking based on each rhetorical situation. Ringer suggests that even “introducing a novel
or unexpected values hierarchy” can be a useful strategy in inflecting discourse away
from conflict and toward more thoughtful understanding of difference (55). For example,
the surprising element on Shannon Q’s channel was seeing an atheist and Christian
converse, rather than angrily spar, due to similar communication values. Introducing this
unexpected values hierarchy made the conversation between Dr. Josh and Robinson all
the more compelling, which many viewers found thought-provoking and exemplary.
Shannon Q’s video was, perhaps, received in this way due to her interlocutors’
ability to translate, which Ringer describes as “the strategic act of selecting, negotiating,
or interpreting values in order to communicate ideas effectively outside of enclaves and
with an audience that holds a substantively different worldview” (55). Rather than
inundate viewers with position-specific jargon, Dr. Josh and Robinson took time to
explain their ideas in terms mindful of both atheist and Christian audiences. They were
aware that Shannon Q’s viewers, even atheist-identifying, came from a broad range of
religious and secular traditions. They were also aware that during the dialogue, their
diverse audience was not imagined but actively responding in the live chat, prompting
questions and new directions for conversation between the two scholars. Ringer via
Hauser qualifies, however, that interpretation is never a perfect one-to-one transfer.
Something always gets lost or left behind (56). For example, in an effort to stretch her
Christian perspective to accommodate atheist critiques, Robinson used language familiar
to secular audiences and conceded to many of Dr. Josh’s ideas identifying a Christian
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tendency to favor a more sanitized reading of biblical slavery. As a result, commenters on
both sides of the aisle accused her of being wishy-washy, of actually being a humanist
wolf in Christian sheep’s clothing (or vice versa). Christians similarly critiqued Dr.
Josh’s occasional yielding to Robinson’s ideas as being half-baked. Though using their
Christian terms, Dr. Josh did not always pass the “authenticity” test due to his supposedly
slippery interpretation of biblical ideals. Thus, translation is seldom perfect and, for it to
work toward deeper understanding, must take care to adopt a community’s “vernacular
language in order to share rhetorically salient meanings” (57). Ringer explains that this
often happens best when rhetors, especially evangelical Christians, “speak from their own
context and experiences” (302)—when they couple translation with the strategy of
rhetorical empathy in an exchange of stories.
Perhaps these strategies are impossible to maintain in the long run, especially with
obdurate interlocutors, but they can certainly assist in creating opportunities for more
invitational, empathetic conversational spaces around polarizing topics. While not a
catch-all solution for every tense rhetorical situation, VRC (as practiced through casuistic
stretching, values articulation, and translation) provides one way to approach negotiation
that prioritizes understanding over persuasion.
Summary and Conclusion
The “Invitational” Approach
Taken together, these negotiation strategies—what I will call the “invitational
approach” in Chapter 4—offer a framework for inflection in the digital age. They each
involve ungrounding the target of rhetorical engagement from argument to dissoi logoi.
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Then, they call for engagement that does not deny pathos and the personal, and that
privileges storytelling and vernacular assertions of belief. Finally, they encourage not just
the exchange of vernacular information but also rhetorical adjustments made between
interlocutors operating in light of diverse cultural and ideological contexts. Once again,
these strategies do not deal with the degree to which people argue or change their belief
but, rather, with interlocutors’ willingness to keep lines of communication open—holey.
To reach this approach, we first examined compositional strategies used by
posthumanist theorists and religious netizens. We recognized that the digital age recognizes the individual as an inherently entwined actant, capable not of ultimate
epistemological control but of temporarily directing the ebb and flow of information that
emerges through intra-actions with human and technical agents. Scholars of Digital
Religion helped us see this condition in clearer terms as we surveyed the religious
actant’s tenuous use of and relationship with electronic technologies. While not
precluding top-down, authoritarian communication strategies, technical actants enable
religious humans to imagine belonging, believing, and behaving in more fluid terms. In
online spaces, especially those that enable participatory interactions, religious community
forms less as a cohesive and locatable group and more as a loose network of fragmented
identities that relate through the convergent practices individuals remix on and offline.
This expanded and ubiquitous conception of belonging and behaving impacts belief not
necessarily in terms of its content but in its expression. Within the framework of digital
religion, belief becomes a more malleable idea that interlocutors bring to the table, not
necessarily as a trump card but as a means to catalyze engagement. Even if catalyzing
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engagement is not a conscious or intentional motivation, the nature of new media often
prompts openness, even amongst communities that largely subscribe to similar systems of
belief. The way such openness skews—whether to civil dialogues like those witnessed
between Dr. Josh and Laura Robinson or sparring matches between Ken Shiloh and a
host of atheist commenters—depends upon the negotiation strategies. And thus the
recursive cycle of online discourse goes.
In our next chapter, we will see how YouTube creators leverage these negotiation
strategies to speak across difference with more empathy and to open rhetorical spaces for
electrate religious engagement.
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CHAPTER FOUR
YOUTUBE VLOGGERS: THE INVITATIONAL APPROACH
“I think a lot of people are turning important conversations into a form of entertainment that’s
consumable. And because they’re turning those conversations into, like, consumable entertainment,
they’re pandering towards what’s going to get the most clicks. And what’s going to get the most clicks
is almost invariably those dumpster fires, the people that are really at each other and have, like, that ‘I
owned you.’” —Shannon Q
“I think the apologetic for today is empathy [… it’s] the way that the algorithm rewards divisive
rhetoric and hateful speech that empathy stands out like a sore thumb.” —Justin Khoe
“Remember the algorithm is people. So, the algorithm represents what most people are going to do or
how most people reacted to it. It’s not actually a computer that’s deciding how well—it’s a computer
that’s recognizing the patterns and trying to exploit those patterns to get it to more people.” —Jimmy
Snow
“If you scream statistics at pro-choicers and they’re still pro-choice when they leave the room, what
have you accomplished? Prove that you can memorize numbers? Like, nothing was achieved. What is
the point? So, I’m hoping to invite more people into that space of humility, and it seems there’s
divinity inviting people to start thinking that way, too. I hope.” —Brenda Davies
“I don’t want you to stop being a Christian. I just want you to start seeing people as equal. That’s all I
care about. So, if that takes you hating me for it, hate me. I’ll be that guy.” —The Rage

Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, we unpacked the “invitational approach,” which is a
pathos-affirming, empathy-forward mode of engagement that prioritizes understanding
diverse perspectives over persuasion, stretching values instead of defaulting to linear
apologetics, and maintaining a dynamic relationship with interlocutors without
marginalizing their perspective. While not a viable or recommended strategy for every
rhetorical situation, the invitational approach provides a negotiation strategy that is
particularly adept at inflecting the fluid, interconnected dimensions of online discourse
away from conflict and toward hol(e)y deliberation. In this chapter, I introduce five
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YouTube creators—featured in the above epigraphs—who both exemplify and thwart this
approach. After briefly contextualizing our research site (YouTube) and the intra-actions
between sacred and secular participants, I will explain my methods for studying these
creators’ rhetorical practices on the platform. Then, I will present recurring themes
related to their articulations of worldview, their production strategies, and their
communication tactics.
Situating Vloggers on YouTube
To understand the invitational approach as it relates to worldview-themed
dialogues on YouTube, we must first examine broader characteristics and dynamics of
the video-sharing platform. In Chapters 2-3, we acknowledged YouTube as especially
effective at facilitating hol(e)y (i.e., oscillations between striated and smooth) intraactions due to its ability to simultaneously host archives of vernacular video content;
encourage participatory behaviors through likes/dislikes, shares, and comments; and
provoke response through the consumption and production of audiovisual media. We also
acknowledged its legitimacy as a site not just for vapid and uncritical utterances but also
substantial, thought-provoking discussions. What we have not explored in-depth are the
ever-evolving, platform-specific factors underlying these hol(e)y assertions and the ways
they impact religious and secular actants. As Sarah Arroyo notes in Participatory
Composition, in electracy, “each act of writing is an identity performance, and
subjectivity becomes the driving force behind composing; the writing subject and the
space within which he or she dwells is symbiotic” (35). Thus, the platform—i.e., the
space of dwelling—and its functions are integral to our understanding of its participants’
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identities and rhetorical practices. Below, we dive into these functions through a brief
overview of YouTube and its relation to the participatory and deliberative dimensions we
have examined thus far.
A Brief Overview of the Platform
In 2005, Steven Chen, Chad Hurley, and Jawed Karim launched YouTube as a
video-sharing site intended to host “home video” productions created by “ordinary
people” (Hosch). Lauded as a competitor to “big” media and infusing the participatory
affordances of Web 2.0—e.g., user-generated content, relatively ubiquitous access to
media, community-oriented engagement—the site quickly became a popular and active
archive of millions of videos, getting hundreds of millions of views daily within a few
months of its founding. By late 2006, Google acquired the site for $1.65 billion and
inaugurated what would become a tenuous relationship between vernacular content
creation and corporate-run media interests. YouTube’s original tagline, “Broadcast
Yourself,” appealed for the everyday “you” to create video content expressive of a
distinct personality, characteristic of what Patricia Lange calls “personally expressive
media,” or the transfer of contextually specific attitudes, perceptions, and identities
through electronic technologies (Kids 16). On YouTube, expressive media proliferated
meaning not through a one-way channel from video producer to viewer but in a “coproductive” relationship between an audience and a content creator (16). Jean Burgess
and Joshua Green note that YouTube creators (i.e., people who upload original content to
the site), especially during the early days of YouTube, desired not just promotion of the
you but development of the tube, or the connections that situated “video practice within
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networks of conversation” (103). They describe the formative culture of YouTube as
“participatory,” fueled by the “cultural logics of community, openness, and authenticity”
(vii). Videos that emulated these qualities were not necessarily polished, carefully
produced pieces but those that knew—consciously or by happy accident—how to speak
and leverage the vernacular of YouTube to amass and engage audiences. Thus, success
on the platform could often be measured by a video’s spreadability, which Henry Jenkins
et al. describe as “the potential—both technical and cultural—for audiences to share
content for their own purposes,” with or without the original creator’s consent (3).
A now-classic example is Howard Davies-Carr’s 55-second video from 2007,
featuring his infant son Charlie, who famously bites his brother’s finger. Davies-Carr’s
intent to post the video, known as “Charlie Bit My Finger,” was simply to share with
friends and family the funny, “normal things” his sons would do day-to-day (Morales).
Within months of its public posting, however, the video amassed thousands of views and
sparked a trend of “contagiously shareable videos” (Morales). Before leaving the
platform in May 2021 due to a $760,999 nonfungible token sale, the video garnered
almost 900 million views, got endlessly remixed by musicians and comedians, and even
became source material for an episode of the TV show 30 Rock. Its widespread and
unanticipated popularity speaks to the participatory culture and logic of early YouTube
content: “material that spreads is producerly, in that it leaves open space for audience
participation, provides resources for shared expression, and motivates exchanges through
surprising or intriguing content” (Jenkins et al. 227). In other words, the point of early
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YouTube was not to remain on an island unto oneself but was to stay holey—to invite
quotidian responses and remix ad infinitum.
In late 2007, the dynamics and motives of the platform definitively shifted,
though the spirit of early YouTube remained. More eyes on content ultimately meant
more opportunities to market. YouTube started running advertisements on videos and
later piloted the “YouTube Partner Program,” which monetized videos from individual
user accounts (i.e., channels) that hit specific viewership metrics.48 This incentivized
creators to gain subscribers (i.e., followers of individual YouTube channels) and produce
content that would gain attention—the currency of YouTube partnership. By 2012,
YouTube dropped the “Broadcast Yourself” slogan altogether and became a more
commercialized space where participants were now “viewers” and a creator could “sell
oneself” by establishing a specific brand on their channel (Raun 101).49 As a result,
YouTube users—those who, like Davies-Carr, hooked and retained audiences through
repeated engagement—could profit off of the participatory attitudes and behaviors they
catalyzed and, in the process, achieve a degree of fame and fortune. The welldocumented phenomenon of “micro-celebrity,” thus, rose on the platform, which Alice
Marwick defines as “a state of being famous to a niche group of people” based on merit
rather than a priori recognition (114). Unlike traditional Hollywood celebrities whose

48

YouTube partnership eligibility in 2021 requires channels to prove at least 4,000 hours of publicly
watched content in the last 12 months, at least 1,000 subscribers, residence in specific countries or regions,
and adherence to community guidelines and monetization policies (“YouTube Partner”).
49
A recent example of the “sell oneself” phenomenon is found in nine-year-old “kidfluencer” Ryan Kaji,
who is the face of educational, comedic, and musical content for his millions of subscribers. In 2020, his
channel raked in $29.5 million in YouTube earnings, got 12.2 billion views on his videos, and amassed
approximately 41.7 million subscribers (Berg and Brown). Partnership with YouTube is not just a perk of
the platform but has evolved into a vehicle for both colossal financial gains and celebrityhood.
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closeness to the public fell as stardom skyrocketed, the YouTube micro-celebrity
flourished through “the celebrification of a private self”—to become so close to
audiences that they believed in a genuine connection to the YouTuber’s “private-public
self” (Raun 106). In his study of transgender micro-celebrities on YouTube, Tobias Raun
summarizes this relationship as “intimacy,” which he calls both “genre and capital”
(100). As genre, intimacy requires YouTube creators to perform “affective labour,” or the
sharing of personal information and experiences in an authentic way for the purpose of
connecting with audiences. Marwick emphasizes that “authenticity is not an absolute
quality, but a social judgment that is always made in distinction to something else” (120).
Put differently, whether a creator is actually being authentic is beside the point; the
perception of one’s performance of authenticity is what determines its legitimacy.
Marwick also adds that authenticity is not a one-and-done endeavor but perpetually
context-bound, “judged over time, in that people’s authenticity is determined by
comparing their current actions against their past for consistency” (120). Thus, it is an
oft-volatile, symbolic quality that creators must carefully curate and negotiate with their
audiences. Put simply, intimacy as genre on YouTube is never without the viewer and
seldom without repeated disclosure of some kind.
Key progenitors of this approach were (and continue to be) vloggers, or video
bloggers, who achieved cultural prominence on the platform in 2006 and whose content
became an “emblematic form of YouTube participation” (Burgess and Green, YouTube
79). Rachel Berryman and Misha Kavka liken the vlog genre to a written diary but
distinguish the multimedia iteration by its presumption not of secrecy but of viewers (“I
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Guess” 311). As necessarily confessional, amateur, and performative, vlogging seeks to
convey authenticity as well as the conceit of an online persona. The genre is technically
uncomplicated and content agnostic,50 featuring individuals or groups of “ordinary”
people who deliver serialized, informal, extemporaneous monologues directly to the
camera on topics they find interesting. Often without the frills or hefty production
budgets of mainstream media, vlogs adopt a “bedroom” or “everyday” aesthetic, as
vloggers create content from comfortable, personalized spaces that prioritize building
connections over time and collapsing distance between creator and viewer. The common
refrain of “like, comment, and subscribe” can also be heard at the close of almost every
vlogger’s video, as they remind their viewers to rate their content (like/dislike), respond
(comment), and to receive notifications for uploaded content on their channels
(subscribe). In their 2009 study of the “entrepreneurial vlogger,” Burgess and Green
describe vlogs as a “prototypical example of ‘situated creativity’—that is, creativity as a
social process, rather than a static individual attribute, embedded within and co-evolving
with YouTube as a dynamic cultural environment, not an inert publishing mechanism”
(“The Entrepreneurial” 95). In other words, vlogs are designed for interaction and
community and continuously call for engagement.
While intimacy-as-genre and micro-celebrity, especially through vlogging, are
largely rooted in genuine connections between the YouTuber and their subscribers,
intimacy-as-capital leverages these relationships to slightly different ends. Researchers
50

This is not to say that individual vlog channels are content agnostic. Though the genre itself addresses a
range of subjects, individual vloggers usually brand themselves, joining a specific niche on YouTube.
Arthurs et al. list “games, politics, beauty, fashion, cooking, family or more general ‘lifestyle’ vlogs” as
popular vlogging topics (9).
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generally associate vlogging with the cultivation of parasocial relationships (Kurtin et
al.), which are one-way engagements that “create the illusion of reciprocal interaction”
(Ferchaud et al. 90). Alexander Rihl and Claudia Wegener explain that parasocial
relationships yield not a “fan/star” dynamic but “virtual relationships between equals, in
which YouTubers appear to act as reliable, albeit somewhat superficial, friends” (563). In
their study of feedback channels (e.g., comments, likes/dislikes) between German
YouTubers and their audiences, Rihl and Wegener find that creators who consistently
upload and interact with their viewers, share similar values or beliefs as their audience,
and actively seek to build a community around their channel form stronger parasocial
relationships. Ferchaud et al. corroborate this observation and add that “identification”
and a “need for companionship” are two primary motivators for these one-way
engagements. A common theme addressed in research related to parasocial interactions
and social media is consumer behavior developed as a result of relationships with media
personalities. The literature shows positive correlations between parasocial relationships,
brand perceptions (Reinikainen et al.; Mannukka et al.; Lee and Watkins), and even
exercise habits (Sokolova and Perez). Taken together, these trends reveal the power of
“relationship” for YouTube’s busines model. If wielded convincingly, a vlogger’s
influence can yield immense financial success on both their and businesses’ parts
respectively. For example, Michelle Phan, one of YouTube’s first beauty vloggers,51
uploaded her first makeup vlog in 2007 “just for fun” (Kilbane). Her approach? She
wanted to fuse first-person storytelling with makeup tutorials, simply intending to share

51

“Beauty” as a vlogging genre typically addresses topics related to make up, skin care, and fashion.
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her personal beauty routine as a non-professional makeup artist. Within days, her
relatable content resonated with thousands of viewers, which grew to millions of
subscribers over the years and a string of beauty brand partnerships. At the height of her
popularity, she had nine million subscribers, brought in $60,000 per month in channel
earnings alone, and now helms her own beauty brand that is valued at $50 million
(Wagoner).
All that glitters is not gold, however. While a model for financial and career
success on YouTube, Phan’s story is also a cautionary tale for the tradeoffs of intimacy
and influence. In 2015, she found herself a “shell of who I was before I was living for the
internet” and “overwhelmed with people feeling too invested in my life” (Wagoner). This
led to a four-year hiatus where she disappeared from her channel with no warning or
explanation. Many YouTube creators experience similar burnout when they realize that
their performance of affective labor is neither genuine (due in large part to its
commodification) nor sustainable for their mental well-being (Dodgson). Creators report
feeling immense pressure to continuously “prove themselves” to viewers by routinely and
rapidly churning out content in order to feel relevant and/or worthy of attention.
YouTubers also face platform-specific pressures: censorship and algorithmic
selection. The commodification of attention and corporatization of the platform reached a
head in 2016-2017 when the infamous “Adpocalypse” occurred. The platform’s business
partners learned that their advertisements were being run on content that was getting
views but proliferated extremist, violent, or misinformed perspectives, especially in
relation to the presidential election in the United States. In response, these partners
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initiated a boycott—the Adpocalypse—where they pulled ads from videos and, as a
result, impacted monetization opportunities for YouTube creators across the board, even
those who did not produce problematic content. YouTube’s reaction to this outcome was
to increase efforts to monitor content, deploying algorithms that would help boost
acceptable, “authoritative sources” (Masadeh and Hamilton). Drawing from Edward S.
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model, Saleem Masadeh and Bill Hamilton
note that those who hold the purse strings often dictate what is “acceptable” in mediated
environments, which ultimately systematizes bias—cognitive, confirmation, or otherwise.
In the context of YouTube, they argue that the Adpocalypse, while necessarily regulating
the spread of disinformation and vitriol, produced an increasingly sanitized approach to
content curation by the site. Search results and YouTube’s homepage, which featured a
list of “recommended videos” based on users’ potential viewing or purchasing patterns,
passed on “borderline content” in favor of more widely accepted, mainstream content.
The algorithm52—what they describe as bearing “no inherent civic responsibility”—
worked to throw such acceptable content in front of viewers, thus incentivizing creators
to produce videos that followed suit. Jane Arthurs et al. explain that the YouTube

Ted Striphas defines “algorithm” as “a formal process or set of step-by-step procedures, often expressed
mathematically” (403). He explains that its etymological roots imply both a numerical system that works to
“expose some truth or tendency about the world” (algorithms) and a coding schema used “to conceal”
(algorisms) (404-405). Though information technologists eventually conflated the term with a process
designed to achieve greater precision (i.e., greater proximity to a “truth”), algorithmic procedures are
founded on the premise that information and communication are inherently ambiguous and disorderly.
Striphas cites Claude E Shannon’s “Mathematical Theory of Communication,” where he posits that the
function of algorithms is to make sense of the “signals and noise stuck in a dizzying, entropic dance, along
with telling redundancies that, if exploited using the right mathematics, could mitigate much of the turmoil
and thereby point the way toward order” (405). Following William Covino’s definition of rhetoric as the
“elaboration of ambiguity,” we might conceive of algorithms as operationalizing a rhetorical function,
bearing both the capacity to elaborate toward greater clarity or concealment.
52

190

algorithm, though a programming mystery in many respects, is one of the primary agents
that determine the degree to which a video gets viewed and, in turn, monetized (10).
Using what they call “collaborative filtering analysis,” algorithms are partly determined
by programmed selection mechanisms as well as “the aggregated practices of viewing,”
or uniquely human activity (11).53 These qualities require financially successful videos,
especially post-Adpocalypse, to be both topically acceptable as well as spreadable by
humans, playable to both the YouTube powers that be as well as the ordinary you—a tall
order for any YouTuber but particularly for the up-and-coming or smaller channels
whose ethos is built around “borderline” topics.
The YouTube experience from the vantage point of the ordinary you is no less
complicated. Despite checks and balances for monetizable content, YouTube is also
prone to what scholars call the “filter bubble,” especially around controversial or niche
issues. Through machine learning,54 the algorithm often extrapolates viewers’ preferences
and leads them down a related rabbit hole, all for the purpose of retaining attention. In her
analysis of the filter bubble, Lauren Valentino Bryant credits this outcome to the business
model of YouTube. She argues that it “was built upon the goal of making money and not
informing or educating” (85). Thus, the algorithm prioritizes feeding viewers with
whatever will motivate them to stay watching, clicking, interacting—not necessarily what
will contribute to more equitable and balanced viewpoints. In their study of right-wing
populist and radical content recommended on YouTube, Daniel Röchert et al. find that
53

Approximately 70% of viewed YouTube content occurs via recommendation (Faddoul et al. 1).
Machine learning occurs through a program’s adaptive study of a user’s personalized “search history,
click behavior or current location” (Röchert et al. 246). Based on these data, the algorithm suggests or
autoplays content that align with or are adjacent to these preferences.
54
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while the rabbit hole is not inescapable, it often keeps the viewer where they are or could
be comfortable. It tends to reinforce pre-existing beliefs rather than challenging them.
Thus, if a user happens to be mildly interested in more politically conservative
perspectives, they are often just a few recommended clicks away from increasingly
conservative and alt-right videos (246). Some scholars hypothesize that these patterns can
contribute to ideological radicalization and, as a result, acts of violence (Gill et al.).
Others suggest that though some, including YouTube’s Chief Product Officer, claim that
the “filter bubble” phenomenon is not as concerning as one might think and that
YouTube’s regulation policies help mitigate extremist or conspiratorial videos, the
platform’s capacity to facilitate echo chambers is always a possibility, especially if users
deliberately choose to sequester themselves in a particular enclave (Faddoul et al.).55
Jonas Kaiser and Adrian Rauchfleisch characterize the congregation of like minds on
YouTube as “algorithmically induced homophily,” which they argue is a symptom of
both user choice and machine learning. Once users get inducted into a community of
choice, the algorithm routes them to either the most popular or more niche content of that
topical vein. Thus, homophily, or the “connectedness between communities” (1), is a
combination of uniquely human and technical intra-activity.
I dwell in these many characteristics and perspectives of YouTube to emphasize
that this platform and its community are incredibly multi-dimensional and influenced by
often-conflicting interests. Burgess and Green summarize the complex dynamics of
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Once again, this ambivalence of how online content can skew reinforces the importance of human
interventions to inflect the digital assemblage away from extremist perspectives and toward invitational,
empathic rhetorical responses.
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YouTube’s operations, policies, partnerships, and creators well. They assert that
YouTube content creators
are embedded in the cultural economy of digital media, organically
engaged with its vernacular culture, and exhibit mastery of its aesthetic
and communicative codes. Successful YouTubers know how to articulate
authenticity to entertainment and to navigate the inherent ambivalence of
their performance and self-representation—using combinations of
intimacy, humour, and irreverence, carefully balancing authenticity,
community, and brand relationships. (37)
In this description, we see that YouTubers are almost always-already hybrid: ordinary
person and pseudo-celebrity, genuine creative and performative brand representative, an
influencer and product of algorithmic selection, boundary-pusher and rule-follower. Even
seemingly passive viewers, or “lurkers,” are actively bound up in this online ecology via
potential or actual hybrid roles: commenters and comment-readers, novice and master,
listener and debater, subscriber and client, supportive friend and harsh critic, filter bubble
reinforcer or popper. The participatory, commercial, and technical dimensions of
YouTube are so interwoven that they can no longer be discussed as separate. Thus, any
analysis of the platform follows careful consideration of the key actants (e.g., vloggers,
viewers, consumer interests, algorithms) motivating the creation and dissemination of
information.
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Conflict Narrative 2.0: Worldview and YouTube
Against this backdrop of competing interests and motivations is a corner of
YouTube focused on worldview.56 Because YouTube is largely content agnostic, identity
formation around worldview is never a given but is uniquely constructed and temporal
(Korte and Van Liere 4). Thus, users—i.e., believers with sacred or secular persuasions—
must explicitly and repeatedly pronounce their values, click related content, and
strategically work the algorithm and monetization parameters to garner affiliation with a
specific discourse community or to establish an online ethos (Pihlaja, “‘Are You’” 48). In
Religious Talk Online, Stephen Pihlaja explains that worldview-themed YouTube
conversations and communities arose as early as 2006, the heyday of participatory culture
on the platform. Unlike “Charlie Bit My Finger” or beauty vlogs, however, these groups
and exchanges were often rooted in and spread by debate and general conflict instead of
laughs and affirmation, as users flocked online to express viewpoints that they felt were
stifled in analogue spaces. As noted in Chapter 3, (inter)religious dialogue online—what
Heidi Campbell calls “networked religion”—often destabilizes traditional authority
structures and offers opportunities to “tinker” with religious hierarchies and beliefs in
innovative ways that are more difficult in offline settings. In his body of scholarship

I conceive of the term “worldview” quite broadly. Rather than allying it solely to the religious realm, I
borrow Alphia Possamai-Inesedy and Alan Nixon’s articulation of “religion,” “belief,” and “worldview,”
which operate on the understanding that each is “sustained through enthusiasm, confidence, and a
willingness to initiate interaction,” which is “not unique to religion” but also “exists in nationalism,
politics, war and other moments of intense social engagement (8). This more agnostic approach to
worldview is useful in this discussion since I will explore expressions of belief that are not limited to
religion. Possamai-Inesedy and Nixon’s descriptions are also helpful in understanding “worldview” online.
They argue that the internet provides a platform for these expressions of enthusiasm, confidence, and
interaction to manifest with increased intensity and resilience.
56
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examining computer-mediated communication between Christians and atheists, Pihlaja
identifies a certain boldness in these digital interlocutors’ communicative strategies,
noting a particular draw to “antagonistic interaction around political and religious issues”
(30). Motivations for this draw are vast and unpredictable, but scholars suggest that while
conflict can be splintering to interpersonal dialogue online, it can also be a vehicle for
participation on social media. Pihlaja, for example, asserts, “Apart from the negative role
that conflict plays in the interaction among users, it can also be seen as a means of
producing content” (62). Put another way, in addition to being a topic of legitimate, oftpolarizing debate on social media, worldview also provides currency to play the
YouTube game. In fact, many an atheist and Evangelical Christian YouTuber57 has
achieved notoriety or micro-celebrity status by building platforms around “flaming,” a
uniquely electronically mediated phenomenon that Sara Kiesler and Lee Sproull define as
“rude, impulsive behavior and the expression of extreme views on networks” (110).
Kiesler and Sproull note that flaming when “uninhibited or unregulated” is generally
unproductive in terms of decision-making but discursively generative as it delays
consensus or closure (110).58 This delay, when exploited and sanitized for YouTube’s

Prime examples are TJ Kirk, creator of the YouTube channel “The Amazing Atheist,” and far-right
evangelical Christian Joshua Feuerstein, who has an eponymous YouTube presence. Pihlaja explains that
users like Kirk and Feuerstein engage in a practice called “p’wning,” which occurs when users seek to
destroy their opponents by presenting “dominant” arguments. Pihlaja also observes that due to its
entertainment value, this strategy draws and increases subscribers.
58
While reasons for delays in consensus online are many, certain factors have been found to exacerbate
flaming behaviors. Peter J. Moor et al. identify “a changed awareness of self and others, miscommunication
and intentional behaviour” as primary motivators (1537). More specifically, they pinpoint internetmediated affordances like anonymity (i.e., destabilization of self-awareness and social cues), contextrelated limitations like delivery and perception (e.g., ambiguous gestures, symbols, or inferences), and
person-specific preferences (e.g., a penchant for offending others or acting aggressively for one’s own
entertainment) as key factors in inspiring or emboldening online hostility (1538-1539). These
57
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censors, can be incredibly lucrative to YouTube creators pressured to publish content
quickly and regularly. In other words, debate and conflict about worldview sells.
Thus, YouTube hosts a conflict narrative akin to the one examined in Chapter 1
between sacred and secular interlocutors. In his study of interfaith59 dialogue on
YouTube, Simon Theobald observes that religiously motivated interactions are
“effectively limited to often rambling condemnations of other faiths, usually by selfprofessed zealous believers” (336). He also notes widespread claims to a “monopoly on
truth” and “militant” dismissals of or attacks on diverse perspectives across sacred and
secular communities, who both uphold and perpetrate these vitriol-fueled strategies as
badges of honor (337). “Interfaith dialogue as it is understood in the real world is looked
upon poorly in the virtual community,” he explains (338). Inviting “opponents” to the
table for conversations founded on mutual respect and trust is not in vogue online. To
quote YouTube commenter Dirty Texan from Chapter 3, “it’s gratifying to flip off a
douchebag after all” (Q). When one “flips off a douchebag,” however, many tend to
follow suit. In 2008, John Paolillo identified religion as the second largest thematic
cluster of information on the platform. In 2012, Mike Thelwall et al. conducted a study of
YouTube commenting behaviors and found religion acting as “the biggest trigger of
discussion” (616). In 2019, Paolillo et al. encountered a noteworthy presence of
conspiracy theory videos linked to Christian interpretations of prophecy, content that

characteristics certainly come to bear on religious dialogue online, though a closer examination of these
behavioral and discursive motivators is beyond the scope of this project.
59
Theobald describes interfaith dialogue in terms analogous to the invitational approach examined in
Chapter 3. He lists “mutual understanding and mutual trust” as core to the interfaith enterprise, which he
ultimately argues is in direct contrast to the tenor of online dialogue (327).
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continued to embolden misinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, flat-Earth
theory, antisemitism, and political arguments in support of Donald Trump’s presidency
(Mohammed; Allington and Joshi; Brittingham; Berry).
Regardless of the intent to participate in discussions around these topics, these
argument-based interactions offer users, whether vlogger or subscriber, opportunities to
generate specific positions and defenses to their ideas. Pihlaja notes an inherent
ambivalence in the way this might occur:
Social media interaction can then benefit from conflict, regardless of how
negative it might be, as it gives content producers a platform to broaden
their audience and reevaluate and remake previous positionings. At the
same time, the constant conflict can lead to users taking more entrenched
positions that are much less hospitable as the arguments continue. (88)
Though the default setting on worldview-themed discourse might hinge around conflict,
Pihlaja’s insights here reveal that the potential for deliberative dialogue is always
possible. Brian Jackson and Jon Wallin suggest that YouTube’s “back-and-forthness,” or
the platform’s facilitation of serial exchanges, opens opportunities to practice negotiating
perspectives. Via Harry Weger Jr. and Mark Aakhus, Jackson and Wallin claim that
“participating in online arguments exposes interlocutors to alternative viewpoints, more
expansive argument pools, and emergent publics” (385-386). Put together, this picture of
YouTube and online discourse exposes the pitfalls, potential, and dynamic quality of
dialogue on the internet. YouTube is hol(e)y indeed.
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Methodology
There is a subset of YouTube creators interested in worldview who are opting out
of the conflict narrative and choosing to practice and create communities around the
invitational approach. To illustrate these complex dynamics and to highlight how sacred
and secular YouTubers leverage their online affordances to invoke worldview-themed
dialogues, I studied five vloggers who identify as Christians and atheists respectively.
Observations and analyses of their behaviors and YouTube channel occurred through
Robert Kozinet’s six-step methodology called netnography, which he defines as a
qualitative, cultural approach to studying social media data involving the following
processes: initiation, investigation, immersion, interaction, integration, and incarnation
(133). While its research application and methods cut across multiple disciplines and
theoretical frameworks, netnography typically seeks meaning online in the “telling of
stories, sharing of beliefs, passing along of powerful images and media” (133). In other
words, netnography is interested in pathos-driven, socially negotiated digital content,
both mundane and influential. In this study, I searched for stories, beliefs, and powerful
media that both modeled and thwarted the invitational approach. Through in-depth
interviews with the five vloggers and longitudinal observations of their channels, I
located recurring rhetorical strategies and uses of YouTube platforms to trigger both
closure and openness to difference and deliberation through participation.
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Initiation, Investigation, Immersion, Interaction
The five vloggers in my study are Christian YouTubers Justin Khoe and Brenda
Davies and atheist YouTubers Jimmy Snow, Shannon Q, and The Rage (see Table 4.1).60
I found these creators through convenience sampling and algorithmic selection, as Justin
Khoe and Jimmy Snow were recommended through my social network, and my
interactions with their content led the YouTube algorithm to recommend the other three
creators’ videos. Initiating the study occurred through approval from Clemson
University’s Institutional Review Board, wherein I received permission—Exempt under
category 2 in accordance with federal regulations 45 CFR 46. 194(d)—to conduct indepth interviews with each vlogger (see Appendices A-E for IRB materials).

YouTube Name
Justin Khoe
Brenda Davies
Jimmy Snow
Shannon Q
The Rage

Channel Name
Justin Khoe
God is Grey
Jimmy Snow
Shannon Q
The Raging Atheist

Worldview
Christian
Christian
atheist
atheist
atheist

Years Active
2016-present
2018-present
2018-present
2018-present
2017-present

# of Subscribers61
119k
139k
370k
31.4k
3.16k

Table 4.1: Study Participants’ Profiles

Criteria for selecting research participants included the following:
•

The creator must be active on social media, posting content at least once a month.

•

Their social media platform must deliver content to at least 1,000 subscribers.

•

Their content must involve matters of religion or invoke religious topics/peoples.

60

Though The Rage has demonstrated an invitational approach, his channel is an important outlier in this
study due to its dissimilarity with the others’. Because his platform is largely fueled by “rage,” his online
persona offers a crucial control variable. The significance of data from his channel will be more apparent in
Chapter 5.
61
Subscriber numbers are ever-changing. This information is relevant as of January 2022.
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•

Participants must have at least one media artifact that demonstrates speaking
across difference in non-combative ways.

Put simply, I was looking for vloggers not only interested in the invitational approach but
also invested in or cognizant of the YouTube platform itself (i.e., intimacy as both genre
and capital).
Investigation of their channels occurred over four months using what I am coining
“binge netnography,” which involves rapid longitudinal observations of a majority of a
creator’s video archive. This approach was a direct response to Pihlaja’s argument that
any attempt “to understand any particular interaction online requires taking a scaled,
longitudinal approach and taking into account the different affordance, histories, and
communities of users is essential” (Pihlaja, Religious Talk 35). Thus, I became a
participant-observer by asynchronously viewing each YouTuber’s video catalog from
beginning to end in chronological order, simultaneously following Kozinets’
recommendation to keep an “immersion journal, which acts as a reflective, catalytic, and
analytic guide to help netnographers find their way through the emanant process of
research, and research decision making” (282). My immersion journal (i.e., a series of
Google documents) took note of production strategies (e.g., audio/video quality and
changes over time, set design, genre-specific edits), content (e.g., video topics, key
quotes, channel milestones), rhetorical strategies (e.g., evidence of invitational rhetoric,
rhetorical empathy, and/or vernacular religious creativity), and personal comments (e.g.,
emotional responses to videos, my evolving perceptions of and personal sense of
connection to the Youtuber’s online persona). In total, I watched and studied 419 videos
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from Justin Khoe, 116 from God is Grey, 418 from Jimmy Snow, 111 from Shannon Q,
and 278 from The Raging Atheist based on available content archived on each channel in
April-July of 2020.62
After full immersion in the research sites, I reached out to each creator via email,
direct messaging on Twitter or Facebook, and personalized videos with requests for an
interview. Each individual accepted a consent form to participate in the IRB-approved
study, received interview questions at least a week in advance, and agreed to a recorded,
face-to-face meeting through the video conferencing platform Zoom. They also
consented to revoke anonymity in this project and gave permission to use their identifiers
as listed above. In-depth interviews occurred between September 2020-March 2021 and
lasted between 1-3 hours based on the creator’s availability (see Appendix D for data
collection instrument). I followed Alan Morris’ insights for semi-structured, in-depth
interviews, which positions the interview guide as a loose road map and coding scheme
to ensure the interaction between researcher and participant remains flexible and
responsive to ideas that may emerge extemporaneously. Despite five unique
conversations, each interview addressed the following topics: worldview and
online/offline persona, YouTube channel goals and evolution, content and production,
audience, and communication strategies. In the next section, I present necessary context
for each channel, along with the major themes that emerged across all transcripts of the
five interviews.
Before narrowing the participant pool to the five, I also watched atheist YouTuber Jaclyn Glenn’s
channel (509 videos) and Christian family YouTubers Mazelee’s channel (364 videos). Though their
content informed my perceptions of worldview-themed online dialogue, I ultimately removed them from
the study when I could secure neither contact nor interviews.
62
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Findings and Discussion: Integration and Incarnation
Worldview and Persona: The Vernacularity of Vloggers
Each vlogger has a distinct you to their tube, painstakingly cultivated through a
consistent video upload schedule over time, relationship-building with viewers and
subscribers, and an online persona who is unapologetically representative of a specific
worldview. Though each creator might identify with a common descriptor—Christian,
atheist—none articulates their beliefs in the same way. Such uniqueness is key to their
channel and influence and illustrative of Jeff Ringer’s emphasis on vernacular
creativity.63 For example, Justin Khoe began his YouTube career as “That Christian
Vlogger,” a vlogger persona-turned-brand that he created with the intent to display “faith
in the first person” (Khoe, “Christian Vlogger”). His early content fulfilled three
purposes: playing to the intimacy expectations of the vlogging genre (e.g., sharing
mundane life moments and speaking off-the-cuff directly to camera), filling what he
perceived to be a void in Christian content on YouTube, and offering religious instruction
particular to his worldview. Speaking to this persona in his interview, he explained,
I think I still am the same person today who started the channel at the very
beginning. When it comes to theology, [I’m] maybe leaning more
conservative. […] I'm very much interested in helping people in their
spiritual life and helping them to maybe even explicitly get to know Jesus
for themselves; like those are the reasons why I started the channel, and
those are still important things to me. (Khoe, Personal Interview)

63

See Chapter 3 for an explication of this concept.
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From the beginning, he pronounced a very mission-driven, educational aim for his
channel, which he delivered through a series of scripted “talking head” vlogs early on,
which later transitioned to an interview format with diverse conversation partners. When
describing these formats, he emphasized the importance of vernacular expression: “I’m
very interested not just in the idea that a person has to share but in kind of the life story
around it.” In fact, he characterized the current slogan of his channel as “explicit
conversations on belief and the stories that shape them.” In other words, he remains
committed to representing an irreducible you on YouTube narrated through story, though
his personal beliefs and intentions might align more with traditional forms of Christianity
that inspire efforts to evangelize.
Brenda Davies of God is Grey also cultivates a Christian you but does so through
a completely different set of motivators. Her entrance to YouTube started by way of a
book deal, where she was looking to convince publishers that there was a market for her
articulation of Christianity: “sex positive Christians, LGBTQ-affirming Christians”
(Davies, Personal Interview). What she found on YouTube instead were Christians,
especially female creators, who believed in the antithesis of her positions: abstinenceonly “purity” culture, heteronormative gender/marriage roles. Watching this content, she
recalls a punctum—
this fury rising up in me because I just couldn’t believe people were
saying the same terrible things that I was taught, that I knew had been so
detrimental to my life. My final straw was Emily Wilson [a Christian
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YouTuber] calling God her birth control. I just lost my damn mind and
picked up a camera.
Before recording her first vlog, however, she remembers her fury dissipating through a
“very divine, beautiful experience” that influenced her to lean into ambiguity instead. She
landed on the channel name “God is Grey” but also thought,
I can't call it that. People are going to say what a hedonistic, terrible
person I am. […] But in reality, from my experience, grey had been the
area where I'd been drawn closest to divinity because when you have a
real answer and it's just easy, why bother seeking it out? You already have
your answer. Whereas, if you have to wrestle with concepts, if there's
more complication in this gray area, then what are you doing? Ideally, if
you are a person that cares about divinity or spirituality, you are pressing
harder into that goodness, into that love, into that light for the answer. […]
So yeah, that's the story of how it [her channel] came to be and why it is
titled as it is. And I did push back, and God was like, “It's going to be
divisive, but let's just go.”
Put another way, Davies’ YouTube ethos arose through a departure from normativity and
an expression of Christianity inspired through her vernacular understanding of divinity.
She soon developed a fervent subscriber base through her story-based approach, where
she couched Christian principles in her lived experiences and presented worldviewthemed topics through long-form interviews.
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Davies’ and Jimmy Snow’s channels began coincidentally on the same day in
2018, but the latter’s platform was built not on Christianity but secular humanism. Also
like Davies, Snow described his origin story as a moment of visceral response, only his
was actively aggressive. As a former member of the Church of Latter-Day Saints who
became an outspoken atheist, he said, “early on, my journey on the outside was like going
to Facebook pages to pick fights and call people idiots and condescend to them and
posting things that would be purposefully offensive to them” (Snow, Personal Interview).
Eventually, however, he became increasingly dissatisfied with this approach but noticed
the growth of a “new atheist cult of anti-SJW [social justice warrior], hyper skepticism”
who exacerbated the aggression. Their prominence on YouTube led to filter bubbles,
largely consisting of male voices, pushing what Snow called going “beyond skepticism,”
or using logical appeals to marginalize the experiences and identities of individuals who
the new atheists deemed as “irrational.” Snow found neither his own expression of
secular humanism nor his identity as a queer individual reflected in their discourse. Thus,
he
became disillusioned with the idea that atheists are skeptical people, that
they’re usually going to be humanists, they’re usually going to be good
people. Because it turns out, being an atheist says nothing about the kind
of person you are. It just answers one question, and it barely even answers
that question. (Snow, Personal Interview)
This realization motivated him to reformulate his understanding of atheism, joining a
growing secular demographic consisting of “more women, people with atypical gender
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identifiers, atypical sexual identities” (Snow, Personal Interview). He recounts an atheist
acquaintance—someone of the “old guard”—warning him that building a YouTube
platform around atheism would alienate this relatively new population and that he should
expect only 6-8% of his subscribers to be women. Purposefully choosing to step beyond
the “hyper skepticism” trope of the atheist YouTuber, Snow developed a secular platform
founded on logic, empathy, and talking head vlogs, cultivating a viewership that is now
75% female. He credits this statistic with his ability to inhabit the identity of an atheist in
a surprising, cathartic way—a persona he continues to uniquely express and create.
Shannon Q also managed to achieve this unexpected positionality as an atheist
YouTuber. “The channel was kind of started by accident,” she explained (Q, Personal
Interview), finding herself with 1,000 subscribers before releasing any content. Previous
to her first upload, she noticed a dearth of productive dialogues happening between
theists and atheists. “It was usually just this sort of posturing that was happening, where
everybody was kind of high-fiving their own team for owning each other at the end of it,”
she recalls. Thus, she started participating but with a different goal, entering public online
forums and discussion spaces with the intent to “ask more follow-up questions and see
what brought somebody to that mindset and see if I could better understand how they got
there” (Q, Personal Interview). Her nuanced approach intrigued and resonated with
people online, who encouraged her to create a YouTube channel. They appreciated her
specific articulation of worldview, which she described in the following way during our
interview:
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I am an atheist. I’m also very, very liberal in my views. […] I am very
socially conscious. I’m a mom; that's something that's incredibly
important to me. I’m a feminist. I’m somebody who cares very deeply
about education, and I’m somebody who cares very deeply about how we
go about consuming information. […] I bring all those up because they
factor into my content. But when you say worldview, I’m not even sure
how to answer that […] because no one thing I could say would
comprehensively describe how I view the world because so many
components of, you know, like past history, and, you know, what I expose
myself to on a daily basis factor into that, and it changes in gradients over
time. (Q, Personal Interview)
Despite the strength and specificity of her positions, she acknowledged a desire to stay
open to new ideas. Much like the others, Shannon Q was and remains unapologetic in her
identification with a particular worldview but expresses her set of beliefs in a flexible,
vernacular way through talking head vlogs and long-form interviews, granting the same
freedom to her interlocutors and subscribers.
The Rage, too, subscribes to a vernacular expression of belief but through the
emotion of anger. His initial draw to YouTube was rooted in frustration due to offline
stigma he received for being an atheist. Describing himself as “100% naturalist, secular
humanist,” as well as an activist with local community groups, he perpetually hit dead
ends with offline institutions when it came to seeking justice for atheist-identifying
individuals. Thus, he decided, “I’m just going to go here [YouTube] and be mad” (The
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Rage, Personal Interview). The vlog format provided an outlet to vent but also introduced
him to an unanticipated audience. He noted, “at first it was like, just put my anger here.
And then people started responding to it and saying, ‘This is really, really genuine. […]
This is like the realest thing I’ve ever seen.’ And it started clicking to me that yeah, this is
the activism that I really wanted to do” (The Rage, Personal Interview). Throughout our
interview, he emphasized that the original intent for his channel was to be honest and
raw: “I just want to be myself. […] I think that’s what makes a lot of people
uncomfortable with me: I don’t care. I don’t wear masks in real life, so I’m not gonna
wear one when I’m here online and everybody else is like, ‘You need to put masks on.’”
Refusing to bend to the expectations of a more polished online persona, he expressed his
atheism through unbridled authenticity, creating caustic talking head vlogs and response
videos to theist content. Regarding his first year on YouTube, he recounts, “I just put out
all of these like really anti-theist, just pretty much all of my frustrations and aggravations
of 37 years of life, 20 of those years being, you know, in the Christian worldview […]
And Christians would see it and reacted viscerally.” Through the conflict-based
interactions that arose around his channel, especially with theists, he developed a distinct
online persona that continues to be 100% unapologetic in both belief and personality.
In each of these accounts, the creator’s platform might adhere to a common
worldview, but each finds their unique niche on YouTube and cultivates an online
persona through a set of vernacularly expressed beliefs. They also each bring an
unexpected element to the table that challenges stereotypical characterizations of their
respective worldview categories. As such, they exemplify what Ringer says of vernacular
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rhetorical action or religion: assuming that one’s belief system “cannot be reduced to that
of elites who speak for it and make headlines” (5). On this side of YouTube, we have not
champions of a specific worldview or unified message but simply Justin Khoe, God is
Grey, Jimmy Snow, Shannon Q, and The Raging Atheist.
Playing the YouTube Game: Audience, Algorithm, Production
Though each creates with a distinct personality and mission, their common
variable is the platform itself, which often complicates or compromises their
vernacularity. In their interviews, most creators noted a similar set of YouTube-specific
pressures that informed the way they cultivated their unique online presence: audience,
algorithm, and production. Due to the impacts of the business model, every vlogger
understood both the importance of YouTube’s currency—attention—and the “branded”
elements of their channel/persona that drew viewers in the first place. Despite creating
authentic videos representative of their values and mission, all became known for
something the more they uploaded content and built parasocial relationships with
subscribers. Khoe, for example, tended to draw a more fundamentalist Christian crowd
early on—individuals who were already eager for religious content. “When I first started,
there were very little ‘Christian YouTubers,’ in whatever sense that meant. And so the
amount of online real estate for explicitly faith-based conversations was very small. […] I
think the initial channel growth was a testament to the fact that I was one of the firsts to
do it,” he explained (Khoe, Personal Interview). The Christian viewers who flocked to his
channel were hungry for affirmation and instruction, not necessarily for challenging
conversations. Thus, once he became a full-time YouTuber and made his core living off
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of views, brand sponsorships, and Patreon,64 he began producing in-demand content
related to Bible study and Christian dating, hosting live Q&A sessions about spiritual
issues, and upgrading his camera equipment for higher quality videos, all of which
spurred viewer participation and increased his subscriber count. “As the years would go
on, I wasn’t enjoying that as much,” he admitted. “There’s only so many videos that
[one] can make on how to know that this guy or this girl is the right one for you” (Khoe,
Personal Interview). Despite these feelings, his pieces on the Bible and relationships
remain his most-viewed videos.
Snow noted a similar pattern with his content addressing the perils of
fundamentalism, both of a Christian and atheist variety. His subscriber demographic,
especially early on, perceived this message and his persona as a breath of fresh air:
I think with my channel, a lot of people get a lot of catharsis from seeing a
person who looks like their oppressor acknowledge their oppression. And
so I think that's why so many women and queer folks like watching me—
who looks a bit like a chubby Mormon Jesus—look a person like me say,
“yeah, no, actually, this is just as bad as they were saying, if not worse.”
(Snow, Personal Interview)
In other words, he noticed that his subscribers wanted to see and hear confirmations of
their beliefs and lived experiences, and his channel delivered this content, always with
sincerity but not always with personal passion. He asserted, “the best content’s going to
64

Patreon is an online platform many content creators use to raise money for their creative output. The
website is subscription-based and allows supporters to contribute a sum of money each month in exchange
for an exclusive perk provided by the content creator. All YouTubers in this study receive support on
Patreon.
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be like the content that is validating for them [his audience], that is calling out the way
religious fundamentalism, whether they were religious or not, has hurt them and has
harmed them” (Snow, Personal Interview). Views skyrocketed on these topics and
plummeted when he critiqued anything this audience held dear. For example, he found
that he could target religious dogma but not astrology. Thus, usual suspects like popular
evangelical Christian YouTube channels Girl Defined and Paul and Morgan65 became
core attention-grabbing sources for react and response videos, or content that directly
unpacked and/or critiqued extant sources. Though he delivered every video with
legitimate enthusiasm and care, Snow also admitted, “there are episodes I make that are
literally just like, ‘I gotta pay my mortgage. I gotta pay my bills. […] I’m like, ‘You
know, my view count’s kind of down; guess I better do a Girl Defined video.’ That
definitely happens” (Snow, Personal Interview).
Davies also discovered, albeit unknowingly, the lucrative nature of responding to
Christian fundamentalists on YouTube. The initial intent for her content was simply to
offer more progressive Christian perspectives on issues related to sexuality, which she
delivered as stories from her life. Soon, however, she began making videos in direct
response to other Christian YouTubers, or what she called “clap-backs.” “I really felt like
I can’t leave these toxic ideologies up there [on YouTube] unquestioned” (Davies,
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Girl Defined is run by sisters Kristen Clark and Bethany Beal, who describe their mission online as
follows: “to help modern girls understand and live out God’s timeless truth for womanhood” (“Meet Us”).
Common themes they address include Christian modesty, reasons against premarital sex, “sexual sin” and
“sexual purity” according to a Christian framework, critiques of feminism, and Bible study. They have
159k subscribers on YouTube as of January 2022. Paul and Morgan Olliges are a married couple who
produce YouTube videos that inspire “a generation of people to have hope and be free in Christ, one video
at a time, speaking on culture and social issues from a Christian Perspective [sic.]!” They also address and
mirror similar talking points as Girl Defined and have 149k subscribers on YouTube as of January 2022.
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Personal Interview). What she immediately discovered, however, was that the difference
between her storytime and clap-back content was in the hundreds of thousands of
views.66
It was the greatest, smartest idea that I had—and I didn’t even realize—
which was to immediately respond to Girl Defined. I didn’t know I was
doing something so intelligently as far as the algorithm went, but that’s
really why it [her YouTube channel] blew up really quickly. Because all
of a sudden, people had an awareness that I was saying something
different, even though I was supposedly in the same camp as these people.
Soon, she found herself embroiled in Christian YouTube drama, as Girl Defined clapped
back by describing Davies as “dangerous,” and creators like Paul and Morgan questioned
the legitimacy of Davies’ Christianity. Despite Davies’ personal discomfort with this
conflict, her audience ate it all up: “My response videos get way more play, and to me, I
don’t know—just goes into the drama that people like feeding into,” she explained
(Davies, Personal Interview). Her approach was never spiteful and took care to avoid ad
hominem attacks; however, her nuanced engagement with fundamentalist content alone
was enough to launch her to a position of influence and for her subscribers—many who
already agreed with her perspective—to regard her as an arbiter of truth. “Sometimes I
wish people didn't rely on me to take a video and respond to it. I wish I could do more
videos that were just like, ‘This is my opinion.’ […] I wish I had built it [her channel] on

For example, Davies’ second video is called “Purity talks sucks,” where she opines on the perils of purity
culture and its ties to rape culture. As of January 2022, it has 33k views. In contrast, her first clap-back
video to Girl Defined, called “Jesus is a Feminist, Girl Defined clap-back,” has 325k views.
66
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something a little more independent” (Davies, Personal Interview). Instead, she found
herself branded as and constrained to a clap-back creator.
These patterns reveal how the filter bubble phenomenon and YouTube’s business
model tend to perpetuate and commodify more conflict-based thinking and behavior,
despite a creator’s best intentions. They also illustrate the tendency of YouTube vloggers
to become branded for a particular skill or gimmick, which often transforms their
authenticity into a one-trick pony act if subscriber count and monetization are of concern.
Fervent audiences, especially those defensive of a defined worldview, seldom seem to
allow their favorite creators to go off script, and strategic creators know how to reel in
and retain these viewers. Khoe, Snow, and Davies, for example, pull in the largest
subscriber numbers of the five participants in this study and, as a result, profit the most
from YouTube. Khoe and Snow are full-time YouTubers, while Davies uses her platform
to build an audience for her creative work writ large. Each has invested significant time
and resources into their channels, from production to content creation. In a livestream
Q&A with viewers in 2018, for example, Khoe revealed that he not only developed his
video editing skills through consistent uploads (i.e., ~350 videos in 2.5 years) but also
through formal training he received at conferences and courses dedicated to social media
(“How to Survive”).
Snow, a professional photographer before his YouTube career, similarly
emphasized the importance of YouTube strategy, especially in terms of production: “If
your content is really, really good but you never put any thought into your production,
you’re going to not grow as much” (Personal Interview). He particularly stressed the need
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for clear audio, even before clear video, and a willingness to improve: “I’m always
thinking about how to take things up and move it to being better” (Personal Interview).
Through his experiences on the platform, he discovered that production and viewership
often correlated and determined how audiences would perceive the creator: “I am sure
that having the better production sort of sets you aside, and when a person comes to your
video, they’re like, ‘Oh, this is an actual, serious channel. I’m going to listen, and I’m
going to watch” (Personal Interview). In other words, he argued that quality audio and
visuals alone could establish ethos, even before any delivery of content. Khoe also
understood this side of video production, often funneling funds he got from YouTube
back into the channel to buy better equipment. Long-time viewers of his channel watched
him go from natural light to ring lights to studio lights, point-and-shoot cameras to
DSLRs to drones, and shaky vlog footage to sleek, professional camera shots and
graphics. Now, as an established YouTuber, he outsources his editing work, which, he
explained, “allows me to really focus on the direction and the heart of what I’m
attempting to do and not really worry about the mechanics of how it’s done” (Personal
Interview). Previous to hiring an editor, he put equal, time-consuming work into
producing visuals, audio, and content, which he found to be an exhausting process. “I can
crank out a lot of content when I’m not tied down to the nitty gritty,” he added, which
enables him to play the YouTube game of creation and marketing with greater freedom
and efficacy (Personal Interview).
In addition to video production, vloggers also voiced concern over the delivery of
content, especially in terms of working with/against YouTube censors that determine
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whether a video is eligible for monetization. Davies, for example, asserted, “I’m very
unhappy with YouTube as a platform. They demonetize me constantly when to me, my
objective is to educate, to invite people in. They [YouTube] not only limit your
advertising or demonetize completely but also censor anyone with no clarity” (Personal
Interview). She noticed that educational content around controversial issues automatically
labeled her channel as “borderline” and, thus, ineligible for advertising revenue. “I’m
like, ‘Can I say ‘birds and bees’ instead of ‘sex’ and then you won’t take away my
livelihood?’ And they can’t answer,” she explained of YouTube content gatekeepers.
Despite these issues, Davies also conceded to the unique affordances of the platform:
“I’m grateful that the platform existed on such a level of notoriety that I was able to slide
in and build an audience from scratch. I think it’s really amazing and empowering that
you can just have ownership over a phone and get to output your message into the world”
(Davies, Personal Interview). In addition to low barriers to participation, she also
described YouTube as a “culturally relevant space” that would be difficult to replace:
“I’ve seen people try to transition to different platforms, and the audience just doesn’t
follow you there” (Personal Interview). Thus, for better or worse, creators must play the
YouTube game, creatively dancing around YouTube censors to stay marketable. Snow,
for example, navigates this dynamic by establishing inside jokes with viewers, where he
substitutes more neutral terms for words YouTube deems as triggering. In fact, he created
an entire series around what he calls the “Pumpkin Saga,” which became shorthand for
critique of the Make America Straight Again conference run by fundamentalist Christian
organizers.
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Production and content strategies like these not only help creators avoid
demonetization but also help build community and bond viewers to the vlogger’s
persona. Insights from Khoe, Davies, and Snow reveal the stakes involved in playing the
YouTube game and the tradeoffs each creator must consider to achieve a degree of
micro-celebrity and/or foster parasocial relationships with viewers. Consistency in both
messaging and video quality seem to be key ingredients for channel growth, making
changes of any kind risky business.
On the flip side, Shannon Q and The Rage see their YouTube work less as a
strategy and more as a supplementary activity since their professional identities exist
offline. Shannon Q, for example, explained,
I don't think I would ever make a YouTube channel be my job. Like my
goal is never to have this be my career because the incentivization that I
have would invariably have to change because I would need to do this to
make a living. Whereas right now, this is an important hobby that I have, I
suppose. So, I’m able to align my intentions with my actions without
having to worry about, “Oh, maybe nobody’s going to be interested in
this.” Because if nobody's interested in this, fine. I can just move on to the
next thing that I think is interesting. But I’ve been very lucky that lots of
people seem to be invested and find it interesting.
Shannon Q, in other words, exists outside of the YouTube business model, which affords
her significant creative freedom, the tradeoff being a smaller audience and less visibility
by the algorithm.
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The Rage voiced a similar view of his channel but offered different reasons for
why YouTube was not at the center of his day-to-day. In 2017, he experienced his first
“viral video” when he filmed a rant about rape in the evangelical church. “I think it’s
close to 40,000 views now, and it’s one of the worst videos I ever put out, but it was the
content of it [that attracted viewers],” he explained (The Rage, Personal Interview).
Despite the attention this video garnered, he asserted,
I’m not gonna spend my entire YouTube career now making videos about
rape. […] I think a lot of YouTubers do that, though […] And yeah, you
have a following. Now you have a base, but you’re not doing anything.
[…] You’re not standing for anything. So my thing is, I’m always gonna
stand, even if YouTube doesn’t like it. (Personal Interview)
Here, he emphasizes that his primary concern is message, not attention. By refusing to
capitalize on YouTube currency by way of creating “clickable” content, he feels more in
control of his sense of authenticity, a quality that, for him, does not hinge on audience
validation. This freedom, of course, has its challenges: “You’ve just got to be yourself,
and you can’t allow yourself to think that you’re anything more than you are. So walking
that fine balance has been the hardest part for me, and it’s probably why I’ve stayed small
[as a YouTube channel]” (The Rage, Personal Interview). There certainly is a difference
between The Rage’s 3.18k subscribers to Snow’s 369k.
Evolving YouTube: Implementing the Invitational Approach
In each of their narratives as YouTube creators, these five vloggers reached a
breaking point that resonated with The Rage’s assertions regarding authenticity: a desire
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for something more than what subscribers had come to expect from their YouTube
personas. This sentiment often began with a weariness of operating within a conflictbased communication model. Davies, for example, became increasingly concerned with
the feedback she received from clap-back videos, observing, “Everybody was screaming
at each other, going in circles, having really useless, worthless arguments with each
other” (Davies, Personal Interview). Rather than feeding into this conflict for views, she
made a video called “‘To the Lovers & Haters,” where she denounced hate and bigotry
and declared her channel to be a “safe space to trade thoughts, ideas, fears, confusion, etc.
on all things Christianity” (Davies, “To the Lovers”). Speaking to the reasons for
producing this video, she explained,
I very intentionally did that video to be like, “No, this is not how we're
doing this. I don't care if you yell at me, say I’m going to hell. Like, your
comments should be more inquisitive, more intriguing, more thoughtful.
Stop just yelling mindless things at each other.” Like, let’s actually be
thoughtful. (Davies, Personal Interview)
By clearly outlining principles for engagement, she shifted her channel’s brand
away from debate and toward rhetorical listening. She made this focus most explicit
when she addressed “stone throwers” in the video, or critics of her ideas, welcoming
them to her channel and expressing solidarity with both kindred spirits and her detractors.
After releasing the video, she “saw a massive, massive change. And ever since, it’s been
so beautiful because I love nothing more than going in a comment section, seeing
someone misbehaving, and seeing my God is Grey community be like, ‘Brenda wants us
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to be kind to each other’” (Personal Interview). Leveraging the participatory affordances
of the platform and her micro-celebrity to promote more nuanced terms of interaction,
Davies instilled thoughtful dialogue as a community-held value rather than just a personal
conviction. Comments from her viewers across videos prove the resonance of this
approach as many pinpoint Davies’ “gentle manner” (Fig. 4.1), report editing their
conversational strategies away from vitriol (Fig. 4.2), find points of connection with
people across worldview (Fig. 4.3), respond to Davies’ terms of engagement on her
channel (Fig. 4.4), and apologize for perpetuating negativity (Fig. 4.5):

Fig. 4.1: User comment left under the video “How the Bible Actually Works,” published on 6/17/19. The
commenter expresses a difference of opinion but also appreciation for Davies’ thought-provoking content
and challenging perspective.
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Fig. 4.2: Back-and-forth comments left on the video “Make America Straight Again & Why I Agree with
Girl Defined,” published 6/24/19. Users report practicing more mindfulness when responding to online
content around worldview.
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Fig. 4.3: Excerpts from user commenters across different worldviews interacting around a video called
“Girl Defined Responded… Sort Of. My FINAL Thoughts,” published 9/2/19. Users connect on the
concept of “unity in diversity.”
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Fig. 4.4: Excerpt of a comment from Davies, left under her video “Paul & Morgan, Must You Be So
Condescending?” that was published on 9/16/19. Davies reminds viewers of her channel’s communication
ground rules and promotes compassionate conversation.

Fig. 4.5: User comment from the video “Are Christians Allowed to Date Non-Christians?” published on
11/27/19. The commenter apologizes for being judgmental toward Davies.

Khoe eventually adopted a similar conversational approach as Davies’ but more
gradually and locally. Like Davies, he grew tired of unproductive conversations online
but was worried about losing his audience if he shifted tone:
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I was really concerned about posturing myself well within the
conservative Christian community. I want to be seen as someone who sits
alongside a gay person, but also I want to make it really clear that my
beliefs are orthodox enough and conservative enough so I don't get outed
[kicked out] by my own community. (Khoe, Personal Interview)
Soon, however, he realized the futility of this approach, as audiences would be critical of
his content regardless of any attempts to hedge or pander. In a 2016 video called “How to
Handle Trolls and Haters | Social Media Etiquette for Christians,” he vlogged about the
reality of hate on the internet, acknowledging, “I fully expect it” (Khoe, “How to
Handle”). He also voiced a concern regarding representations of Christianity online:
There are people who will only ever see Christianity through the lens of a
screen or phone, and they’ll never go to a church. They’ll never go to a
Bible study or anything like that, and their view of Christianity is what
they see in the comments section of a video. It’s—it’s what they see
through videos and through experiences like these, and sometimes, if
we’re not careful, we can allow, like, our picture of Christianity to be a
very hateful version of the gospel, and that is definitely not the type of
behavior that Jesus commended. (“How to Handle”)
Using an ethic of engagement grounded in love for others—a principle directly informed
by his Christian worldview—he began to prioritize dialogue and empathy over audience
retention.
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Khoe started to practice what he preached when The Raging Atheist, at this point
a stranger on the internet, made a clap-back video about Khoe’s content related to
physical intimacy before marriage, a common theme of his popular “Christian
relationships” series. In our interview, The Rage explained his rather arbitrary reason for
“attacking” Khoe: “I found Justin because I was looking for a [Christian] guy [to
critique]. Like I was talking about all these girls [like Girl Defined]. I’m like, ‘This is
super sexist, I need to find a dude that I can really like focus some of this energy on’”
(The Rage, Personal Interview). His critique, a video called “Kissing Is A Sin! (The
Raging Atheist Vs. ThatChristianVlogger),” was scathing and admittedly “disrespectful”
as he called Khoe’s content “Christian propaganda.” What followed the release of this
video, however, completely surprised The Rage:
He [Khoe] did something that nobody else had done up to that point: he
responded. You know, he saw it [the video], he responded in the
comments section, and that just kind of led to this back and forth to where
we started talking. And I just really appreciated the fact that he saw my
video, he was able to look past my digs at him personally, see what I was
saying, and actually respond back to the things that I was saying, and that's
what started the kind of back and forth
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Fig. 4.6: Screenshot of Khoe’s comment on The Rage’s clap-back video.

Khoe’s comment invited The Rage to dialogue rather than war, which the latter
took up in earnest. They invited each other onto their respective channels, talked on the
phone, and eventually met in person two years into their back-and-forth. The Rage now
considers Khoe one of his closest friends: “Justin, he is what he represents, and you just
don’t get that much. And I think when you find it, you have to appreciate it and then
culture that relationship” (The Rage, Personal Interview). Khoe, too, acknowledged the
uniqueness of this relationship, describing their interactions as a huge turning point for
his channel:
Just getting to know him [The Rage] over the internet for like two years,
you know, going back and forth here and there, was really, really
meaningful. And so, just the joy that it was to be able to fly out there and
hang out with him for a whole day, to get to be in his actual apartment and
to meet his daughter and to like just kind of spend a day with him—it was
huge. It was very, very meaningful and it helped me realize the level of
connection that I could have with a person that I've met on the Internet if
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like I'm open to it and like motivated to move in that direction. So, the
shift [in his channel’s tone] happened when I started to realize, “Oh, these
are the kinds of interactions I could be having instead of the ones that I
was having.” (Khoe, Personal Interview, my emphasis)
In 2019, Khoe took a 6-month hiatus from YouTube to rebrand his channel, calling it
“I’m Listening” and featuring, almost exclusively, long-form interviews with people who
believe differently than he does. The Rage was his first guest. Despite the loss of some of
his long-time subscribers, namely fundamentalist Christians, Khoe’s channel continues to
grow and invite viewers from all walks of life. He described his rebranded channel’s goal
this way: “to love on someone, and to see them for who they are and to not really go for
any kind of ‘change’ from the get-go” (Personal Interview). His is a truly invitational
approach, refined by many back-and-forths on YouTube, where the target of his
rhetorical practices is not change but understanding.
Snow’s rhetorical modus operandi is similar, where he cares very little about
“winning” an argument in his online back-and-forths. In our interview, he stated, “A
structured debate? I think I’d rather eat fire” (Snow, Personal Interview). At first,
however, his strategy emulated an approach called “street epistemology” (SE), which is a
“conversational tool” first articulated in A Manual for Creating Atheists by Peter
Boghossian. The goal of SE is “to encourage ourselves and others to examine the
methods we use to judge the accuracy of truth claims, and ultimately to improve the
reliability of our epistemology” (Street Epistemology). Common tactics mirror tenets of
invitational rhetoric such as tacitly recognizing an interlocutor’s perspective as legitimate
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and barring change as a metric for “successful” dialogue. Using this approach typically
involves asking a series of questions that seek to respectfully understand the modes of
reasoning and evidence underlying another’s belief system. The “Street Epistemology
Guide” suggests that interlocutors (i.e., atheists interacting with religious individuals)
“strive to ‘sow seeds of doubt that will blossom into ever-expanding moments of doxastic
openness’” (7). The point, in other words, is to poke holes with the hope of planting
alternative ideas.
Though Snow expressed admiration for this approach, he also added, “If I'm
allowed to be critical of it, though, too many people I think see it as an end all and that it
isn't just a tool. And so it becomes a scripted interaction, and people see through scripted
interactions immediately” (Personal Interview). SE, in other words, tends to limit
opportunities for improvisation and genuine engagement. Shannon Q made a similar
critique, describing SE as
great if you're having like a one-on-one dialogue with a stranger—isn't
always adaptive enough to be used in real life. So because street
epistemology is very often sort of like this one-sided conversation, if
you're talking to somebody who you're actually in a real-life relationship
with, it can feel as though it's an interrogation because it's not the normal
cadence that a conversation has. (Shannon Q, Personal Interview)
In place of SE, Snow and Shannon Q evolved their online dialogic strategies to be more
people-centered and story-based. Interlocutors’ arguments became important only insofar
as their identities and perspectives could be better understood and acknowledged.
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Shannon Q, for example, noticed that many of her viewers were losing
relationships with friends and family due to differences of opinion and belief. She also
noted that many atheist creators defaulted to calling religion a mental illness. While
taking care not to paint all subscriber experiences and online conversations with a broad
brush, she suggested that implementing different communication strategies might
alleviate significant roadblocks to these tense interpersonal interactions. More
specifically, she emphasized a need to unpack
why people come to the decisions they do, why they hold the positions
they do, why people hold different positions, how they came to those
positions, what information they consumed to get to those positions, how
they came across that information, how they use it in the world—all of
that stuff. You need to understand first. (Personal Interview)
The first step in this process, she explained, is ensuring all interlocutors “have an opening
in that space to be listened to and understood, and analyze what it means to have different
beliefs from a place of safety and acceptance, and not from a place of combativeness and
disregard for their position” (Personal Interview). Directly pointing to strategies of
invitational rhetoric and rhetorical empathy as identified in Chapter 3—e.g., safety, or
holding space for the perspective of an other without fear of tacit dismissal; considering
intent underlying speech acts and actions—Shannon Q highlighted the importance of
modeling these approaches on her channel. Rather than making clap-back videos of
“toxic” content creators, she voiced an intent to “talk to them as best I can” (Personal
Interview). Thus, she invited theists to long-form interviews, livestreaming these
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collaborations on her and their channels. She did this not to platform or condone their
ideas but to ask “why” and “how” questions of her interlocutors, especially so that her
viewers could witness alternative perspectives from the mouths of their adherents. Snow
did the same, creating a call-in show to have live conversations with theists and fellow
atheists. Describing his conversational approach when interacting with callers who
believe differently than he does, he said, “I didn't give up any of my atheism to be in that
conversation with them, even to concede things where I would say, ‘I understand”
(Personal Interview). Put differently, Snow knew how to respect the boundaries around
his and another’s belief system, recognizing that engaging difference did not need to
default to coercion or ridicule. Speaking to this idea, he explained,
I think there used to be an idea that either you are going to take no bullshit
or you're going to be empathetic. And you actually can do both. I think
you can go, “Okay, stop with the bullshit” but not make a person feel like
you think they're stupid or bad for their beliefs.
Taken together, these conversational strategies reinforce and exemplify the
invitational approach. From each of the above accounts, we see the following principles:
•

Consciously and repeatedly stepping outside of an adversarial framework to
reinforce and/or practice deliberative dialogue.

•

Leveraging YouTube’s participatory affordances, micro-celebrity, and parasocial
relationships with viewers to promote speaking across difference.

•

Moderating conversations by establishing and didactically reminding users of
clear ground rules for engagement built around understanding and respect.
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•

Yielding to a perceived other through empathic responses that pursue “why” and
“how” questions of their worldview.

•

Seeking out and validating lived experiences as answers to “why” and “how”
questions.

•

Recognizing another’s opinions and emotions as legitimate, logical to them, and
without compromising their humanity.

Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the logics and mechanics of the YouTube platform
and unpacked insights supplied by five vloggers, all of whom have created communities
centered around a particular worldview. In each vlogger’s account, we saw a similar arc:
an individual rose to prominence because of something distinctive to their online
persona—their vernacularity; that persona gave them access to virtual community and
either the commercial aspects of YouTube or online micro-celebrity; their position of
influence led to creative stagnation and/or unproductive interactions, which spurred a
desire to find less vitriolic alternatives; they took a risk and evolved their channel and/or
audience. In this effort to evolve their YouTube presence, along with conflict-based
approaches inherent to the filter bubble, each practiced (in at least one moment on their
channel) a communication approach prioritizing understanding between interlocutors
over persuasion and change. While this strategy might have been instilled from jump
(e.g., Shannon Q), as formal terms of community engagement (e.g., God is Grey),
through complete re-branding (e.g., Justin Khoe), more subtly alongside mainstream
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YouTube content (e.g., Jimmy Snow), or as a fleeting exception (e.g., The Rage), these
vloggers demonstrate that YouTube is capable of nurturing more than just hate.
Of course, these vloggers are not infallible, nor should their channels be idealized
as bastions of online hate repellent. Shannon Q, for example, asserted, “I am human,
right? I try my best, but there are times that I’ve been frustrated with people. But I try my
hardest to see if we can model better dialogues because I think that there are ways that
you can address really complex and contentious issues that don’t always end in a
screaming match” (Personal Interview). This caveat is important when considering
YouTube as both a conversational, community-based space and a place to do business.
As Shannon Q and Snow noted of street epistemology, YouTube audiences do not
necessarily connect with automatons or highly scripted interactions; they are looking for
an irreducible, imperfect, human you. The yous who fashion their tubes with this
authenticity and transparency are not only those who garner views but also profit off of
these identities, especially when higher quality production follows. Each of the creators
profiled in this study have built influential platforms because of, not despite, their
willingness to put everything—the gracious interactions, the clap-backs, the apologies,
the anger—on full display for viewers.
Because of such willingness, along with the holey-ness of the YouTube platform,
creators and viewers will always be hybrid and multifaceted. There will always be the
potential for response of all kinds. Lurking behind every compassionate exchange is a
troll or a naysayer, as we can see in this excerpt from Khoe’s comments section:
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Fig. 4.7: Screenshot of user comments from the video “How to Let Go and Let God | How to Hold onto
God” published on 2/23/17.

Here, a Muslim viewer finds resonance with Khoe’s message, casuistically stretching
their beliefs to find something “similar to what we believe in” and, as a result, connection
with this Christian creator. Moments later, we find a user ask, “what about the gospel”?
This comment implies that resonance is predicated on adherence to “the gospel,” or a
uniquely Christian perspective laying out principles for “right” belief. Strict defense of
this principle precludes this individual from stretching their perspective to embrace a
Muslim user or recognize this constructive exchange between Khoe and Yara Naser as
admirable. The next commenter further drives this division home, calling the Muslim
user to “just let God in who is total, complete and unconditional Power of Love.” Here,
there is a clearly defined conception of “God,” a clear right or wrong answer, which
further prevents any invitational interaction from occurring. The final commenter in this
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thread calls attention to this tension: “Why are you sorry that he follows a different
religion tho?” Why, indeed, does the inhospitality to difference occur?
In her reflections on being a YouTube creator, Davies explained that the potential
for inhospitable interactions and being misunderstood was always a reality: “uploading a
YouTube video implies that you are opening yourself up for that possibility. And to me,
you have to enter that space with that level of courageousness and acceptance that that’s
going to happen to you” (Personal Interview). For better or worse, assertions on YouTube
are loaded; when made public, each bears the capacity to, as Pelle Snickars and Patrick
Vonderau say, “incidentally change the course of history” (11). However, without this
risk—this exposure and vulnerability—there is no possibility to change this course from
conflict and flaming-for-entertainment to more constructive discourse. As we explored in
Chapter 2, electrate religion begins in a moment of exposure to difference, which
presents the exposed with a choice: to be or not to be hospitable? As evidenced by the
five vloggers in this study, those on YouTube who say “yes” to hospitality do so not by
ridding their platforms of emotion and logic but by following the punctum—the
conviction to respond, the anger, the curiosity—and consciously choosing to inflect their
responses toward compassion. The creators in this study practiced these strategies by
sharing their own stories, inviting diverse interlocutors to narrativize their perspectives,
rhetorically listening to these positions without passing judgment, recording and
archiving these perspectives on their channels, and producing these conversations with
YouTube audiences in mind. They left change and perspective-taking up to the viewer or
fellow interlocutor and used their online work simply to open the door to empathy. As
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Lisa Blankenship observes of social media communities, the sharing of stories, especially
when hosted in an online medium, “creates a participatory, communal aspect that
facilitates empathetic responses” (Chapter 2).
These considerations beg the question, “How will we, users of the internet,
choose to play the YouTube game?” In our next and final chapter, we investigate the
degree to which audiences take up these invitational strategies and implement them in
their interactions with fellow netizens.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE (W)HOLE PAGE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF SACRED-SECULAR
DIALOGUE IN ONLINE PARTICIPATORY SPACES
“It would be hard to measure or prove that the exchange of media increases empathy between
cultures, just as it has been hard to prove that the transmission of culture imposes meanings and
values on other societies. Such exchanges can provoke conflict as well as understanding, but
often the conflict can be a way of clearing the air of preconceptions and forcing participants to
look at each other through fresh eyes.”
-Jenkins et al., Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture
“A multimodal composition does not achieve its rhetorical effects through simple addition (text +
image + sound = message). The holistic effect of a multimodal text is achieved through, to
borrow David Blakesley’s word, the ‘interanimation’ of semiotic components, resulting in a
whole that is decidedly greater than the sum of its parts.”
-David M. Sheridan, Jim Ridolfo, Anthony J. Michel, The Available Means of Persuasion
“[A]nalysis of interactions on YouTube should take into account all the elements of the video
page.”
-Stephen Pihlaja, “Cops, Popes, and Garbage Collectors”

The Video Page
Throughout this project, I have argued that YouTube is a holey medium, keeping
the oft-striated discourse of religion in motion, especially as it encounters and combats
secular ideologies. In similar fashion to Marshall McLuhan’s assertion that the medium is
the message, my framing of YouTube purports that the medium is an electrate mediator
of online discourse, disallowing utterances of any kind to reign supreme indefinitely. Its
message, in other words, is Gille Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s assemblage, which we
examined in Chapter 2 as a contingent and unstable linkage of meaning. By virtue of its
dynamic interface, YouTube enables assemblages of both vitriol and civility to form,
breaking and re-forming through user participation and algorithmic selection—the human
and the technical intra-acting, which we explored in Chapter 3. Despite the inherent
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fluidity and epistemological ambivalence of YouTube, I have stressed the role of an
invitational approach to inflect worldview-themed assemblages away from conflict and
toward more civil alternatives that prioritize understanding over persuasion. In Chapter 4,
we analyzed the journeys and strategies of five YouTube vloggers who exemplify this
invitational approach by leveraging the affordances of a participatory video platform to
bring diverse interlocutors to shared conversational spaces; critically listen without
passing judgement; prioritize user response, not for the sake of stirring up drama but to
acknowledge that negotiating values and beliefs, especially those in opposition, requires
repeated and sustained interaction; and create content that plays to and catalyzes
engagement on YouTube, whether through video production strategies, algorithm-driven
decisions, or surprising vernacular expressions. To be clear, these creators did not frame
these strategies as “strategies” (i.e., systematic solutions to the problem of internet
incivility). Rather, they positioned their approaches to sacred-secular dialogue as everevolving and adaptive, necessarily involving emotions of all kinds, and remaining open to
the new stories and ideas that would inevitably emerge along the way—in short, a
heuristic. Each, in other words, read not just their lines as content creators in the
YouTube script but the full video page—their role as an entwined actant in the larger
ecology of online discourse.
In like manner, we must also take account of the entire video page in our
examination of sacred-secular dialogue on YouTube. With an understanding of vloggers’
motivations and approaches to worldview-themed content curation and creation, we turn
now to the quotidian responses that proliferate from these performances—the traces of
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participation left by those who find, feel moved by, and respond to vloggers’ output. I do
this through an examination of YouTube videos and comments, variables that YouTube
researchers have used as a barometer to study user behavior, expression, sentiment,
discussion topics, and YouTube culture (Thelwall and Sud; Madden et al.; Snelson). In
this chapter, I present exploratory research on user perspective, engagement, reasoning,
and emotional tone through a quantitative study of 80 purposefully sampled videos and
76,163 public user comments. Together with social psychologist Dr. Oriana Aragón,67 we
study the changes in these variables when users are exposed to videos explicitly modeling
an invitational or adversarial approach. Arriving at these insights, I first explain my units,
tools, and variables of analysis; qualitatively describe how each channel models and
responds to the invitational approach; and present findings on users’ patterns of behavior
and their proposed correlation to invitational strategies. Though situated on a videosharing social media site, the insights gleaned from this study are significant to sacredsecular dynamics operating in the writing classroom. After contextualizing the measures
and methods of this study and presenting my and Dr. Aragón’s findings, I will conclude
my project by addressing potential pedagogical applications for this research.
Measures
Units of Analysis: YouTube Comments
In their study of YouTube’s value as a “co-constructive” educational resource,
Ilana Dubovi and Iris Tabak remind us that the video medium is not inherently
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Dr. Aragón is a co-author of this chapter as she created and ran the statistical models in this study, which
she explicates in the “Results” section.
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interactive, even if it boasts sophisticated production value. They explain, “Linear video
that is akin to a recorded lecture reflects a transmission model of instruction,
consequently, it is likely to result in inert knowledge, even if the video is visually and
audibly appealing” (3). Put differently, videos are not electrate by virtue of their
“multimodal” qualities. They can easily replicate the linear logics of the literacy
apparatus. Thus, Dubovi and Tabak suggest that in order to catalyze interactivity (and, by
hopeful extension, deeper learning), videos must exist in an environment that
“intersperses actions on and with the video” (3). They point to the YouTube comments
section—a user-generated feature that enables threaded, text-based responses to video
content—as one site that could extend discussion topics beyond a creator’s linear and
potentially passive transmission of information. Their study, which analyzes public
comments left on science-based YouTube content, reveals that the possibility for
“efficacious informal learning” is present when users engage in the back-and-forth of
commenting and do not preclude disagreement or counter-claims in their assertions (11).
In other words, the presence of both participation and deliberation are key to cultivating
constructive and interactive online discussions, and Dubovi and Tabak’s findings show
that the comments section bears immense potential to facilitate these exchanges and
learning experiences.
Despite Dubovi and Tabak’s encouraging and more optimistic portrait of
commenting behaviors, scholars studying worldview on YouTube typically frame the
comments section less as a place for learning and more as a cesspool, though an
insightful cesspool for attitudes and behaviors. In his survey of methods to study religion
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on YouTube, Denis J. Bekkering pinpoints comments sections as common sites of
research but finds that researchers describe them as vitriolic and unproductive, primarily
due to the veil of user anonymity. Shielded by name/facelessness, users can feel all the
more emboldened to flame—exhibit rude, aggressive communication—in ways
unavailable or disallowed offline. This behavior is not the presentation of counter-claims
as envisioned by Dubovi and Tabak but is often conflict for conflict’s sake. In their study
examining the correlation between pre-existing beliefs and verbal aggression online, John
Petit et al. discover that “differences of opinion can lead to a more polarized and divisive
climate, which encourages individuals to use aggressive language to express their
viewpoints rather than to engage in civil discourse” (8). Differences of opinion in
comment form only seem to foment these uncivil tendencies. Bekkering is quick to note
that comments sections are not necessarily bastions of free speech or without oversight
either. YouTube channel holders can regulate comments by blocking users, deleting
specific posts, and removing the ability to reply altogether (58)—in short, to take more
explicit control of their channel’s narrative and brand or, from the viewer’s perspective,
to shut down opportunities for response. The platform via algorithms also monitors
comments by flagging “spam,” “sensitive content,” “violent or dangerous content,” and
“misinformation” (“Community Guidelines”). Moreover, the comments section is an
ever-shifting landscape. Its traces are ephemeral as users can delete and edit their own
comments, boost the visibility of content through likes,68 and/or become lost in a barrage
Comments with significant “likes” become rated as “top comments” and are ordered first in the
comments section, which is the default view for comment organization on YouTube. The only other “sort
by” option is “Newest first,” a chronological option which the user must manually choose for it to be
visible.
68
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of one-off responses if user engagement is particularly fierce. Put simply, user-generated
responses to YouTube content are difficult to pin down in terms of content and motives,
making them a challenge to study but also burgeoning with opportunities for both
meaningful and trivial conversations.
To get at a more precise understanding of the YouTube comments section’s
Janus-faced nature—the potential and perils of users’ textual response—I look to Ruth
Tsuria’s tripartite framework for analyzing online discourse for interreligious dialogue:
“the technological affordances (what is possible), the religious/cultural norm (what is
acceptable), and the actual linguistic choices and strategies (what is said/written)” (449).
In Chapters 2-3, we looked at the technological affordances of YouTube through electrate
religion, a posthuman orientation to social media and networked religion. In Chapter 4,
we examined the religious/cultural norms—i.e., the adversarial and invitational
approach—established by vloggers Justin Khoe, Brenda Davies, Jimmy Snow, Shannon
Q, and The Rage, along with the platform-specific motivations that help establish their
community’s atmosphere. Now, we focus on the linguistic choices and strategies
employed by their audiences through analysis of public-facing comments, our unit to
explore qualities of response. The question I ask of my data is as follows: considering the
holey affordances of YouTube, continuously creating space for smooth and striated
expressions of belief, how do users respond when they are exposed to vlogger
performances that demonstrate invitational or adversarial approaches?
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The Tools of Analysis: LIWC2015 and Trait Empathy
I explore answers to this question by analyzing user comments generated by
videos I have coded as “invitational” or “non-invitational,” which I sampled from the five
above-mentioned vloggers’ YouTube channels. (Later in this chapter, I will justify my
sampling methods.) In an ideal research scenario, I would manually perform close,
textual analyses of these comments in their proper context; however, due to the sheer
scope of comments scraped from each video—76,000+ in total—I rely on a computermediated “psycholinguistic tool” called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, 69 or LIWC
(Sakib et al.). Operating on the premise that “the words we use have tremendous
psychological value,” this application is the culmination of over twenty-five years of
validated and reliable psychology research wherein scholars study the “emotional,
cognitive, and structural components present in individuals’ verbal and written speech
samples” (Pennebaker et al. 1). This tool functions by way of dictionaries, which contain
words categorized in four ways: summary language variables (e.g., emotional tone),
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In their overview of tools and methods for textual analysis in the Digital Humanities, David Hoffman and
Don J. Waisanen argue that the limitations of computer-aided textual analysis software are uniquely
technical. The authors explain, “any capacity to understand context-related meanings must come from the
human reader” and that even the most sophisticated computer programs cannot account for “sense and style
at the sentence level” in all of their nuance (179). Despite these limitations, they credit digital tools with the
ability to analyze “huge numbers of text” in an effort to approximate “the meaning and usage of key terms”
(180). They point specifically to the software Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count as a tool to perform
“objective and systematic comparisons of broad features of textual style and tone” (181). Though my
dissertation has repeatedly critiqued “objective and systematic” approaches to analysis and expression, I
find immense value in (and, considering the overwhelming amount of data, no viable alternative to)
utilizing computer-aided textual analysis software because of their ability to offer a bird’s-eye view of user
style and tone. Findings, in other words, are not meant to be 100% accurate portrayals of user behaviors
and beliefs but are, instead, necessarily broad and relay the general mood of text. The key words here are
exploratory research and approximation through numerical data. These quantitative insights complement—
not define—the effects produced by the technological affordances and cultural practices that I have
presented qualitatively in this project through interview data and netnographic research. I utilize these
mixed methods to unpack as many dimensions of online discourse as possible within the context of the five
vloggers’ channels.
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general descriptor categories (e.g., number of words per sentence), standard linguistic
dimensions (e.g., pronouns), and psychological constructs (e.g., cognition and insight).
The default dictionary of LIWC’s most current version—LIWC2015—contains 6,400
words/word stems that exemplify these categories and their subdivisions, along with
updated accommodations for “netspeak,” or language native to social media (e.g.,
emoticons, internet slang). The process of analysis begins with a line of text run through
the software. Each word in the sentence or phrase becomes a “target word,” which the
software approximates with a dictionary word and, by extension, a category scale. Data
appear as numbers that indicate how many times a target word matches a dictionary
word, which theoretically convey the presence or absence of various linguistic and
psychological variables. Put another way, LIWC2015 is a barometer of attention—what
and how people place focus and emphasis, based on their communication patterns.
Considering that attention is also YouTube’s currency, the affordances of LIWC2015
make it a particularly effective tool to efficiently read and analyze large quantities of
YouTube comments.
Immense research on online environments has been done using LIWC software.
For example, researchers have used LIWC2015 measures to study everything from
emotional tone and verbal tendencies in medical communities on Facebook and Reddit
(Kimball et al.; Nobles et al.) to opinions on international tourism in TripAdvisor reviews
(Litvin) to political threats and insults found in speeches of world leaders on YouTube
(Okuno et al.). These studies point to widespread scholarly interest in not just LIWC2015
but also the use of textual cues as an indicator for online behavior and attitudes. Of
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particular interest to my project is trait empathy operating in online contexts, which
scholars have interpreted in diverse ways using LIWC. Before exploring these links, let
us first review “trait empathy” and its relation to the invitational approach.
As discussed in Chapters 3-4, empathy is multidimensional and often subcategorized into cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral outcomes. Though
yielding or encouraging different relational configurations, the common thread between
these empathy categories is their catalyst: exposure to an “other.” How one responds
determines the type and degree of empathy. When paired with invitational rhetoric and
vernacular religious creativity, which both rely on understanding interlocutors’ humanity
and arguments in their complexity, the most-desired empathic outcome is cognitive, or
more specifically, perspective-taking. This is not a simple “put myself in your shoes” act
but is, as Jonathan Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes assert, “an acknowledgement of
radical alterity” (450)—recognition that exposure to an “other” is an invitation to step
outside of one’s own perspective in order to begin the difficult, murky process of
understanding, or, as Krista Ratcliffe puts it, “standing under” discourse. Perspectivetaking, in other words, is often a step toward the holey negotiation of ideas, which our
vloggers demonstrated can be a relatively constructive and healing process, as well as a
potential antidote to unproductive, conflict-based online communication.
I focus in on perspective-taking not only to emphasize its resonance with the
invitational approach but also to distinguish it from other empathy outcomes. Elizabeth
Simas et al. aver, “Because empathy can be both psychologically and monetarily costly,
there are many factors that regulate whether a person experiences empathy” (259). In
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their study of political polarization, Simas et al. find that due to its cost, empathy is often
biased, especially when expressed as empathic concern, or the “increasing valuing of
another person’s welfare” (M. Davis, “Empathy and Prosocial Behavior” 292). Both
Simas et al. and Mark H. Davis find that empathic concern often favors in-group
members, which perpetuates partisanship and decreases the likelihood of extending help
to out-group members. Both also identify perspective-taking as an empathy outcome that
reverses this tendency. Pointing to scholarship in perspective-taking, Simas et al. assert,
Indeed, perspective-taking, not empathic concern, best facilitates
negotiations and the ability to discover hidden agreements, and high
perspective-takers are less likely to stereotype (Wang et al. 2013), and
more likely to tolerate disagreement (Mutz 2006), and more likely to be
attracted to opportunities for political debate and dialogue (Clifford,
Kirkland, and Simas 2019). (266)
Perspective-taking, in other words, neither negates nor goads conflict but creates a
channel for more robust dialogues. 70
Scholars studying empathy online, especially perspective-taking, correlate it with
countering hate fomenting in participatory spaces. Dominik Hangartner et al., for
example, find that empathy-based counterspeech, which they define as a strategy to
“reduce hate through persuasion of the perpetrator” without suppressing “free
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Speaking to perspective-taking as it relates to deliberative democracy, Michael Hannon argues that
“instead of regarding empathic understanding as the result of rational deliberation, we might better think of
it as a precondition for the kind of rational process standardly envisioned by deliberative theorists” (603,
emphasis in original). Here, Hannon flips cause and effect, making empathy the substrate, not the
destination, of deliberative discourse. This framing emphasizes that perspective-taking as an empathy
“outcome” is not a conclusion but a key ingredient to begin and sustain more productive dialogues.
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expression,” can reduce “xenophobic hate speech” on Twitter (2-3). Responding to racist
tweets with the help of an empathy “bot” (i.e., software trained to identify racist language
and respond with a text-based prompt to practice perspective-taking), the researchers
found a slight but notable decrease in xenophobic hate speech, suggesting the importance
of empathy’s role in changing the tone of online back-and-forths. Some researchers
studying this phenomenon have used LIWC as a tool to study user attitudes and cognition
expressed in text. Many look to Mark Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) as an
instrument to more precisely identify empathy measures. The IRI consists of four
subscales: perspective-taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress (Davis,
“A Multidimensional Approach”). Typically, researchers use the IRI as a survey,
showing participants twenty-eight statements and asking for response via a five-point
Likert scale. Answers are paired with the empathy scale, which determines how
individuals express empathy. Marina Litvak et al. adapted this scale for LIWC, and I
explain their measures, along with the other measures of my study, in the next section.
The Measures of Analysis
Pronouns
In their study of empathy, communication, and friendship patterns on Facebook,
Litvak et al. hypothesized that user comments conveying more “socially oriented
content” and “linguistic styles that engage others” were more empathic. They paired
LIWC2015 measures with Davis’ IRI, finding that pronouns were a positive indicator for
perspective-taking and fantasy, the latter variable denoting the ability to imagine oneself
in feelings and actions through identification with fictional or abstracted characters. More
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specifically, they posited that the “regular use of pronouns might indicate that a user is
switching perspectives frequently within a session, which would in turn exercise
perspective taking skills” (134). Similarly, Joni Salminen et al. found links between
pronoun usage and empathy in their examination of personified and non-personified
advertisements designed for social media. Their study yielded positive correlations
between empathy and personified user groups (i.e., PUGs, or “faces to user data”), as
well as increased use of personal pronouns (e.g., she/he, we, they) in PUGs. They
provisionally linked these results to support findings connecting empathy and
personification.
Further breaking down pronoun usage, James Pennebaker—one of the creators of
LIWC—and Yla Tausczik found the use of second-person pronouns as predictive of
“lower-quality relationships” in their survey of research analyzing pronouns and
relationships (Tausczik and Pennebaker 34). Researchers, they explain, often affiliate
“you” with criticism, hostility, and “an overinvolved emotional reaction” (34). Also using
LIWC to examine pronouns, Annika L. Meinecke and Simone Kauffeld similarly found
correlations between low empathy measures and the use of “you” pronouns in their study
of leaders’ communication with employees. Based on a characterization of empathy as a
way to facilitate greater understanding of employee’s needs, Meinecke and Kauffeld
argue that an empathic communication style can lead to “shared understanding,”
especially in terms of reasons why changes in performance might be necessary (489, my
emphasis). The goal here, in other words, is two-way perspective-taking. Though they
qualify that second-person pronouns could be used in an affirmative way (e.g., “You are
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amazing.”), they largely found that leaders who used this pronoun were perceived as
more domineering and confrontational (e.g., “You should change.”) and less selfreflective, which resulted in lower empathy scores.
In addition to the “you” pronoun as predictive of lower-quality relationships,
researchers have found the “I” pronoun to point in this direction as well. In her study of
partner- and self-focus and its effect on relationship quality, Oriana Aragón found that
low partner-focus, especially as indicated by the use of self-focused singular pronouns
(e.g., I, me), correlated with less emotional engagement and fewer inferences made of
partners. She concluded that these results seem to indicate that “low partner-focus is a
detriment to understanding others in a very global (not partial) way” (157). Put in the
context of our study, the “I” pronoun, thus, could be an indicator for decreased
understanding of others and greater emphasis placed on self. In another study using
pronouns as a predictor for behavior, namely maternal caregiving, Kathryn L. Humphreys
et al. found that “I” pronouns negatively correlated with caregiver warmth. They describe
warmth as a relational quality affiliated with the ability to assuage or prevent the effects
of major depressive disorder, which they characterize as a “maladaptive cognitive style”
often resulting in “individuation at the expense of a relational identity” (465). Such
maladaptive individuation can inhibit the capacity to perceive and process the differences
of others (Senholzi and Kubota). Looking at a similar phenomenon, Jens H. Hellman et
al. also used the “I” pronoun to predict egocentric behavior in students prompted to write
essays about group learning. They found singular subject pronouns interacting with their
measures for more narrow-minded behavior that prioritizes self over others. Taken
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together, these studies point to the use of personal pronouns as a predictor variable for
perspective-taking, with “you” and “I” pronouns pointing to less empathic and more selffocused communication patterns.
Our hypothesis regarding these measures is that videos demonstrating an
invitational approach will elicit less instances of “you” and “I” pronouns (i.e., selffocused and others-obscuring language) in user comments and more instances of plural,
group-focused pronouns like “we.”
Engagement and Insight
In addition to perspective-taking, which I linked to deliberative rhetorical
approaches in Chapters 3-4, my project is also interested in the extent to which people
participate. In Chapters 1-2, I noted that the relationship between participation and
deliberation is often inverse. According to political scientist Diana Mutz, “The kind of
network that encourages an open and tolerant society is not necessarily the same kind that
produces an enthusiastically participative citizenry” (qtd. in Vander Lei 102).
Demonstrating broad-mindedness towards others, in other words, does not always seem
to motivate robust interaction between the parties involved. Robert Kozinets corroborates
this observation but on the opposite end. He explains that those who do participate,
especially on social media, are seldom open and tolerant and, instead, are typically “more
polarized and more extreme in their opinions and expression” (204). Put simply, those
who feel motivated to participate are usually entrenched and passionate about their belief
and, as a result, less amenable to negotiating their perspectives. Kozinets also points to
the unique affordances of social media networks as emboldening such behavior: “People
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who post anonymously also tend to be more reactive and more opinionated. Those who
post publicly using their given names tend to be motivated by attention-seeking, for one
reason or another” (204). Thus, the apparatus of the internet is complicit in producing and
reproducing these behaviors that pit deliberation and participation against one another.
Using electrate religion—the “holey” frame—as an alternative model to a
“participative citizenry,” I argued in Chapter 2 that participation and deliberation go hand
in hand, as the former is a precondition for the latter in networks that keep the oscillation
between smooth and striated discourse ever-moving. When framed not through linear,
literate logics but through the affective, choric plane of electrate reasoning, participation
becomes a response to rhetoricity: a choice to be or not to be hospitable to the other in
our midst. My argument in Chapter 4 was that when guided by the invitational approach,
the ambivalence inherent in this choice could skew toward greater perspective-taking and
understanding of difference.
Based on this theoretical framing of participation and deliberation, I added
“engagement” and “insight” as variables to account for these dimensions of my study
respectively. We measured “engagement”—the participation variable—in three ways: the
amount of original comments posted to a video (i.e., “parent” comments), the amount of
replies posted to original comments (i.e., “children” comments), and the amount of words
used in these comments. To qualify these three characteristics, we affiliated replies with
participation in a discussion, an association that Mike Thelwall and Pardeep Sud also
made in their study of commenting behaviors on YouTube. They specifically identified
replies as “a logical and easily identified proxy for the extent to which comments form a
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discussion” (7). Speaking to the role between parent and children comments in such
discussions, Hazel K. Kwon and Anatoliy Gruzd assert that parent comments are most
visible to potential commenters and act as important catalysts for how and what
commenters mimic in their replies or their own original posts. Thus, original posts are
key tone-setters in the participatory and deliberative behaviors that emanate from
comments. In turn, replies function as extensions and propagators of these behaviors and
ensuing conversations.
To determine not just the presence of participation but also the quality of the
discussions that take place, we looked at “insight” words—the deliberation variable—
which LIWC dictionaries affiliate with words like “think, know, consider.” Tausczik and
Pennebaker relate the “insight” category with “cognitive mechanisms” that indicate that
people are “actively processing” perceived information (35). In the LIWC2015 language
manual, “insight” is part of a larger “cognitive processes” category that includes the
following subcategories: causation, discrepancy, tentative, certainty, and differentiation.
We selected the “insight” variable from these categories because it tends to denote having
found meaning rather than searching for or hedging meaning. Studies using the insight or
cognitive category link it with understanding and health benefits (Tausczik and
Pennebaker 35-36), along with perspective-taking (Seih et al.). These characteristics
resonate with the goals of the invitational approach.
Our hypothesis is that videos modeling an invitational approach will elicit
comments that demonstrate more participation (i.e., replies, word count) and deliberation
(i.e., insight words).
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Affective Processes
Since perspective-taking and online discourse do not just involve cognitive
processes, we examined the emotional dimension of these variables as well. Studies of
empathy emphasize that this trait is both cognitively and emotionally experienced.
Sharma et al. describe cognitive empathy as “a more deliberate process of understanding
and interpreting the experiences and feelings of the user and communicating that
understanding to them,” whereas emotional empathy involves “stimulation in reaction to
the experiences and feelings expressed by a user” (2). Put in terms of this dissertation, we
might characterize cognitive empathy as the deliberation variable and emotional empathy
as the participation variable, or at least their catalysts. In Chapters 2-4, I emphasized the
importance of the affective dimension as a punctum, or felt knowledge that triggers
information—Roland Barthes’ “obtuse meaning”—in an aleatory way, one that cannot be
evoked through traditional forms of reasoning. Following this punctum is what often
triggers activity and enables the individual to reason with the body and with knowledge
that operates on the fringes of conscious thought.
Such embodied knowledge is crucial to the invitational approach, especially in
connection to rhetorical empathy. Lisa Blankenship directly ties rhetorical empathy to
pathos, asserting, “Connection and embodied experience, including emotions, form our
perceptions, and those in turn inform our judgment, which influences our words and
actions in a recursive process” (Chapter 1). Thus, any examination of decision-making
and perspective-taking as it relates to empathy and the invitational approach must include
an examination of emotion. Studies of empathy and emotion in online contexts find the
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phenomenon of “emotional contagion” at play, where an individual’s emotional
expression triggers similar emotions in others, which then spreads across a
communicative context. Yixin Chen and Yang Xu identify previous studies where
“empathic responses often mimic the emotion of the original user or speaker,” and their
own study of this phenomenon in online mental health communities finds that those who
receive empathic feedback “would publish significantly more empathic comments on
others’ posts” (13-14). This observation, coupled with the pathos-driven plane of
empathic engagement, points to the potential of the invitational approach spreading when
users see and, in turn, mimic the empathic strategies modeled by YouTube vloggers.
In this study, we examine the “Affect Words” category, namely words that point
to positive and negative emotion. Tausczik and Pennebaker explain that these measures
can be used to gauge how people express, not just whether or not they are engaging
cognitive mechanisms in the way they process and respond to information (32). We use
these variables not necessarily to predict behaviors but to get a broad understanding of
the tone users employ when reacting to invitational and adversarial approaches.
Methods
Contextualizing the Invitational Approach
My method of sampling comments for analysis involved three steps: 1) watching
and analyzing videos from the five vloggers’ channels, 2) selecting videos from this
dataset that demonstrate invitational and non-invitational approaches, and 3) scraping and
cleaning comments from these videos to run through LIWC2015 software. Following
Robert Kozinets netnography methodology, which I explicated in Chapter 4, I watched a
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significant amount of channel content (i.e., ~80% of archived videos available in summer
of 2020) to better understand the narrative arc of each creator, their rhetorical strategies,
and the overall tone of their YouTube personality and community. My approach was
entirely qualitative and involved longitudinal observations of creators’ subject matter,
production, and audience interactions (i.e., comments, likes, dislikes). Though these
observations were immersive and fluid, my overall analysis was motivated by the
invitational approach. Thus, I made note of video topics, specific interactions, and key
quotes that demonstrated understanding, empathy, and deliberative discourse, using the
invitational criteria outlined in Chapter 4 as a guide in my analyses. Before describing the
data extracted from these observations, I must first explain how the “invitational
approach” played out on each channel so that comparative findings in this study land with
more context.
Shannon Q, Brenda Davies, Justin Khoe
Q, Davies, and Khoe’s channels share similar characteristics in channel tone and
conversational approach, though their video production styles vastly differ. Each
frequently interacts with users in the comments section, and each founded their channel
as a response to worldview-themed conflict on YouTube, catalyzed by a desire to create
space for more productive dialogues. Q initiated this focus from the very beginning; her
first video was called “Engaging in Complex Conversations,” where she outlined ways to
acknowledge and work through the difficult emotional work of negotiating clashing
perspectives. In subsequent uploads, she explicitly spelled out her channel’s mission in
almost every video via closing catchphrases: “elevate the discourse” and “advocate for
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your own understanding.” Based on my observations of 111 videos on her channel, I
found that she maintains a focus on and performance of civil conversations in a majority
of her videos, which are a mix between short, talking head vlogs and long-form,
livestreamed conversations with individuals from a range of worldviews. In these
dialogues, she demonstrates her invitational approach by either explicitly discussing her
communication strategies or by having civil “debates” with theists, in which she seeks
understanding by exchanging personal stories, asking clarifying questions that allow her
interlocutors to express beliefs in their own words, refraining from proselytizing, and
being charitable but firm toward her conversation partner when they attempt to convert
her. Her community has come to expect this invitational tone from her channel as they
commonly affirm her civility in the comments section:

Fig. 5.1: User comment left on a video called “Paulogia vs SJ Thomason Aftershow ‘The facts of
Christianity,’” where Shannon mediates a debate between a panel of Christians and atheists. This user
affirms the robust but civil nature of this conversation.
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Fig. 5.2: User comment left on a video called “Can a Christian and an atheist have a civil discussion?
Watch and see!!” Shannon and an Anglican Christian have a conversation about their worldview and find
points of overlap. This commenter affirms both their own worldview and the “honest and open”
conversational approach of Shannon Q and her conversation partner.

Despite a few one-off videos where Q uses a more aggressive, adversarial
approach, usually in response to theist ideologies that stigmatize mental illness or
perpetuate abusive behaviors toward children, the tone of her channel is broadly
congenial. Participants can expect to have and see robust and thoughtful conversations. In
a video celebrating her channel reaching 20,000 subscribers, Q described this tone as well
as her audience:
I’m not saying that I’m like the best at conversations, but I at least do my
best regardless of who I’m talking to, to try to keep things civil and
address them and their ideas—however I may disagree and however
ardently I may disagree—in a calm and rational way as opposed to a way
that’s going to escalate or potentially harm them, myself, or viewers,
however many clicks that may get me. And it probably would; like if I
spent all my time fighting with people and calling them names and looking
for opportunities to own them in conversation, you know, I may have
more subscribers. But I wouldn’t want them. I want you guys. So, thank
you for being interested in it and for investing in me and in trusting me to
continue to do it and for thinking that I do it well enough that it’s worth
watching. It’s humbling. (“Shannon Q EXPOSED”)
Here, she emphasizes that her approach is markedly different from mainstream YouTube
conversations that profit off of conflict for increased attention. She stresses that despite
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its tradeoffs, her intent as a YouTube creator is to invest in an audience who is open to
conversing and improving online conversations. This portrait of her channel highlights a
baked-in invitational approach and, as a result, an audience who tends to engage with
more intent. As of 2022, Q has 31.8k subscribers, the second smallest in this study.
Davies’ channel has a similar tone, formed around principles of listening and civil
dialogue, but her approach began by asserting her own perspective. Her first video is
called “How I lost my virginity | God is Grey,” where she shares personal stories and
childhood photos that trace her history and struggles with fundamentalist Christian
practices around purity culture. In this video, she makes the thesis of her channel clear: “I
wanted to share my story to open up a dialogue with other people to find people of like
minds that have had experiences far and worse and hopefully have a very kind, notYouTube-abusive sort of talk about what we believe on this subject as modern-day
Christians living in 2018” (“How I Lost”). Though she identifies her target audience as
“modern-day Christians,” her channel would eventually draw individuals far beyond this
demographic, especially those who were not like-minded. The negativity she tried to
preempt gradually seeped into her comments sections, so she redirected the tone of her
channel early, namely in her eleventh video, “To the lovers & haters | God is Grey.” As
noted in Chapter 4, this video established “constructive and kind critique” as a
community-held value as Davies welcomed both “stone throwers” as well as like-minded,
modern-day Christians (“To the Lovers”). Of the 118 videos I observed on her channel, I
found her maintaining this tone in her comments section as well as in a majority of her
videos, which consist of medium-length talking-head vlogs and long-form interviews
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with individuals across worldviews. Her invitational approach, however, is not as
immediately evident as Q’s. Because Davies uses her YouTube presence as a conduit to
her other creative online work, she is more conscious of YouTube strategy and leverages
attention-grabbing tactics to draw viewers in. Many of her video titles are thoughtprovoking questions or references to controversial topics that might incentivize clicks.
For example, her most-viewed videos include titles like “The Lauren Daigle
Controversy,” “Girl Defined Totally Stabbed Me in the Back,” and “Can Christians
Masturbate?” Once people begin watching, however, they immediately perceive Davies’
characteristic thoughtfulness, charitability to conflicting perspectives, and desire for
understanding.
For example, under her twelfth most popular video, a response to drama involving
the YouTube channel Girl Defined, a user left this comment:

Fig 5.3: User comment left on a video called “Girl Defined Responded… Sort Of. My FINAL Thoughts |
God is Grey.”

This user’s response reveals the incentive for clicking (i.e., a rebuttal) as well as the
motivation for watching and interacting with the video (i.e., “Brenda’s unfathomable
grace”). This dynamic between clicking and watching also speaks to the general tone of
Davies’ content: invitational but not conflict-averse. Davies plays to both the YouTube
algorithm as well as her larger mission of modeling and inviting more productive
dialogues on YouTube. She neither apologizes for her beliefs nor tones them down for

257

easier consumption, but she advocates and interacts in ways that invites users to speak to
rather than at others. As of 2022, she has 140k subscribers, the second highest in this
study.
Khoe also stays mindful of both his YouTube strategy and his messaging, as he is
a full-time YouTuber. His early online persona especially played to more mainstream
YouTube conventions, as he emulated famous editing styles popularized by prominent
vloggers like Casey Neistat, who Khoe credited as a major influence (“I’m deleting”).
During the first few years of growing his channel, Khoe participated in standard vlogging
“challenges” like “Vlogsmas” and “VEDA” (Vlog Every Day in April), where creators
platform-wide would push themselves to upload content more frequently for a bounded
period of time. By 2017, after almost two years of consistent uploads, he was doing
YouTube full time and had over 35k subscribers. Alongside his conscious social media
strategy, he also held tightly to his role as a “digital missionary,” which he recognized as
his primary purpose on YouTube (“Why I Need”). In our personal interview, he
described the initial tone of his channel as “prescriptive by nature,” where his goal was to
teach beliefs to his audience: “The agendas in the past were, ‘I need you to think like I
think. I need you to believe like I believe. I need you to worship like I worship. Like, it
was very black and white in that sense” (Khoe). His most popular content of that era was
his talking head vlogs, which dominated his uploads and spoke more than they listened.
To date, his most-viewed videos come from this time period and have titles like “How To
Study the Bible for Beginners,” “Why Many Christian Girls Remain Single,” and
“Should Christians Kiss Before Marriage?”
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Until two years ago, the overall approach of Khoe’s channel was didactic—not
invitational. A representative video is one from 2018 titled “marijuana… an honest
christian discussion,” where Khoe and a Christian pastor caution viewers against the use
of marijuana, despite having never used marijuana themselves. Khoe described the intent
of this video in our interview: “I wanted a specific yes or no answer [regarding marijuana
use], but I was certainly leading all of our conversations to a point” (Khoe). Commenters
noticed this bias:

Fig. 5.4: User comment left on a video called “marijuana… an honest christian discussion.”

This more one-sided presentation of information, as noted by this commenter,
limited opportunities to understand perspectives in their fullness, which was a realization
that Khoe personally had that prompted him to rebrand his channel. In February 2020, he
shifted from talking head vlogs to long-form interviews with people across worldviews,
where he listened more than he spoke and interjected only to describe the context of his
conversations. Of the 419 videos I observed on his channel, I noted a dramatic tone and
persona change once he started this new production style, along with a flood of new,
more diverse subscribers. In our interview, he described his new approach as having “no
agenda. And I think when you show up in spaces without an agenda, people feel that
differently than when you’re here to serve a purpose. […] It makes the human connection
less real when you have an agenda” (Khoe). The current iteration of his channel is
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branded as “videos for the curious spirit,” leaving his audience and conversation topics
even more open-ended. As of 2022, he has 119k subscribers, the third highest in this
study.
Jimmy Snow and The Rage
Though practicing and infusing tenets of invitational rhetorics on their channels,
just like the three vloggers outlined above, Snow and The Rage are outliers in this study
for two reasons: 1) They represent opposite ends of the “attention” spectrum, with Snow
having the most subscribers in this study (367k) and The Rage having the least (3.1k); 2)
The invitational approach is not the primary lens they use to present information to
audiences. For example, Snow started his channel with the intent to clarify
misconceptions about atheists, titling his first video, “What’s the Point of a Show About
Atheism?” In this piece, he introduces himself as a formerly religious individual and
positions his channel as a means to disseminate information about the harms of religion.
The tone of this video, however, is gregarious and pleasant. He breaks into different
character voices, inserts humor, and speaks with enthusiasm, making his content easy to
digest and entertaining to watch. In my observation of 418 of his videos, I noted this tone
and charisma in every video, along with extremely high production values and a much
more frequent upload schedule than the others—qualities more characteristic of
“mainstream” YouTube vloggers. Snow also made greater efforts to connect with users
via livestreams, merchandise, YouTube community polls, and channel rituals/inside
jokes. For example, his sign-off for a time was, “As always, I’m Jimmy Snow. Mr.
Atheist was not my father,” a reference not to the thesis of his channel but to a joke he
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held with long-time viewers. He also signaled a “rant” video by tying his long hair into a
bun, which many christened as the “rant bun.” Viewers knew he was gearing up for a
“hot take” when they saw this visual cue, which further added to the “Jimmy Snow”
persona online and the fun of participating in his community. As a full-time YouTuber
with a considerable audience, Snow remains vigilant of these more platform-specific
concerns like audience engagement and viewership statistics.
Despite these added pressures, Snow is also concerned with his messaging and the
way he expresses ideas online. Though unapologetic in his beliefs and perspectives,
Snow typically “rants” and deals his critiques of theism in a fair, largely charitable way.
He does not position himself as infallible or always correct; in fact, he has released
unsolicited apology videos after recognizing his mischaracterization or misrepresentation
of an opponent’s argument (Snow, “Girl Defined… I Am Sorry”). He even forms
alliances and has civil conversations with theists, and he encourages his audience to
engage critically in online dialogues but to not spread hate (“Snow, “The Greatest
Stream”). “I don’t want to ever attack the individuals. I’m always going after the
ideology,” he explains in a video called “Don’t Call Me MORMON!!!” (Snow, “Don’t
Call”). Thus, his invitational approach is more an embodied, expressed value than a
communication principle he actively moderates on his channel. In his personal interview,
he stated that he stays out of his comments section because he does “not care about a
stranger’s opinion on me, negative or positive. Now I care that my audience engages, and
I care about their experience, but I really don’t care what they think about me. At all”
(Snow). Thus, his primary focus is engagement and audience retention, which he hopes
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will be productive and thoughtful. He is not holding his breath, however: “Sometimes
people just come to you to shit on you because they’re having a bad day” (Snow,
personal interview).
The Rage, on the other hand, frequently communicates with his commenters but
often through debates. His channel prioritizes expression, namely of anger, which tends
to embolden those who seek to “shit on you.” During the early days of his channel, this
audience and their responses did not deter The Rage but empowered him as he also
sought to present ideas in a more aggressive, adversarial way. As stated in Chapter 4, his
viewers found his unfiltered approach to be raw, grating, but refreshing. Rage, thus,
became the theme of both his channel and YouTube persona, despite the measured and
genuinely kind persona I met in our personal interview. Of the 278 videos I observed on
his channel, a majority were scathing critiques of theism and theists. Every now and then,
however, he would share a more “human” side of his online identity, making vlogs with
his young daughter, apologizing to viewers and YouTube creators when he realized his
critiques went “too far,” and collaborating with individuals like Khoe to prove that he
was not all rage. These more invitational approaches were always exceptions to his rule,
though.
Contextualizing the Samples
Based on my longitudinal observations of these creators’ channels, I sampled 80
videos across the five channels and extracted 76,163 corresponding comments using the
open-source tool YouTube Data Tools. I coded the videos as “Invitational” or “NonInvitational” according to the rhetorical strategies explicitly or implicitly modeled, along
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with my own understanding of the creators’ ethos. I tried to find an equivalent number of
comments for invitational and non-invitational videos on each channel, which required an
unequal number of videos selected in the respective categories since comments were not
equally distributed. Moreover, I tried to select videos from all points of the creator’s
archive to get a comprehensive snapshot of their channel. If I found multiple videos from
the same channel era that emulated similar characteristics, I chose the one with the
highest views and comments. My sampling was also influenced by personal interviews
with the vloggers. I asked them which videos they found most memorable or significant
in terms of audience interaction or invitational approach. Khoe, for instance, identified
the pattern of his early video catalogue as being more instructive and less invitational,
specifically referencing his piece on marijuana as an example. The Rage similarly
identified his “greatest hits” and explained why he thought they became influential in his
community. I included all personally referenced videos in my sample. The table below
shows the distribution of videos and comments across channels.

Jimmy Snow
God is Grey
Justin Khoe
Shannon Q
The Rage

Invitational
9
10
12
9
5

Non-Invitational
6
5
6
7
11

Total Comments
44,179
14,897
8,587
7,054
1,446

Table 5.1 Distribution of videos and comments across channels

The only binary measure of my study was the presence or absence of the invitational
approach. I was interested to see how engagement, pronoun usage, insight words, and
affective processes differed in user comments when videos modeled or did not model
invitational practices. I present these findings in the next section—Results—which Dr.
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Aragón authors. Shorthand for each channel included the following: “Jimmy” (Jimmy
Snow), “God” (Brenda Davies of God is Grey), “Justin” (Justin Khoe), “Shannon”
(Shannon Q), and “Rage” (The Rage). Based on theory presented in this dissertation,
these were my hypotheses:
•

H1: videos demonstrating an invitational approach will elicit more participation
(i.e., word count, replies).

•

H2: videos demonstrating an invitational approach will elicit less instances of
“you” and “I” pronouns (i.e., self-focused and others-obscuring language) in both
original and reply posts, and more instances of plural, group-focused pronouns
like “we.”

•

H3: videos demonstrating an invitational approach will elicit more deliberation
(i.e., insight words) in original and reply posts.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Comments from a total of 80 videos were analyzed. The Jimmy channel (44,179)
had the most posts, followed by God (14,897), Justin (8,587), Shannon (7,054), and Rage
(1,446).
Thirty-four of the videos were coded as having a non-invitational approach and
forty-five were coded as having an invitational approach. Overall, of the comments used
for this analysis, 52.1% (40,467) were original posts and 46.9% (35,696) were replies to
those posts. The God channel had the highest percentage of comments left to videos that
had an invitational approach (53.3%), followed by the Justin (49.5%), Shannon (46.7%),

264

Jimmy (37.9%), and Rage (5.9%) channels, 2 = 2054.67, df = 4, p < .001. The Justin
channel had the most frequent replies (58.3%), followed by the Shannon (49.2%), God
(47.3%), Rage (46.6), and Jimmy (44.1%) channels, 2 = 600.69, df = 4, p < .001. Videos
with invitational approaches had more frequent replies (48.6%) than those with noninvitational (45.5%) approaches, 2 = 69.41, df = 1, p < .001.
Within this dataset, each channel did not differ significantly by the percentage of
videos that were invitational, (2 = 6.26, df = 4, p = .180) i.e., all channels had a
representation of both invitational and non-invitational videos.
Relationships Between Outcome Variables
Table 5.2 illustrates the relationships between the tested variables in zero-order
correlations. Positive numbers indicate that as one factor increases, so does the second
factor. In contrast, negative numbers indicate that as one factor increases, the other factor
decreases. Word count, and indices of engagement, was positively related to presence of
reasoning and insight words, and negatively related to the presence of emotion and
positive emotion words. That is, longer posts had more reasoning and less affective
words than did shorter posts. The use of the pronoun “we” was also related to longer
posts, a higher use of reasoning, and lower use of affect words. The pronoun we” was
negatively related to the pronouns “you” and “I,” that is, the more that people on the
forum used the pronoun “we,” the less those same people used the pronouns “you” and
“I.” Both “you” and “I” were related to reduced word counts, i.e., shorter posts.
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Taken together, it appears that more engaged posts had content that showed the
presence of reasoning, the absence of emotion, a focus on “we,” and less of a focus on
“you” or the self, i.e., “I.”

word count
affect
positive
emo.
negative
emo.
pers. pron.
we
you
I
reasoning
insight

wc
aff.
--0.10 --0.10
-0.02
-0.03
0.06
-0.04
-0.03
0.11
0.07

pos

neg

pers

we

you

I

reas.

insi.

0.84 -0.44
0.01
-0.04
0.11
-0.01
-0.11
-0.09

-0.10
0.02
-0.03
0.14
-0.01
-0.10
-0.08

--0.01 --0.03 0.12 --0.03 0.46 -0.05 --0.01 0.63 -0.09 -0.07 --0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03 --0.04 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.72 --

Table 5.2: Relationships between the tested variables in zero-order correlations
Note: shaded cells indicate no significant relationship; all non-shaded cells indicate statistically significant
relationships.

Word Count Analysis
Invitational Approach Predicting Word Count
Overall, when a channel moderator demonstrated a more invitational approach (M
= 66.25, SE = 1.28), the comments left by viewers contained more words than when a
channel moderator had a non-invitational approach (M = 55.51, SE = 1.23), F(1, 15641) =
36.45, p < .001. See Figure 5.5.
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The mean number of words within posts
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Fig. 5.5: When moderators used invitational approaches in their videos, their viewers appeared to be more
engaged than when those same moderators used non-invitational approaches, as indicated by high word
counts in their posts to the videos. Error bars indicate +/- 1 standard error.

Invitational Approach by Channel Predicting Word Count
These effects differed by channel, F(4, 74997) = 15.06, p < .001, i.e., we saw
these effects for the Shannon, Justin, and God channels, but not for the Jimmy or Rage
channels. See Table 5.3.

Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Non-Invitational
Mean
Std. Error
51.964
1.357
58.520
1.264
41.210
0.503
42.304
2.257
53.892
1.040

Invitational
Mean
Std. Error
67.051
1.451
65.693
1.277
40.782
0.643
42.244
8.976
57.487
0.973

Table 5.3: Invitational approach by channel predicting word count

Original Post – Reply Analysis
Invitational Approach Predicting Replies
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p-value
< .001
< .001
.559
.995
.012

Overall, videos with invitational approaches had more frequent replies (48.6%)
than those with non-invitational (45.5%) approaches, 2 = 69.41, df = 1, p < .001. See
Figure 5.6.
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Fig. 5.6: When moderators used invitational approaches in their videos, their viewers appeared to engage in
discussion more than when those same moderators used non-invitational approaches, as indicated by replies
posted to original comments.

Invitational Approach by Channel Predicting Replies
This pattern differed by channel, interaction between channel, and
invitational/non-invitational approach, 2 = 536.43, df = 4, p < .001. When considering
videos with invitational approaches for the Shannon (60.0%), Justin (55.8%), and God
(53.2%) channels, a majority of the posts were replies to previous comments. In contrast,
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for the Jimmy (42.6%) and Rage (27.9%) channels, the minority of posts were replies.
When considering videos with non-invitational approaches, all channels but Justin
(60.7%) showed a minority of the posts were replies (Shannon, 39.8%, Rage 47.8%,
Jimmy 45%, and God 40.0%).
Personal Pronoun “You” Analysis
Channel Predicting the Use of “You”
There were differences in the usage of the pronoun “you” between the five video
channels in our analysis, F(4, 74997) = 213.35, p < .001. See Figure 5.7.

Percentage of Text containing the pronoun "you"

5
4.5
4
3.5
3

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Shannon

Justin

Jimmy

Rage

God

Fig. 5.7: Use of the “you” pronoun differed across channels. The Rage channel had the most
instances of “you” while the Jimmy channel had the least.

Invitational Approach Predicting the Use of “You” by Channel
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Overall, the usage of the “you” pronoun did not differ between invitational and
non-invitational approaches, F(1, 15641) = 3.21, p = .073. However, the use of the “you”
pronoun did differ when we considered the channel on which the comment had been
made, F(4, 74997) = 3.06, p = .016. For the Justin (Minvitational = 3.526, SE = .079; Mnoninvitational

= 3.846, SE = .079, p = .004) and Jimmy (Minvitational = 2.418, SE = .040; Mnon-

invitational

= 2.660, SE = .031, p < .001) channels, the usage of the “you” pronoun was

higher for non-invitational than invitational approaches. In contrast on the Rage channel,
the usage of the pronoun was significantly higher for the invitational than the noninvitational approach (Minvitational = 4.871, SE = .558; Mnon-invitational = 3.688, SE = .140, p =
.040). There were no differences for the Shannon (p = .626) or God (p = .070) channels in
the usage of the “you” pronoun in comments made by their viewers.
Original or Reply Comment by Channel by Invitational Approach Predicting the Use of
“You”
Overall, the usage of the “you” pronoun did not differ between original and reply
posts, F(1, 15641) = 3.22, p = .073. However, these patterns were different when
considering the factor of invitational/non-invitational approaches, F(4, 74997) = 13.89, p
< .001. Original posts on the Shannon and God channels had higher usage of the pronoun
“you” when their videos had non-invitational approaches than when they had invitational
approaches. When considering reply-posts, the Justin, Jimmy, and God channels had
higher usage of the pronoun “you” when their videos had non-invitational approaches
than when they had invitational approaches. See Table 5.4 and Figure 5.8.
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Original Post
Reply Post

Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God
Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Non-Invitational
Mean
Std. Error
2.664
0.109
3.516
0.125
2.434
0.042
3.874
0.194
4.556
0.083
3.630
0.133
4.059
0.101
2.935
0.046
3.485
0.203
3.159
0.102

Invitational
Mean
Std. Error
2.183
0.142
3.502
0.119
2.371
0.053
4.984
0.656
4.050
0.088
3.728
0.116
3.545
0.106
2.481
0.061
4.579
1.055
3.649
0.083

p-value
0.007
0.937
0.352
0.105
< .001
0.58
< .001
< .001
0.308
< .001

Percentage of "You" Pronoun in Posts

Table 5.4: Original or reply comment by channel by invitational approach predicting the use of “you”

7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
0.000
Shannon

Justin

Jimmy

Non-Invitational Original Post
Invitational Original Post

Rage

God

Non-Invitational Reply Post
Invitational Reply Post

Fig. 5.8: The interaction revealed that use of “you” pronouns differed across channels and between original
and reply posts when videos were invitational or non-invitational.

Personal Pronoun “I” Analysis
Channel Predicting the Use of “I”
There were differences in the usage of the pronoun “I” between the five video
channels in our analysis, F(4, 74997) = 307.61, p < .001. See Figure 5.9.
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Percentage of Text containing the pronoun "I"
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Fig. 5.9: Use of the “I” pronoun differed across channels. The Jimmy channel had the most instances of “I”
while the Shannon channel had the least.

Invitational Approach Predicting the Use of “I” by Channel
Overall, the use of the pronoun “I” was significantly higher when moderators
used non-invitational approaches (M = 3.483, SE = .058) than when they used invitational
approaches (M = 3.089, SE = .060) in their videos, F(1, 15641) = 22.40, p < .001. See
Fig. 5.10. When considering this pattern in each of the channels, we found that the
pattern differed significantly, F(4, 74997) = 9.97, p < .001. Comments left on the
Shannon (Minvitational = 2.891, SE = .108; Mnon-invitational = 3.436, SE = .101, p < .001) and
Justin (Minvitational = 3.247, SE = .095; Mnon-invitational = 3.518, SE = .094, p = .042) channels
had a higher use of the pronoun “I” when the moderators’ approach was non-invitational
than invitational. In contrast, comments posted on the Jimmy channel contained higher
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usage of the “I” pronoun when they were invitational than when they were noninvitational, (Minvitational = 5.523, SE = .048; Mnon-invitational = 5.236, SE = .037, p < .001).
The Rage (p = .058) and God (p = .716) channels did not have differences in the usage of
“I” in comments made to invitational and non-invitational approaches.

4

Percentage of "I" Pronouns in
Non/Invitational Videos

3.5
3

2.5
2

1.5
1

0.5
0

Non-Invitational

Invitational

Fig. 5.10: Compared to non-invitational approaches, the presence of “I” pronouns was less when
moderators used an invitational approach.

Original or Reply Comment by Channel Predicting the Use of “I”
Overall, replies (M = 3.675, SE = .086) had a lower usage of the pronoun “I” than
did original comments (M = 4.438, SE = .080), F(1, 15641) = 88.90, p < .001. This
pattern was different among the five channels, F(4, 74997) = 19.81, p < .001. On all
channels, except for the Rage channel, replies had a lower usage of the pronoun “I” than
did original posts. Comments made to the Rage channel did not differ in their usage of
the pronoun “I” between original and reply posts (p = .921). See Table 5.5 and Figure
5.11.
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Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Original Post
Mean
Std. Error
3.450
0.105
3.607
0.103
5.947
0.040
4.054
0.363
5.132
0.072

Reply Post
Mean
Std. Error
2.891
0.105
3.219
0.087
4.650
0.045
4.022
0.398
3.593
0.077

p-value
< .001
0.004
< .001
0.921
< .001

Table 5.5: Original or Reply Comment by Channel Predicting the Use of “I”

Precentage of "I" Pronouns in Posts

7.000
6.000
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3.000
2.000
1.000
0.000
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Justin

Jimmy

Original Post

Rage

God

Reply Post

Fig. 5.11: The interaction revealed that use of “I” pronoun decreased in reply posts across channels except
for the Rage channel.

The interaction between channel, invitational/non-invitational approach, and
original/reply comment was not significant, F(4, 74997) = 1.07, p < .369.
Personal Pronoun “We” Analysis
Channel Predicting the Use of “We”
There were differences in the usage of the pronoun “we” between the five video
channels in our analysis, F(4, 74997) = 99.17, p < .001. See Figure 5.12.
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Percentage of Text containing the pronoun "we"
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Fig. 5.12: Use of the “we” pronoun differed across channels. The Justin channel had the most instances of
“we” while the Rage channel had the least.

Invitational Approach Predicting the Use of “We” by Channel
Overall, the usage of the “we” pronoun did not differ between invitational and
non-invitational approaches, F(1, 15641) = 2.59, p = .108. Usage also did not differ in the
invitational and non-invitational approach across the five channels, F(4, 74997) = 1.18, p
= .318.

Original or Reply Comment by Channel by Invitational Approach Predicting the Use of
“We”
The use of “we” did differ when it was a reply or original post dependent on the
channel on which the comment was made, F(4, 74997) = 5.24, p < .001. Original
comments (M = .534, SE = .033) posted on the Shannon channel had a higher usage of
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the pronoun “we” than did replies (M = .431, SE = .033), p = .028. In contrast, replies (M
= .460, SE = .014) on the Jimmy channel had a higher usage of the pronoun “we” than
did original posts (M = .382, SE = .013), p < .001. The use of the “we” pronoun in
original and reply-posts did not differ for the Justin (p = .114), Rage (p = .519), or God (p
= .932) channels.

“Insight” Analysis
Channel Predicting Use of “Insight” Words
There were differences in the usage of “insight” words between the five video
channels in our analysis, F(4, 74997) = 62.47, p < .001. See Figure 5.13.

Percentage of Text containing "Reasoning" words
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Fig. 5.13: Use of “insight” words differed across channels. The Shannon channel had the most instances of
“insight” words while the Rage channel had the least.
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Invitational Approach Predicating the Use of Insight Words by Channel
There was a marginal difference for the use of “insight” words between
invitational and non-invitational approaches, F(1, 15641) = 3.17, p = .075. Videos with
invitational approaches tended to have more insight words (M = 3.201, SE = .050) than
videos with non-invitational approaches, (M = 3.078, SE = .048). See Figure 5.14.

Percentage of "Insight" words in
Non/Invitational Videos
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Fig. 5.14: Compared to non-invitational approaches, the presence of “insight” words was slightly greater
when moderators used an invitational approach.

There were significantly different patterns for the use of “insight” words among
the five channels, F(4, 74997) = 3.59, p = .006. When the Shannon, Jimmy, and God
channels used invitational approaches (M = 3.844, SE = .074; M = 2.768, SE = .032; M =
2.894, SE = .048, respectively) there were more insight words in comments posted to
those videos than when they used non-invitational approaches (M = 3.453, SE = .067; M
= 2.665, SE = .025; M = 2.730, SE = .051, respectively, p <.001, p = .011, p = .020).
These effects were not found in comments posted to the Justin (p = .273) and Rage (p =
.875) channels.
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Original or Reply Comments by Invitational Approach Predicting the Use of Insight
Words by Channel
Overall, there were more “insight” words used in replies (M = 3.058, SE = .058)
than in original (M = 2.743, SE = .054) posts, F(1, 15641) = 33.826, p < .001. This effect
was significantly stronger in posts made to videos with invitational approaches (Moriginal =
2.743, SE = .095; Mreply = 3.151, SE = .100, p < .001) than in videos with non-invitational
approaches (Moriginal = 2.743, SE = .042; Mreply = 2.965, SE = .044, p < .001), F(4, 74997)
= 8.89, p = .003.
There was a significant 3-way interaction between channel, invitational and noninvitational approaches, and original/reply post, F(4, 74997) = 3.46, p < .008. See Table

Invitational

Noninvitational

5.6 and Figure 5.15.

Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God
Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Original Post
Mean
Std. Error
3.266
0.086
2.725
0.100
2.652
0.033
2.393
0.154
2.720
0.066
3.500
0.113
2.477
0.095
2.726
0.042
2.722
0.522
2.587
0.070

Reply Post
Mean
Std. Error
3.736
0.106
2.809
0.080
2.680
0.037
2.798
0.161
2.745
0.081
4.074
0.093
2.839
0.084
2.824
0.049
1.978
0.839
3.164
0.066

p-value
< .001
0.509
0.572
0.070
0.814
< .001
0.004
0.126
0.452
< .001

Table 5.6: interaction between channel, invitational and non-invitational approaches, and original/reply
post for insight variable
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Non-Invitational Original Post

Percentage of "Insight" Words in Posts

4.5

Non-Invitational Reply Post

Invitational Original Post

Invitational Reply Post

*
*

4.0

*

3.5

*
3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

1 Shannon

2 Justin

3 Jimmy

4 Rage

5 God

Figure 5.15: The interaction revealed that the pattern of more insight words in replies than in original posts
was consistent for only the Shannon, Justin, and God channels. * Indicates significant comparison.

“Affect” Analysis
Channel Predicting the Use of Affect Words
Channel predicted differences in the usage of affect words, F(4, 74997) = 38.55, p
< .001. See Table 5.7 and Figure 5.16.

Channel
Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Mean
7.652
8.921
7.853
9.827
8.72

Std. Error
0.121
0.109
0.05
0.564
0.087

with 1
*
< .001
0.124
< .001
< .001

Table 5.7: Channel predicting the use of affect words
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Contrasts p values
with 2
with 3
with 4
< .001
0.124
< .001
*
< .001
0.115
< .001
*
< .001
0.115
< .001
*
0.148
< .001
0.052

with 5
< .001
0.148
< .001
0.052
*

Percentage of Text Containing
"Affect" Words
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Fig. 5.16: The presence of “affect” words differed across channels. The Rage channel had the most “affect”
words while the Shannon channel had the least.

Invitational Approach by Channel Predicting Affect
Overall comments to videos with invitational approaches (M = 7.684, SE = .125)
had a lower percentage of “affect” words than did videos with non-invitational
approaches, (M = 9.008, SE = 1.20), F(1, 15641) = 58.56, p < .001. See Figure 5.17.
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Fig. 5.17: Compared to non-invitational approaches, the presence of “affect” words was less when
moderators used an invitational approach.
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This pattern differed by channel as indicated by the significant invitational/noninvitational approach by channel interaction, F(4, 74997) = 12.96, p < .001. For the
Shannon (Minvitational = 7.118, SE = .177; Mnon-invitational = 8.186, SE = .165, p < .001) and
Justin (Minvitational = 8.155, SE = .177; Mnon-invitational = 9.688, SE = .165, p < .001)
channels, invitational approaches were associated with a lower percentage of “affect
words” than non-invitational approaches. Differences between invitational and noninvitational approaches for “affect” words did not differ for the Jimmy (p = .491), Rage
(p = .130), and God (p = .642) channels.
“Positive Emotions” Analysis
Channel predicted differences in the usage of positive emotion words, F(4,
74997) = 121.64, p < .001. See Table 5.8 and Figure 5.18.
Contrasts p values
Channel
Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Mean
4.693
6.718
4.801
6.14
6.14

Std.
Error
0.108
0.098
0.044
0.504
0.078

with 1
*
< .001
0.353
0.005
< .001

with 2
< .001
*
< .001
0.261
< .001

Table 5.8: Channel predicting the use of positive emotion words
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with 3
0.353
< .001
*
0.008
< .001

with 4
0.005
0.261
0.008
*
0.999

with 5
< .001
< .001
< .001
0.999
*

Percentage of Text Containing "Positive
Emotion" Words
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Fig. 5.18: The presence of “positive emotion” words differed across channels. The Justin channel had the
most “positive emotion” words while the Shannon channel had the least.

Invitational Approach by Channel Predicting Positive Emotion
Overall comments to videos with invitational approaches (M = 5.433, SE = .116)
had a lower percentage of “positive emotion” words than did videos with non-invitational
approaches, (M = 6.183, SE = 1.12), F(1, 15641) = 21.55, p < .001. See Figure 5.19.

Percentage of "Positive Emotion"
words in Non/Invitational Videos
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Fig. 5.19: Compared to non-invitational approaches, the presence of “positive emotion” words was less
when moderators used an invitational approach.
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This pattern differed by channel as indicated by the significant invitational/noninvitational approach by channel interaction, F(4, 74997) = 8.48, p < .001. For the
Shannon (Minvitational = 4.193, SE = .158; Mnon-invitational = 5.192, SE = .148, p < .001) and
Justin (Minvitational = 6.445, SE = .139; Mnon-invitational = 6.991, SE = .138, p = .005)
channels, invitational approaches were associated with lower percentage of “positive
emotion” words in viewers comments. In contrast, on the Rage channel (M = 7.635, SE =
.978), invitational approaches were associated with a greater percentage of positive
emotion words than non-invitational approaches (M = 4.645, SE = .2468), p = .003.
Differences between invitational and non-invitational approaches in the percentage of
“positive emotion” words did not differ for the Jimmy (p = .644) and God (p = .143)
channels.
“Negative Emotions” Analysis
Channel Predicting the Use of Negative Emotion Words
Channel predicted differences in the usage of negative emotion words, F(4,
74997) = 53.14, p < .001. See Table 5.9 and Figure 5.20.
Contrasts p values
Channel
Shannon
Justin
Jimmy
Rage
God

Mean
2.888
2.15
2.966
3.626
2.519

Std.
Error
0.064
0.058
0.026
0.297
0.046

with 1
*
< .001
0.261
0.015
< .001

with 2
< .001
*
< .001
< .001
< .001

Table 5.9: Channel predicting the use of negative emotion words
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with 3
0.261
< .001
*
0.027
< .001

with 4
0.015
< .001
0.027
*
< .001

with 5
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
*

Percentage of Text Containing "Negative
Emotion" Words
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Fig. 5.20: The presence of “negative emotion” words differed across channels. The Rage channel had the
most “negative emotion” words while the Justin channel had the least.

Invitational Approach by Channel Predicting Negative Emotion
Overall comments to videos with invitational approaches (M = 2.190, SE = .057)
had a lower percentage of “negative emotion” words than did videos with noninvitational approaches, (M = 2.763, SE = .055), F(1, 15641) = 51.99, p < .001. See
Figure 5.21.
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Emotion" words in
Non/Invitational Videos
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Fig. 5.21: Compared to non-invitational approaches, the presence of “negative emotion” words was less
when moderators used an invitational approach.
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This pattern differed by channel as indicated by the significant invitational/noninvitational approach by channel interaction, F(4, 74997) = 17.23, p < .001. The Justin
(Minvitational = 1.650, SE = .082; Mnon-invitational = 2.651, SE = .081, p = .005) and the Rage
(Minvitational = 2.979, SE = .577; Mnon-invitational = 4.273, SE = .145, p = .030) channels had a
lower percentage of “negative emotion” words in the invitational than in the noninvitational videos. Differences of “negative emotion” words between invitational and
non-invitational approaches did not differ for the Shannon (p = .688), Jimmy (p = .076),
and God (p = .163) channels.
Discussion
Our results provide insights into four characteristics of online responses to
invitational and non-invitational YouTube content: level of engagement (participation),
pronoun usage (perspective-taking), cognitive processes (deliberation), and affect.
Our findings indicate that the first hypothesis—videos demonstrating an
invitational approach will elicit more participation (i.e., word count, replies)—is partially
supported. Comments from invitational videos generally contained more words and
replies to original posts, our metrics of engagement and discussion, though this pattern
was only the case on the Shannon Q, Justin Khoe, and God is Grey (Brenda Davies)
channels. Considering that these three creators model and encourage difficult
conversations, lightly moderate discussions in the comments section, and build empathy
into their YouTube persona and channel more explicitly than the other two channels, I
suggest that positive correlations between the invitational approach and participation are
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most likely when moderators intentionally and overtly incorporate invitational practices
into their YouTube ethos and interactions. This demonstrates the potential of an
invitational approach being a catalyst, not a deterrent, to participation.
Results also indicate that the second hypothesis—videos demonstrating an
invitational approach will elicit less instances of “you” and “I” pronouns (i.e., selffocused and others-obscuring language) in both original and reply posts, and more
instances of plural, group-focused pronouns like “we”—was also partially supported and
largely dependent upon the channel. Overall, in videos modeling the invitational
approach, instances of “you” and “I” pronouns were fewer compared to non-invitational
videos. When users engaged in discussion (i.e., replies to original posts) on noninvitational videos, instances of “you” tended to go up, which was the case for the Justin,
Jimmy, and God channels. Based on literature around “you” pronoun usage and empathy
(see “measures” section), this pattern might also indicate less perspective-taking.
Increased usage of the “I” pronoun yielded a similar outcome for non-invitational videos,
but only for the Shannon and Justin channels. Uses of the “we” pronoun were not
interactive with the non/invitational approach, though the Justin channel ranked highest
in “we” pronoun usage. Taken together, these trends indicate that non-invitational
approaches tend to elicit more self-focus, which could be indicative of less empathic
attitudes toward others. Although we cannot assume that less self-focus leads to more
others-focused language, the Justin channel shows that this outcome is potentially
possible. Considering that his channel follows a chronological, non-invitational to
invitational narrative arc, distinctions between the two approaches are much more evident
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in both my sampling and to his users. For example, all but one video coded as “noninvitational” came from his early, more prescriptive era. The invitational videos are
nearly all characteristic of his channel rebranding around critical listening. Thus, his
channel’s commenting patterns in terms of pronoun usage could display (non)invitational
effects more distinctly than the others, demonstrating the possible effects of perspectivetaking for invitational approaches—less self-focus and more others-focus.
Findings also show that the third hypothesis—videos demonstrating an
invitational approach will elicit more deliberation (i.e., insight words) in original and
reply posts—was also partially supported and interactive by channel. Overall, invitational
approaches comparatively and marginally produced more insight words. This was a
consistent pattern for the Shannon, Jimmy, and God channels. When analyzing how users
were using these words in the space of a discussion (i.e., replies to original posts)
according to approach, we found “insight” words intensifying in replies on invitational
videos for the Shannon, Justin, and God channels. Again, considering the similarities
shared between these three creators, I posit that a more direct invitational approach can
catalyze greater insight in user discussions. Also, considering that the invitational
approach for these three channels also correlates with more participation, we might
provisionally conclude that participation and deliberation are not always inversely
related, especially when moderators use and model more empathic strategies in their
communication.
Finally, to assess the overall emotional tone of each channel as it relates to
invitational approaches, we examined LIWC’s affect category and its subcategories,
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positive and negative emotion. Interestingly, there was less affect (positive and negative)
in comments made on invitational videos. When assessing the ratio of affect words in
invitational videos, the Rage and Justin channels followed a similar pattern: more
positive emotion and less negative emotion in invitational videos. Despite these nuances
and considering the general portrait of invitational videos—more engagement, less selffocused language, more deliberation—this relationship to affect somewhat complicates
the characterization of perspective-taking, deliberation, and empathy described earlier in
this chapter: that emotionality is a core part of the invitational approach. I offer two
theoretical reasons for why this might not be the case in our dataset:
First, lower affect scores for invitational videos do not imply that emotion is
absent from online discourse or that only less emotional demonstrations of the
invitational approach can elicit more “desired” or “productive” discursive negotiations in
user conversations. A cursory glance of any YouTube comments section or its
scholarship will immediately disabuse us of the assumption that comments are devoid of
emotion, especially negative emotion. Rather, this relationship between affect and the
invitational approach could demonstrate the relationship between pathos-driven, electrate
performances (i.e., vloggers’ videos) and the literacy-based responses they produce (i.e.,
user comments). As noted in Chapter 2, apparati are not islands unto themselves but mix
and remix the modes and social practices they catalyze to various, unpredictable effects.
Here, in the relationship between affect and the invitational approach, perhaps we see
electracy—what Gregory Ulmer calls the apparatus of the body (Konsult 89)—kicking
open the door to dialogue, and literacy—the apparatus of the mind (Konsult 89)—
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engaging the cognitive processes required for perspective-taking and rhetorical listening.
This relationship is not an either-or but is paralogical and symbiotic between the electrate
and literate, an understanding that the cognitive processes the electrate and literate modes
afford could work toward civil, thought-filled discourse when its modes co-mingle in a
holey medium influenced by invitational rhetorics. Perhaps the medium facilitates the
exchange of smooth and striated information produced through these modes, keeping
both affect (that stimulates participation) and negotiation (that stimulates deliberation) at
play.
Second, lower affect scores might point to less instances of emotion contagion,
which I described earlier as the spread of similar emotion triggered by a locally or
globally perceived response (Chen and Xu). In their examination of commenting
behaviors on YouTube, Thelwall and Sud largely found that “negative comments tended
to be disliked and positive comments tended to be liked” (Thelwall and Sud 5). Though
these tendencies could result in the spread of emotion-based behaviors like empathic
concern (e.g., collectively feeling sad when viewing a video of someone in pain), they
can also default to bandwagon fallacies where users choose the path of least resistance in
their participation (e.g., accept what is broadly acceptable; dislike what is broadly
unacceptable). By operating beyond this emotion-based frame, perhaps we are able to
exit these group tendencies on social media that, as Robert Kozinets explained, are often
attention-seeking and vapid. Coupled with the finding that invitational approaches tend to
correlate with more replies and insight words than non-invitational approaches, the
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YouTube discussions examined in this study seem to involve negotiations of meaning
rather than replications of the same idea or emotion.
Though exploratory, these findings, especially when contextualized according to
YouTube channel, speak to the potential of the invitational approach to support both
deliberative and participatory behaviors and processes.
Limitations
Of course, these findings are not illustrative of all YouTube conversations or even
each vloggers’ channels, despite my best efforts to acquire representative samples. Our
results would benefit from replications of this study using similar measures but a more
widespread sample of user comments as well as YouTube creators. Another limitation of
this study is in my sampling methods and the inability to determine user motivation for
viewing or commenting on videos. Because I (Shauna) was the sole researcher watching
videos and conducting in-depth interviews, I made my video selections based on criteria I
developed through personal, qualitative observations and collaborations with video
creators, not through methods validated through intercoder reliability. Moreover,
complete context for why and how viewers comment was unavailable. As noted in
Chapter 4, YouTube users are often motivated by human and technical actants.
Consumers are typically drawn to content that reinforces held beliefs, and algorithms
work to feed viewers with related or similar content to increase watch time on the
platform. In light of these tendencies, there was no way to control how a user selected a
video or related to its content. Thus, self-selection bias may be present in the dataset, as
some commenters may have already been drawn to a certain channel because of its tone

290

or personality. Through longitudinal study of and comparisons between five unique
channels, however, I attempted to offer a more comprehensive picture of the different
audiences and tendencies viewers might have to sampled content, which could alleviate
but not completely erase this limitation.
Conclusion: Application to the Classroom
In this open ocean of data and online discourse, we seem to have journeyed far
from the writing classroom. These excavations, however, have not taken us far from
writing practices. The composing we have examined both in this chapter and throughout
this project has been a perpetual negotiation, whether between religious and secular
interlocutors (Chapter 1), oral/literate/electrate apparati (Chapter 2), human and technical
actants (Chapter 3), the YouTube ecosystem (Chapter 4), and/or invitational and
adversarial communication frameworks (Chapter 5). In each case, our goal has not been
to find an all-encompassing negotiation strategy to resolve the unsolvable problem of
sacred-secular conflict but has been, instead, to locate opportunities to inflect the oftstriated space of offline and online dialogue—to use the tension between the two to find
ways to stay adrift and ungrounded. I have argued that this work begins in recognizing
our entwinement with others, our contingency as writers, the rhetoricity inherent in every
encounter with the Stranger. Though easily obscured in the confines of the literacy
apparatus, this condition becomes the default mode online as connection (electronic or
interpersonal) is often a prerequisite for participation in digital discourse of any kind.
This condition, however, does not guarantee holeyness or a hospitable response, as
proven by the intensified, global, YouTube version of the local conflict narrative
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witnessed in the public university composition classroom. More often than not,
participation breeds filter bubbles, bigotry, and unchecked biases. Fortunately, there are
other configurations for these conflict-ridden relationships. Statistical analysis71 of user
comments in this study signal that in worldview-themed conversations on YouTube, an
invitational approach can be a destabilizing mechanism—a means to nudge netizens out
of their conflict-based comfort zones and toward perspective-taking and deliberation.
Again, this outcome is not a guarantee but always a possibility. Despite nefarious
technical actants and the ephemeral nature of digital utterances, how we assemble and
deliver meaning is in our human hands. This affordance and responsibility, especially on
Youtube, provides immense exigency and opportunity for composition pedagogy.
Coupling YouTube with pedagogical aims or positioning the platform as a
teaching tool for the writing classroom is, of course, not a unique suggestion. Many have
found social media as attractive sites for study and classroom application since, as Ann
Amicucci and Kathleen Blake Yancey put it, writing in these environments is often “selfsponsored” and “no one is forcing this public to write” (Amicucci 2). Some, like Michelle
Barbeau, have seen such self-motivated writing as a sign of where students are actually
writing, heralding a chance to connect with and engage students where they are already
composing (3). Others, like the instructors in Stephanie Vie’s study of social media use in
the writing classroom, embrace these platforms as both tool and content, a way to employ

My use of empirical data in this study resonates with Pamela Takayoshi’s take on incorporating these
methods into composition research: “Rather than seeing data as a pure representation of some truth,
ethically motivated and theoretically informed researchers understand data as a building block toward
knowledge—a partial representation of some aspect of an experience that is suggestive of the ways some
people experience some things in the world” (561). The intent of my LIWC2015 data was to understand
how some writers experience online dialogue when exposed to or influenced by invitational rhetorics.
71

292

students in the use and analysis of twenty-first-century literacies. Sarah Hentges even
makes a case for social media being “an excellent resource for social justice and
activism” when students recognize how its affordances can be leveraged to expose others
to little-known perspectives that challenge presuppositions and encourage more inclusive
viewpoints (234). In these instances, social media seem to function as an appendage: a
place we go to meet students and their self-sponsored writing, a mechanism to develop
online competencies, a way to disseminate a targeted message with greater visibility and
impact. In addition to its role as a supplement and support to writerly outcomes, what if
these media—their logics, publics, technical components—took on a more immersive,
paralogical role? How might our social media pedagogy look when we recognize that our
unique, human abilities to inflect online discourse exist alongside the entire video page?
Amicucci insists that writing instructors “craft a writing education that continually
explores the networks in which students operate as writers […] and the complications
that students’ networked writing introduces into the educational opportunities we create”
(18-19). Here, her suggestion speaks to a more reciprocal relationship between a writing
pedagogy and networked practices as she argues that the latter is not just a discourse for
study or a place to meet students but is an influence on the way we imagine ways to
teach. In this dissertation, I framed these networked publics as appararati, that is, “an
interactive matrix of technology, institutional practices, and ideological subject
formation” (Ulmer, Heuretics 17). Noting in tandem the modal, epistemological, and
ontological dimensions of twenty-first-century rhetorical situations demonstrates that our
ways of knowing, doing, and making are necessarily interconnected and far beyond the
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simple addition, use, or analysis of an electronic technology. As stressed in Chapter 2, the
technology (or the accoutrements of writing) is beside the point. The changes they
introduce in our social and cultural practices is where the reciprocal nature of composing
comes into play and we begin to view our writing situations more comprehensively.
Pamela Takayoshi goes so far as to say that the relationship between “individual and
culture” in networked spaces “make uniquely visible this negotiation that has been and is
always part of writing” (570, emphasis in original). Put simply, negotiating and
networking are inherent to acts of writing. This begs the question, does our pedagogy—
our learning outcomes, prompts, educational opportunities—reflect and/or support this
insight?
In Chapter 3, I explained that in our effort to reflect this inherent negotiation and
interconnectedness in composition pedagogy, we make composition holey—that is, we
complicate the parameters of writing practices that privilege static, linear, argumentbased models of communication. Chapter 2 offered examples of the troubling
consequences that result when we do not attempt this work, and Chapter 4 emphasized
that even when we do make these attempts, holeyness is never a guarantee. There is a
certain ambivalence in the way we disrupt linear composition and assemble meaning in
networked publics. In Chapters 3-5, I suggested that one way to “unground”
composition—what Cynthia Haynes calls “writing offshore”—is not to negate argument
altogether but is to invite it to participate more deliberatively. Informed by Sonja Foss
and Cindy Griffin’s invitational rhetoric, Lisa Blankenship’s rhetorical empathy, and Jeff
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Ringer’s vernacularly religious creativity, this invitational approach works within the
foxholes of conflict and inflects rhetoric toward the following:
•

The target (i.e., not the conclusion) of rhetoric, what we often conflate with
persuasion, aims at understanding without pronouncing judgments.

•

The function of rhetoric, what we often conflate with argumentation, is to
facilitate listening, wherein listeners hear not to prepare for response but to create
an opening for deeper understanding of an other.

•

The practice of rhetoric, what is often put in service to critique, happens in the
sharing and legitimation of personal stories and diverse perspectives; in
identifying motives behind people’s assertions; and in reflecting on our own
motives and impact.

•

The strategy of rhetoric, what often materializes in systematized arguments,
occurs in the creative stretching and translating of belief, not to compromise its
meaning but to seek connections with those who have different frames of
reference.

Again, the suggested inflections I offer through the invitational approach are not
prescriptions. Rather, they are efforts to work against—i.e., alongside—meaning of all
kinds. The unique contribution of my research demonstrates that when this invitational
approach fuses with the participatory affordances of social media, more openings seem to
emerge for holey negotiations.
When situated on YouTube in particular, these affordances involve not just
rhetorical “tactics” that the writer can manipulate but also platform-specific factors that
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can contribute to greater openness in the rhetorical situation and networked publics writ
large. For example, YouTube reminds us that audience is not just a group to address but
is one that actively shapes the rhetor and the way flows of information get distributed.
When conceived of in this way, the audience-rhetor relationship is not speaker-listener
but listener-listener, not message-disseminated to message-received but a feedback loop
of message exchange. Brian Jackson and Jon Wallin call these serial exchanges
YouTube’s “back-and-forthness,” which models a more dynamic way of negotiating
perspectives. In addition to reconceptualizing audience, YouTube also reconceives
invention, style, and delivery. Through our five vloggers’ insights, we witnessed an
embodied, vernacular mode of delivery, all characteristics of an electrate apparatus that
reasons not just with mind but also with the body—the punctum, the obtuse meanings, the
felt that calls us into awareness of our entwinement with people, places, things. This
expanded palate of inventive modes does not stem from a standard convention but is
unique to each participant. Even when operating within a specific YouTube genre like
vlogging, stylistic expression is always specific to the individual and their channel. Thus,
as Ulmer posits in “One Video Theory,” online writers “are breaking out of the confines
of literate selfhood to write with identity” (159, emphasis in original). Such vernacularity
can open doors to alternate ways of delivering information beyond arguments. Our
vloggers showed us that these alternatives might look like the sharing of stories and
sustained, repeated, empathic, and unscripted interactions with others. LIWC2015
findings provisionally demonstrated that what proliferates from these performances can
be an increase in both participation and deliberation and a decrease in self-focus.
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Our vloggers and their channel interactions also illustrated that with increased
interactivity and vernacularity comes more opportunities for difference and tension. The
very components that are YouTube’s greatest affordances can also be its biggest
limitations to dialogue, especially when interaction and vernacular expression are bound
up with an intent to defend a belief system. As seen in our brief vignette of YouTube
back-and-forths on Shannon Q’s channel in Chapter 3, visceral forms of reasoning and
expression, especially in the comments section, can lead to flaming and highly
unproductive conversations; however, even YouTube’s limitation can be its advantage,
especially for pedagogical purposes. Heightened awareness of conflict, as Harry Weger
Jr. and Mark Aakhus assert, “exposes interlocutors to alternative viewpoints, more
expansive argument pools, and emergent publics” (qtd. in Jackson and Wallin 385-386).
In fact, it was only through YouTube’s default mode of conflict for religious-secular
exchanges that our vloggers pursued alternative ways of communing. Put another way,
the invitational approach is neither possible nor necessary without an adversarial
approach. Thus, “conflict = bad; invitational approach = good” is too simplistic a
distinction. Instead, we might position the tension that ensues from our entwinement with
others as a perpetual call to shapeshift, resee, remix—to never stay static for too long.
This project coded “Christianity” both empirically and rhetorically to see what
“shapeshifting” could look like and to recognize that even the “holy,” our proxy for the
most static and unbending of ideologies, can indeed participate and deliberate in holey
ways. Christian discourse functioned as both source material and analogy to explore the
possibilities of operating beyond adversarial models of communication. While I have
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explored this dynamic through the lens of religious discourse, these approaches are
amenable to negotiations beyond sacred-secular friction. We might begin this extension
by asking a series of simple questions regarding our own writing pedagogy: how might
we emulate the back-and-forth negotiations of YouTube interactions in our in-class
activities, our assignments, and our assessment? When we teach the “building blocks” of
essay writing, how might we frame standard features like thesis statements when we have
the invitational approach in mind? What might the purpose of evidence be in body
paragraphs and the sources of research when the conclusion of writing is a beginning, or
an invitation to critically listen? What might we do, not just as teachers and students in a
classroom but as global citizens, when we reimagine the logics of our communication
strategies as a negotiation seeking understanding rather than a persuasive monologue
masquerading as an objective argument? How might we speak and listen not just with the
institution of school but of the internet, the electrate, the Stranger? Dear reader, perhaps
answers to these questions are our windows of opportunity—our glimmers of hope, albeit
small and necessarily inconclusive. If vloggers on one of the most contentious social
media platforms are finding ways to inflect sacred-secular discourse alongside its
characteristic vitriol, perhaps this holey, deliberative frame—within or without the
classroom, within or without religion—is not so far beyond our reach.
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Appendix A
Application for IRB Approval

IRB Expedited/Full Board Review Application
Office use only

Protocol Number:

Approved: ☐
Expedited: category
☐ Full
Board Review

Approval
date:

Completion date:

1. Principal Investigator (PI): The PI must be a Clemson faculty or staff, per the PI
assignment policy. Graduate students may not be the PI if they are conducting the research
for their thesis or dissertation. The PI must have valid human research protections training.
Name: Cynthia Haynes
E-mail: texcyn@clemson.edu
Department: English

Phone: (864) 656-6411

Campus address: 711 Strode Tower
☒ Faculty ☐ Staff ☐ Other:

CITI expiration date:

2.
Enter Project Title: Coding Christianity: Negotiating Religious Dialogue in Online
Participatory Spaces
3.
Research Personnel: Will other individuals assist with recruiting, obtaining informed
consent, data collection or data analysis? ☐ No ☒ Yes If YES, complete and attach the
Additional Research Team Members Form.
4.
Study Purpose: Describe the purpose and goals of the research using plain language
(avoid technical terms, acronyms or jargon, unless explained).
Description: This project investigates the ways religiously committed and non-religiously
affiliated individuals use digital tools (e.g., video, audio, social media) to express their beliefs
to a broad public (e.g., general YouTube viewers). The purpose of this study is to determine
how these individuals leverage digital tools to communicate their beliefs in ways that
promote empathy, civility, and understanding between themselves and people who do not
share their worldview. Ultimately, the goal of this project is to analyze these online
communication strategies and apply them to the offline college writing classroom—sites
where students actively grapple with their identities, personal convictions, and challenging
academic concepts.
5.
Benefits and Sharing of Results: Describe the potential benefit(s) to the participants
and/or society that may be reasonably expected as a result from this study.
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Description: In an increasingly polarized society, speaking across difference and engaging in
productive dialogue are necessary communicative acts to combat acts of physical and
psychological violence (e.g. mass shootings, hate speech, cyberbullying, toxic classroom
environments). This study seeks to understand how university students and civic-minded
individuals can partner with digital technologies to negotiate religious differences of opinion
and, as a result, promote understanding and civility between traditionally opposed people
groups and ideologies.
Describe how research results will be shared (e.g., academic publication, evaluation report to
funder, conference presentation)?
Description: Research results will be shared in a PhD dissertation, an academic publication,
and a conference presentation.
6.
2021

Research Timeline: Anticipated start date: July 2020 Anticipated completion date: April

7.
d.

Funding: Is the research funded (internal or external)? ☒ No ☐ Yes If YES, answer 7a-

a.

Enter funding source (Do not use acronyms):

b.

Enter name of PI on award:

c.
Was the award processed through InfoEd? ☐ No ☐ Yes, enter ten-digit InfoEd proposal
number (PPN):
d.
Did the IRB office issue a developmental (temporary) approval for this research? ☐
No ☐ Yes, enter the IRB protocol number:
8.
Research Sites: Will research activities occur at a non-Clemson site or outside of the
United States? ☒ No ☐ Yes If YES, enter site location(s):
Non-Clemson site(s): Site permission may be required. Contact appropriate
office/department and include site/support letter in IRB packet. If collecting data at another
institution that has an IRB, you may need permission from each participating institution’s
IRB office. See Guidance on the Submission of Research Site/Permission Letters for more
information.
9.
Expedited Review Categories: Select one or more of the categories below that appear
to be applicable to your research.

☐1. Clinical studies of drugs and medical devices only when condition (a) or (b) is met:
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a.
Research on drugs for which an investigational new drug application is not
required. (Note: Research on marketed drugs that significantly increase the risks or
decrease the acceptability of the risks associated with the use of the product is not eligible
for expedited review.)
b.
Research on medical devices for which 1) an investigational device exemption
application is not required or 2) the medical device is cleared or approved for marketing
and the medical device is being used in accordance with its cleared/approved labeling.
☐2. Collection of blood samples by finger stick, heel stick, ear stick, or venipuncture as
follows:
a.
From healthy, non-pregnant adults, who weigh at least 110 pounds. For these
subjects, the amounts drawn may not exceed 550 ml. in an eight week period and
collection may not occur more than two times per week; OR
b. From other adults and children, considering the age, weight, and health of the subjects,
the collection procedure, the amount of blood to be collected, and the frequency with
which it will be collected. For these subjects, the amount may not exceed the lesser of
50 ml. or 3 ml. per kg. in an eight-week period, and collection may not occur more
than two times per week.
☐3. Prospective collection of biological specimens for research purposes by non-invasive
means.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

i.
j.

Examples:
hair and nail clippings in a non-disfiguring manner;
deciduous teeth at time of exfoliation or if routine patient care indicates need for
extraction;
permanent teeth if routine patient care indicates need for extraction;
excreta and external secretions (including sweat);
uncannulated saliva collected either in an unstimulated fashion or stimulated by
chewing gum base or wax or by applying a dilute citric solution to the tongue;
placenta removed at delivery;
amniotic fluid obtained at the time of rupture of the membrane prior to or during labor;
supra- and subgingival dental plaque and calculus, provided the collection procedure is
not more invasive than routine scaling of the teeth and the process is accomplished in
accordance with accepted prophylactic techniques;
mucosal and skin cells collected by buccal scraping or swab, skin swab, or mouth
washings;
sputum collected after saline mist nebulization.

☐4. Collection of data through non-invasive procedures (not involving general anesthesia or
sedation) routinely employed in clinical practice, excluding procedures involving x-rays or
microwaves. Where medical devices are employed, they must be cleared/approved for
marketing. (Studies intended to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the medical device
are not generally eligible for expedited review, including studies of cleared medical
devices for new indications.)
Examples:
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a.
physical sensors that are applied either to the surface of the body or at a distance
and do not involve input of significant amounts of energy into the subject or an invasion of
the subject’s privacy;
b. weighing or testing sensory acuity;
c. magnetic resonance imaging;
d. electrocardiography, electroencephalography, thermography, detection of naturally
occurring radioactivity, electroretinography, ultrasound, diagnostic infrared imaging,
Doppler blood flow and echocardiography,
e. moderate exercise, muscular strength testing, body composition assessment, and
flexibility testing when appropriate given the age, weight, and health of the individual.
5. Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been
☐
collected or will be collected solely for non-research purposes (such as medical treatment
or diagnoses).
6. Collection of data from voice, video, digital, or image recordings made for research
☒
purposes.
7. Research on individual or group characteristics, behavior (including, but not limited to,
☐
research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural
beliefs or practices, and social behavior), or research employing survey, interview, oral
history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance
methodologies.
10.
Study Population
a.

Enter projected number of participants that will be enrolled in the study: 7 adults

b.

Identify the group(s) specifically targeted for the study (check all that apply).

☐
Clemson students
☒ Adults not affiliated with
Clemson

☐ Clemson faculty/staff
☐
Minors, including wards of the state, or any other
agency, institution, or entity (complete and attach Child
Research Addendum)
☐ Individuals with intellectual disabilities

☐ Non-English speaking
individuals
☐ Individuals with impaired
☐ Individuals economically or educationally disadvantaged
decision-making capacity
☐ DoD personnel
☐ Pregnant women
☐ Prisoners (complete and
☐ Human Fetuses and/or Neonates
attach Prisoner Addendum)
☒
Other-describe: YouTube Vloggers (i.e. individuals who document their lives and/or
share ideas via a video-sharing website)
Recruitment Procedure
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a.
Describe how potential participants will be identified and contacted: Unless opting to use
an alias, online participants will be identified by their YouTube channel and affiliated social
media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram). They will be recruited through a convenience sample
and contacted primarily through email or, if email is not available, through social media
messaging outlets (e.g. Facebook messenger, Instagram direct message, Twitter direct message).
Upon giving consent to participate in the study, they will be offered the option to choose an alias
for their online personas or remain known by their online persona.
b. Are there any inclusion or exclusion criteria for participation? ☐ No ☒ Yes If YES,
describe criteria and screening process to determine eligibility (provide copy of screening
tool) and briefly explain why the inclusion or exclusion criteria is necessary for your
research: Because this project directly implicates online communication between
religious and non-religiously affiliated individuals, participants must meet the following
criteria: 1) They must be active on social media, posting content at least once a month. 2)
Their social media platform must deliver content to an audience of at least 1,000 users.
This figure is the minimum number of subscribers a YouTuber must accrue in order to
qualify as a YouTube Partner (i.e. be elligible to receive a small commission and
recognition from the platform). 3) Their content must involve matters of religion or
invoke religious topics/peoples. 4) Participants must have at least one media artifact (i.e.
a video, photo, tweet, comment) that demonstrates speaking across difference in noncombative ways. The metrics used to determine this form of communication will be taken
from Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin's definition of "invitational rhetoric," which they
characterize as "an invitation to understanding as a means to create a realtionship rooted
in equality, immanent value, and self-determination."
c. Check all recruitment methods below AND attach copy of recruitment documents for
review. See Guidance for Recruitment Materials for more information on what is
required on the documents. Participants may not be contacted prior to IRB review.
☐

Flyers/Advertisements

☐ In-person-describe:

☒ E-mail notice

☐
Internet-describe: Private social media messaging
applications (e.g. Facebook Messenger, Instagram Direct
Message, Twitter Direct Message)
☐ Letter mailed to individuals

☐ Dept. subject pooldescribe:
☐
Other-describe:
12.
Participant Incentives
a.
Will participants receive any incentive or compensation for participating in the study? ☐
No ☒ Yes
If YES, answer 12b-c.
b. Are there any conditions for receiving incentives (i.e., have to complete all research
activities, answer attention check questions correctly)? ☐ No ☒ Yes If YES, describe
conditions: Online participants (i.e. YouTube vloggers) will receive a "thank you" gift for
participating in the study.
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c.
Check all that apply and provide requested information for each incentive checked (all
incentives must be listed on informed consent document).
☐ Course/extra credit for students (an equivalent alternative to research participation must be
provided and described on informed consent document): Indicate number of credits that will
be offered and if partial credits will be offered:
☒ Gift(s) - describe gift(s) [include value and when gift(s) will be given]: Online participants
will receive a gift valued at around $30, which will be given at the conclusion of the study.
☐ Monetary incentive(s): Indicate value of incentive, when incentive will be given and if partial
payment will be offered:
13.
Informed Consent from Adult Participants:
If ALL of your participants will be minors, skip question 13 and complete the Child
Research Addendum (under Expedited or Full Board review tab). If you will have minors
AND adults as participants in your study, complete this section for the adult participants
AND the Child Research Addendum.
a.
Do you plan to obtain informed consent from ALL of your adult research participants
and/or legally authorized representatives for adult participants with diminished capacity? ☐
No ☐ Yes
If YES, skip to question to question 13b. If NO, answer questions 13(a)(1-2) to
request a waiver of informed consent.
1. For what groups are you requesting a waiver of informed consent?
☐ for all participants ☐ for some participants (describe for which participants):
2.
The IRB may waive the requirements to obtain informed consent if the following criteria
are met. Explain how your study meets the criteria below:
Criteria for Waiver of Consent

How is this
criterion met
within this
study?

The research involves no more than minimal risk to subjects.
The research could not practicably be carried out without the requested
waiver.
The waiver will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects.
Whenever appropriate, the subjects or legally authorized representatives
will be provided with additional pertinent information after participation.
If the research involves using identifiable private information or identifiable
biospecimens, the research could not practicably be carried out without
using such information or biospecimens in an identifiable format. (Enter
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N/A if you are NOT recording identifiable data or collecting identifiable
biospecimens.)
If you are requesting a waiver of consent for ALL adult participants, then skip to
question 14.
If you are requesting a waiver of consent for SOME adult participants, then complete
questions 13b-d.

b. Will you collect participants’ signatures on all consent documents? ☐ No ☒ Yes
If YES, skip to question 13c. If NO, answer questions 13(b)(1-2) to request a waiver
of signed consent.
1. For what groups are you requesting a waiver of signed consent?
☐ for all participants ☐ for some participants (describe for which participants):
2.
The IRB may waive the requirement for the PI to obtain a signed consent if one of the
following criteria is met. Check one box below:
☐ That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no
procedure for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context.
☐ That the only record linking the subject and the research would be the consent document
and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of confidentiality. If
the subject wants documentation linking the subject with the research, the subject’s wishes
will govern.
☐ If the subjects or legally authorized representatives are members of a distinct cultural group
or community in which signing forms is not the norm, that the research presents no more
than minimal risk of harm to subjects and provided there is an appropriate alternative
mechanism for documenting that informed consent was obtained.
c. Will you use concealment or deception in this study? ☒ No ☐ Yes
If YES, see guidance regarding Research Involving Deception or Concealment, submit
a copy of the Additional Pertinent Information/Permission for Use of Data Collected
in a Research Study form (under Expedited or Full Board review tab) you will use,
and request a waiver of some elements of consent under question 13d.
d. Do you plan to use all of the consent elements in your document(s) or procedures? ☐
No ☒ Yes
If YES, skip to question 14. If NO, answer questions 13(d)(1-3) to request a waiver of some
elements of consent.
1. For what groups are you requesting a waiver of some consent elements?
☐ for all participants ☐ for some participants (describe for which participants):
2.
A list of consent elements is given below. Indicate which of these elements you WILL
NOT include in your consent document(s) or procedures. In the case of a study involving
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deception or concealment, check all of the elements that ARE NOT truthfully presented during
the informed consent process.
List of Elements of Informed Consent
☐ statement that the study involves research ☐ expected duration of participation
☐ statement that participation is voluntary,
☐ description of any reasonably foreseeable
refusal to participate or discontinue of
risks or discomforts
participation will involve no penalty or
loss of benefits
☐

disclosure of appropriate alternative
procedures or courses of treatment, if any,
that might be advantageous to the subject

☐

description of any benefits to the participant
or to others that may reasonably be expected
from the research

☐

explanation of the purposes of the
research

☐

statement describing the extent, if any, to
which confidentiality of records identifying
the subject will be maintained

☐

description of the procedures to be
followed

☐

☐

identification of any procedures that are
experimental

☐

contact for answers to pertinent questions
about the research and research subjects'
rights
for more than minimal risk research,
compensation/treatment available in case of
injury

3.
The IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include some or all of the
elements of informed consent if the following criteria are met. Please explain how your study
meets the criteria below:
Criteria for Waiver of Elements of Consent

The research involves no more than minimal risk to subjects.
The research could not practicably be carried out without the requested
alteration.
The alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the
subjects.
Whenever appropriate, the subjects or legally authorized representatives
will be provided with additional pertinent information after participation.
If the research involves using identifiable private information or identifiable
biospecimens, the research could not practicably be carried out without
using such information or biospecimens in an identifiable format. (Enter
N/A if you are NOT recording identifiable data or collecting identifiable
biospecimens.)

14.

Research Methods and Procedures
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How is this
criterion met
within this
study?

a.
What data will you collect or devices/equipment will be used in the research? Check all
that may apply AND attach copy of data collection instruments/tools (i.e., surveys, interview
questions), photos of devices/equipment (i.e., eye tracker, activity trackers) and screenshots of
mobile apps or computer programs.
☐ Surveys/Questionnaires
☐ Focus group
☐ Student educational records (FERPA may
apply)
☐ Digital data (i.e., computer, cell phone, other
equipment/devices)-describe:
☐ Blood, urine or saliva-describe:
☐ Investigational medical device-describe:

☒ Individual interview
☐ Observation
☐ Protected Health Information (HIPAA
may apply)
☐ X-ray, DEXA scan, or other device
using ionizing radiation-describe:
☐ Drug, substances or biologicsdescribe:
☐ Other-describe:

b. Will you audio/video record or photograph participants? ☐ No ☒ Yes
If YES, check all that may apply: ☒ Audio ☒ Video ☐ Photographs
If YES, will you use audio, video, or photographs in presentations, publications, and/or
training materials? ☐ No ☒ Yes - a media release form is required
See Guidance on the Use of Audio/Video Recording and Photographs for more
information on what is required on the informed consent document.
c. Describe the informed consent process, include who will obtain consent from all
participants, when, and how this will be done. If participants are not competent to consent
for themselves, then describe procedures for obtaining consent from legally authorized
representative. Attach all informed consent document(s).
Description: The moment of IRB approval, the graduate student researcher (Shauna
Chung) will first reach out to select YouTube vloggers, who meet the above criteria,
through email or social media to gauge interest for their participation in the study. They
will have approximately two weeks to respond. If they respond positively, Chung will
supply participants with the consent and media release forms, which detail the purpose
and goals for the study, a thorough justification for why participants were selected, and a
request for consent. Chung will then request a written response (in the form of an email
reply) that offers consent and also indicates whether or not participants will use an alias
throughout the study.
d. Describe, in detail, your data collection methods and procedures. Describe how data will
be collected, what information will be collected from participants and what sessions will
be audio/video recorded and/or photographed. Provide a timeline or schedule of events, if
applicable.
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Description: Chung will first formulate and distribute interview questions to participants, giving
respondents at least one week to prepare their answers. These questions will address how
participants navigate and negotiate their online identities in relation to their personal worldviews
and their online audiences. The questions will also address participants' video production
strategies, their relationship to various social media outlets (e.g. Youtube, Instagram, Facebook,
Twitter), and their perceived personal and professional change/growth over time as a result of
engaging in online platforms and with fellow online users. The initial interview would be an hour
and would be conducted via video-conferencing software (e.g. Skype, Google Hangouts, Zoom,
WebEx). Up to three 15 to 30-minute follow-up interviews would take place over the course of
the next six months. Ideally, candidates would be approached in early July 2020, and interviews
would begin in late July, concluding in January 2021.
e. What is the total time (hours, minutes, days) that each participant will spend in the entire
study, include follow-up sessions?
Description: 3 hours
f.

Describe all potential risks (before protective measures are put into place). Risks may
include possible loss of confidentiality, physical, psychological, social, legal or other
risks connected with the proposed procedures.
Description: Discussing topics invoking religion can be tied to painful or uncomfortable
personal histories. Though the nature of interview questions will not be invasive, some
may unintentionally implicate personal matters or firsthand experiences involving
religion. Recalling these instances could cause participants psychological or emotional
discomfort. Additionally, since participants will be selected based on their extensive
social media following, they may have online identities and personas that they may wish
to protect. By participating in this study, they could face a loss of confidentiality, which
could compromise their persona and credibility with audiences.

g. Describe the procedures to protect against or minimize potential risks.
Description: To account for potential psychological or emotional risks, researchers will
supply participants with interview questions ahead of time, offering at least one week to
prepare responses. Researchers will also assure participants that the interview will follow
the trajectory of the supplied questions and will skip any topics that participants feel
uncomfortable addressing. Additionally, to account for a possible loss of confidentiality,
researchers will offer an option for participants to adopt an alias. If participants allow
their interview to be recorded and used in publication materials but wish to remain as
anonymous as possible, researchers will only use the audio from the interview and will
distort the participant's voice so that it is less reocognizable.
15.

Data Management Plan:

a.
Will you collect biospecimens and/or information that could identity the participants
directly or through identifiers linked to the participants (i.e., names, ID numbers, audio/video
recordings and photographs, demographic data) during the study? ☐ No ☒ Yes
If NO, go to question 16.
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If YES, answer 15b-d.
b. Describe your management plan for storing and securing the biospecimens and/or
identifiable data, protecting the privacy of participants and maintaining confidentiality of
biospecimens/data.
Description: Recorded interview data will be saved in a secure, password-protected
external hard drive throughout the duration of the study. Participants will sign a media
release form to indicate that they consent to having their interview recorded, stored, and
used in an academic publication. Data will be erased after three years.
How long will you retain biospecimens and/or identifiable data (i.e., names, audio/video
recordings, photographs, digitized data, codes or links to identifiers)?
Description: I will retain the identifiable data for three years after the conclusion of the
study.
d. Will you share biospecimens and/or identifiable data with other institutions, agencies, or
companies?
☒ No ☐ Yes
Describe management plan on informed consent document(s) and notify participants if
biospecimens/data will be shared with other institutions, agencies, companies and/or
used to support future studies.
16.

Conflict of Interest Statement/Financial Disclosure:
Could the results of the study provide an actual or potential financial gain to you, a member
of your family, or any of the co-investigators, or give the appearance of a potential conflict of
interest (COI)? Refer to Conflict of Interest policy for more information.
☒

No.

☐ Yes; indicate the status of your COI and/or financial disclosure:
☐ On file with COI office ☐ Will be submitted to COI office
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Appendix B
Exempt Determination Letter
Dear Dr. Haynes,
The Clemson University Office of Research Compliance reviewed the protocol titled “Coding
Christianity: Negotiating Religious Dialogue in Online Participatory Spaces” and
determined on August 5, 2020 that the proposed activities involving human participants
qualify as Exempt under category 2 in accordance with federal regulations 45 CFR
46.104(d).
This IRB protocol was reviewed during modified university operations. The determination
does not grant permission to utilize university facilities, and researchers are required to
follow safety protocols for facilities not affiliated with Clemson. All in-person data collection
must be approved by the Office of Research Compliance. COVID-19 research resources
available at https://www.clemson.edu/coronavirus/research/index.html.
No further action or IRB oversight of the protocol is required except in the following
situations:
1. Substantial changes made to the research methods that could potentially change the
review level or category. If you plan to make changes to your project, please send an
email to IRB@clemson.edu outlining the nature of the changes prior to
implementation of those changes. The IRB office will determine whether or not your
proposed changes require additional review.
2. Occurrence of unanticipated problem or adverse event; any unanticipated problems
involving risk to subjects, complications, and/or adverse events must be reported to
the Office of Research Compliance immediately. Additional information available
at https://www.clemson.edu/research/compliance/irb/forms.html.
3. Change in Principal Investigator (PI); changes to co-investigators do not have to be
reported to the IRB office.
All research involving human participants must maintain an ethically appropriate standard,
which serves to protect the rights and welfare of the participants. This involves obtaining
informed consent and maintaining confidentiality of data. Research related records should be
retained for a minimum of three (3) years after completion of the study.
The Clemson University IRB is committed to facilitating ethical research and protecting the
rights of human subjects. Please contact us if you have any questions and use the IRB
number and title when referencing the study in future correspondence.
All the best,
Nalinee
Nalinee Patin, CIP
IRB Administrator
OFFICE OF RESEARCH COMPLIANCE

Clemson University, Division of Research
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Appendix C
Exempt Adult Consent

Information about Being in a Research Study
Clemson University
Coding Christianity: Negotiating Religious Dialogue in Online Participatory
Spaces
KEY INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH STUDY
Voluntary Consent: Dr. Cynthia Haynes is inviting you to volunteer for a research
study. Dr. Haynes is Director of the Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design
program at Clemson University, conducting the study with PhD candidate Shauna Chung.
Alternative to Participation: Participation is voluntary and the only alternative is to not
participate. You will not be punished in any way if you decide not to be in the study or to
stop taking part in the study.
Study Purpose: The purpose of this research is to study online communication between
Christian- and atheist-identifying individuals on YouTube in an effort to examine users’
conscious or non-conscious strategies for speaking across ideological differences with
empathy, understanding, and/or nuance. By studying these exchanges, the researchers
hope to map online strategies onto the offline writing classroom to better address and
guide students who bring challenging ideas to academic environments.
In an increasingly polarized society, speaking across difference and engaging in
productive dialogue are necessary communicative acts to combat acts of physical and
psychological violence. This study seeks to understand how university students and civicminded individuals can partner with digital technologies to negotiate religious and
secular differences of opinion and, as a result, promote understanding and civility
between traditionally opposed people groups and ideologies.
Activities and Procedures: Your part in the study will be to answer questions the
researchers supply in the format of a live interview. Interviews will be conducted by
video conferencing software (e.g. Skype, Google Hangouts, Zoom, WebEx).
Alternatively, if you are unable or prefer not to engage in this way, interviews via email
will be a second option.
Shauna Chung will first contact you via email to gauge interest. If you agree to take part
in the study, Chung will request written consent via email, give you the option of
selecting an alias, and establish a convenient time for the initial interview to take place.
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At least one week before the interview, Chung will supply you with a list of interview
questions to ensure preparation and efficiency on the part of both researcher and
participant during the interview.
Participation Time: It will take you about three hours to be in this study, which will be
dispersed over a few months. The initial interview will be an hour, and up to three, 15 to
30-minute follow-up emails will take place in the following months.
Risks and Discomforts: Though the researchers do not foresee any risks to you in this
study, we do acknowledge that discussing topics invoking religion can be tied to painful
or uncomfortable personal histories. Though the nature of interview questions will not be
needlessly invasive, some may unintentionally implicate personal matters or firsthand
experiences involving religion. Please know that the researchers will not push you to
answer any questions that you feel uncomfortable discussing. By supplying questions
ahead of time and creating a clear roadmap for the interview, we hope to reduce the risk
of psychological and/or emotional harm.
Additionally, we understand that you have well-established social media identities and
platforms that you may not want exposed to academic procedures and audiences. Know
that the purpose of this study is not to damage or critique your social media presence but
is to celebrate and examine strategies you use that could be beneficial to the writing
classroom. Also know that all study results will be shared with you before they are
published, and permission will always be requested before sharing your information in
any venue.
Possible Benefits: The knowledge you contribute will be applied directly to the college
writing classroom, where students continue to grapple with their religious/secular
identities in relation to academic concepts with varying degrees of openness. A
substantial body of scholarship in the field of Rhetoric and Religion finds that there are
writing strategies students can harness to address and interact with perspectives that differ
from their own—approaches that do not ask students to abandon their belief system or
guard it dogmatically but to use the tension between secular and sacred ideas to work
toward understanding and empathy for the “other.”
While scholars have examined how these strategies work in offline contexts, few have
explored how approaches involving electronic technologies (e.g., video, photography,
sound design) could offer a new perspective. Online environments promote a form of
inquiry, creativity, dynamism, and fierce participation that offline settings do not afford.
Your interview responses will help shape this new perspective and offer necessary
insights to continue improving and evolving the college writing classroom.
EXCLUSION/INCLUSION REQUIREMENTS
Because this project directly implicates online communication between religious and
non-religiously affiliated individuals, participants must meet the following criteria:
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1) They must be active on social media, posting content at least once a month
2) Their social media platform must deliver content to an audience of at least 1,000
subscribers.
3) Their content must involve matters of religion or invoke religious topics/peoples.
4) Participants must have at least one media artifact (e.g., a video, photo, tweet,
comment) that demonstrates speaking across difference in non-combative ways.
You have been selected because you meet the above criteria.
INCENTIVES
Compliments of the researchers, you will receive a “thank you” gift for participating,
which will be administered at the conclusion of the study and be valued around $30.
AUDIO/VIDEO RECORDING AND PHOTOGRAPHS
With your consent, the interview will be recorded and transcribed so that the researchers
can reference and analyze your responses to the interview questions. Because some
results of this study will be presented/published in video form, the researchers may
feature the recording in a video created for an academic audience and purpose.
Alternatively, if you choose an alias, just the audio of the interview will be used, which
will be distorted to further mask your identity. Please see the attached media release to
grant permission for the recorded interview to be used in these ways.
EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES THAT WILL BE USED IN RESEARCH STUDY
Video conferencing software will be used, which could include Skype, Google Hangouts,
Zoom, or WebEx.
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
The results of this study may be published in academic journals, professional
publications, or educational presentations.
The interview will take place in a private location on the part of the interviewer. In other
words, no other individuals will be present during the interview from the researcher’s
end. After conducting and recording the interview, the researcher will store the recording
in a secure, password-protected external hard drive throughout the duration of the study.
Though the identity of interviewees will be known by the interviewer, the following
options to keep information confidential will be made available: 1) use an alias and/or 2)
default to an audio-only or text-based, summary-only approach when presenting
interview data to a broader academic audience. If participants are comfortable with their
identities being known, all identifying information will be retained in the recordings and
interview transcript. Throughout the duration of the study, only the researchers (Dr.
Haynes and Shauna Chung) will have access to the data collected.
Once the study concludes, data will be retained for three years before being completely
erased.
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CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please
contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-0636
or irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the
ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297-3071. The Clemson IRB will not be able to answer
some study-specific questions. However, you may contact the Clemson IRB if the
research staff cannot be reached or if you wish to speak with someone other than the
research staff.
If you have any study related questions or if any problems arise, please contact Shauna
Chung at Clemson University at shaunac@g.clemson.edu.
CONSENT
By participating in the study, you indicate that you have read the information written above, been allowed
to ask any questions, and you are voluntarily choosing to take part in this research.

315

Appendix D
Interview Protocol
Video Interview Script
INTRODUCTION
Hello, my name is ______ and I’m a ______ at Clemson University. Thank you
so much for agreeing to participate in this study on online Christian-Atheist dialogue. I
appreciate you making time for an interview.
>Perfunctory greetings, etc.
If you are ready, let me give you some additional information on this study.
>Receive affirmation.
This study is part of a dissertation project on negotiating religious dialogue in
online participatory spaces. The primary research question guiding this study is, “How
can college writing students—individuals who hold specific worldviews dear—leverage
digital tools to communicate across difference with more empathy?” Our increasingly
polarized society begs an answer to this question, especially as violence and hatred of the
other seem to motivate many of our online interactions these days. The goal of this
project is to observe and analyze more productive and dialogue-inducing exchanges
online between people with diverse worldviews in an effort to apply these
communication strategies to the offline writing classroom.
Today’s interview will be approximately one hour, and all information gathered
will be stored in a secure, password-protected external hard drive and analyzed only by
the researchers, Dr. Cynthia Haynes and Shauna Chung. I would like to record our video
conference to ensure accuracy in my reporting and analysis of our conversation. Know
that when these results are published, you will have the option to remain anonymous and
adopt an alias. If you grant permission for me to use your answers as is, I will run all data
and analysis by you before it gets published or presented to an academic audience. I’ll
erase all data three years after the conclusion of this study. Do you have any questions
about this information?
>Answer questions
Do I have your permission to start recording?
>Receive affirmation; start recording
Thank you. Are you ready to begin?
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>Receive affirmation
We will now start the interview.
INTERVIEW
Your beginnings
• First, who are you, and what motivated you to start a YouTube channel?
• When did you start your channel, and how would you describe its
evolution over time? (i.e. its purpose, structure, community)
• Are you a full-time Youtuber?
o If so, how long has this been the case?
o If not, what other professions/activities supplement your online
work?
Your persona & worldview
• Do you have distinct online and offline personas?
o If so, how would you describe each persona?
o If so, have they influenced each other? In other words, what do you
carry from one realm into the other? How have they influenced
each other over time?
o If not, how would you describe your persona? (i.e. the one viewers
see)
• How do you characterize your worldview, and who/what are your major
influences?
• Does your worldview impact the content you create?
o If so, how?
o If so, to what extent does your offline community (e.g. institutional
or peer) influence your online content and vice versa?
o If not, what sources shape your content?
Your content & production
• What kind of content populates your channel? Are there patterns or
themes?
• How do you choose topics to discuss?
• How do you typically present your information (e.g., vlog, rant, short film,
interview, videoed podcast), and what determines this form of delivery?
• What equipment do you use to film and edit your content, and how has
your recording/editing setup changed over time?
• What’s a day in the life of your production schedule?
Your community interactions
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•

Who was/is your target audience, and what were/are the general
demographics of your viewers?
• How do you interact with your subscribers, and how has your relationship
with them changed over time?
• Have you had any memorable interactions with commenters/fellow
YouTubers?
o If so, what were those like?
o If so, how often do you engage in this way or collaborate with
others?
o If so, did your interactions impact your production strategies or
content in any way?
• How do you deal with criticism or “hate” comments?
• Have you been able to reach across the aisle and address people with
differing worldviews?
o If so, how does this occur for you? In other words, what conditions
need to exist or what actions must you take in order for productive,
non-combative exchanges to occur?
CONCLUSION
That concludes our interview. We are no longer recording audio. Do you have any
questions?
>Answer questions
I’ll be in touch to schedule a short, follow-up interview with you in the coming
months. Does that work for you?
>Receive affirmation
Thank you so much for your time! Have a wonderful day.
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Appendix E
CITI Certification

Figure E-1: CITI Training certificates for 2020-2024.
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